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Hygiene And Daily Life In Republican China, 1911—1945
Abstract
This dissertation reveals how acceptable, clean, responsible behaviours were defined through
overlapping, transnational networks of both medical professionals and laypeople, and how the
proliferation of these developments featured in the everyday lives of Chinese in the early twentieth
century. Responding to previous studies of public health in Republican China on the central government’s
institutions, the project instead explores aspects of daily life and public opinion from grassroots actors,
highlighting myriad nuanced lived experiences and the inherent value that ordinary Chinese placed on
health and social responsibility. Chinese society in the early twentieth century was cosmopolitan in its
outlook and influenced by internationally-circulating ideas of health, wellness, and innovative progress;
even small, rural communities exercised local autonomy to institute hygiene education campaigns,
leading to innovative collaborations between international organizations and local leaders.
The first chapter is an extended case study of the province of Shanxi between 1918 and 1928, and an
intervention into previous scholarship which assumes that effective public health was impossible before
the establishment of national infrastructure in 1928. Beginning with plague control in early 1918, Shanxi
leveraged global-local partnerships into opportunities for the development of localized public health
campaigns. Hygiene initiatives gained popularity precisely because reformists carefully addressed local
concerns, and because the public recognized the tangible benefits to their daily lives. The themes
apparent in the first chapter are then explored at length. Each following chapter focuses on a specific
communal space in which new expectations of hygienic behaviour were formed. The chapters are
focused on the “School”, “Kitchen”, “Home”, and “Public Streets”. At each site, the maturation of hygiene
teaching and practice was driven by, and indeed made possible by, individuals at the local level, even
when they mirrored national developments.
Together, the chapters are a comprehensive exploration of idiosyncratic hygiene improvement
developments and their participants, elevating lived experience and local agency along the way. Moreover,
the dissertation asserts China’s establishment as an important, proven participant in the global
organizations for the advancement of public health.
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ABSTRACT
HYGIENE AND DAILY LIFE IN REPUBLICAN CHINA, 1911—1945
Sarah Xia Yu
Arthur Waldron
This dissertation reveals how acceptable, clean, responsible behaviours were defined
through overlapping, transnational networks of both medical professionals and laypeople,
and how the proliferation of these developments featured in the everyday lives of Chinese
in the early twentieth century. Responding to previous studies of public health in
Republican China on the central government’s institutions, the project instead explores
aspects of daily life and public opinion from grassroots actors, highlighting myriad nuanced
lived experiences and the inherent value that ordinary Chinese placed on health and social
responsibility. Chinese society in the early twentieth century was cosmopolitan in its
outlook and influenced by internationally-circulating ideas of health, wellness, and
innovative progress; even small, rural communities exercised local autonomy to institute
hygiene education campaigns, leading to innovative collaborations between international
organizations and local leaders.
The first chapter is an extended case study of the province of Shanxi between 1918 and
1928, and an intervention into previous scholarship which assumes that effective public
health was impossible before the establishment of national infrastructure in 1928.
Beginning with plague control in early 1918, Shanxi leveraged global-local partnerships into
opportunities for the development of localized public health campaigns. Hygiene initiatives
gained popularity precisely because reformists carefully addressed local concerns, and
because the public recognized the tangible benefits to their daily lives. The themes apparent
in the first chapter are then explored at length. Each following chapter focuses on a specific
communal space in which new expectations of hygienic behaviour were formed. The
chapters are focused on the “School”, “Kitchen”, “Home”, and “Public Streets”. At each site,
the maturation of hygiene teaching and practice was driven by, and indeed made possible
by, individuals at the local level, even when they mirrored national developments.
Together, the chapters are a comprehensive exploration of idiosyncratic hygiene
improvement developments and their participants, elevating lived experience and local
agency along the way. Moreover, the dissertation asserts China’s establishment as an
important, proven participant in the global organizations for the advancement of public
health.
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INTRODUCTION
“In nature, beings need ways to protect themselves from enemies”, wrote Shen Qichun, a
Shanghai-based author, in 1928. Shen lamented that there were many young people in the
prime of their lives who were unable to protect themselves against diseases that lead to
early death. The reason for these tragedies, Shen wrote, was that people did not pay
attention to hygiene (weisheng). Shen’s book Weisheng ABC (the ABCs of hygiene) then
carefully delineated a person’s ideal hygienic environment and habits at home, at schools,
public places, factories, and other sites where “hygienic behaviours” (xingwei weisheng)
were required for individual and communal health.1

The layout of this textbook is representative of similar texts during the era. The
demarcation of specific communal spaces in which Chinese people were expected to refine
their behaviours pervaded through hygiene guides, many of which are discussed as
examples in this dissertation. Individuals labelled themselves with a variety of new roles
and identities – students, housewives, middle-class workers, fashion-oriented youth – from
which they derived social responsibilities to contribute towards national progress, towards
modernity. Within this process, hygiene improvement, according to Shen and his
contemporaries, was the key. In 1929, the Kuomintang Party’s (Nationalist Party,
Guomindang) guidance committee in Fujian province published a pamphlet that declared,
“our country’s people have never paid much attention to hygiene… and we dismiss [the
inevitability of] life and death using mysticism and superstition”. To prevent the Chinese
population from declining, authorities and the people needed to take concrete steps to
promote hygiene, “the livelihood and survival of a society”, by making clear the

1

Shen Qichun, Weisheng xue ABC [the ABCs of hygiene] (Shanghai: Shijie shuju, 1928), Chapter 2.
1

responsibilities of each individual in his or her daily life. The pamphlet goes on to discuss
hygiene with regards to clothing, living space, eating and drinking, and on public streets.2
The in-depth guidance on all such quotidian details extended far beyond laypeople’s
interactions with the growing community of medical professionals in China at the time, such
as visiting clinics for regular check-ups or getting vaccinated.

In fact, for China and its reformists, hygiene included far more than its narrow “association
with science” with which we view the term today. As Ruth Rogaski writes, the early
twentieth-century definition of weisheng rather more broadly encompassed the entire
lifestyle of modern, progressive individuals concerned for their health, the health of others,
and the health of the country.3 It was, as the French hygienists in Bruno Latour’s The
Pasteurization of France described, an “accumulation”: “advice, precautions, recipes,
opinions, statistics, remedies…” in attempts to launch “all-round combat” on diseases.4
While compatible with contemporary scientific developments and discoveries, the suite of
“hygienic modernity drew on “traditional” Chinese concepts to ‘yangsheng’” (nourish life)
that made the hygiene initiatives simultaneously more palatable for Chinese audiences and
representative of Chinese innovation.5

Zhongguo guomindang Fujian sheng dangwu zhidao weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu [propaganda
department of the Kuomintang Party’s guidance committee in Fujian province], “Weisheng yundong
xuanchuan gangyao [outline for hygiene movement promotion]”, July 1929. Kuomintang Party
Archives [henceforth “KMT”]/436/61.
3 Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2004), 18.
4 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1988), 19–20.
5 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, 18.
2
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Despite myriad reports that China was a “land of insanitation”, systematic and collaborative
education and reform seemed to be lively, innovative, and promising.6 This dissertation
investigates how hygiene, a popularising life science globally, was introduced and practiced
in everyday life during China’s Republican period until the end of the Sino-Japanese War
(1911—1945). Contrary to the consensus in the scholarship of Chinese public health that
the Kuomintang central administration, established in Nanjing in 1927, was the first to
institute public health with well-received authority, the case studies in this dissertation
indicate that other (and earlier) reform-forward, health-oriented initiatives that aimed to
improve daily life actually thrived. This project is thus a social history that examines a
variety of programs targeting hygiene improvement, reform of specific behaviours, and
basic medical knowledge, and how they were received by grassroots communities around
the country.7 These initiatives were not merely direct transfers of methods and ideas from
the West, nor were they used to control a passive population. The development and
improvement of public health is conceptualised as a dynamic public-private-international
partnership, while previous studies have generally taken a top-down approach, which has
often been negligent of the subject matter “health” and dismissive of the agency of the

“Boring from Within”, Health Magazine (Shanghai, 1924), 85.
Ka-Che Yip highlights lofty goals undermined by ineffective funding. Sean Lei’s examines the
creation of the Ministry of Health in 1928, which merged Chinese and Western medical traditions to
create a new canon. More recently, Liping Bu suggests that Chinese students of modern medicine
before the Nanjing government were more interested in revolution than public health reform. Ka-Che
Yip, “Health and Nationalist Reconstruction: Rural Health in Nationalist China, 1928-1937”, Modern
Asian Studies 26, no. 2 (1992): 395–415. Sean Hsiang-Lin Lei, Neither Donkey nor Horse: Medicine and
the Struggle over China’s Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). Liping Bu, Public
Health and the Modernization of China, 1865—2015 (New York: Routledge, 2017).
3
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“public”. 8 I instead highlight the opinions, actions, and participation of the layman, often
missing from government-heavy secondary literature.9

Persistent and effective changes often began outside of dominant central administration, in
dynamic negotiation with the public. During this period, bookended by the Manchurian
epidemic of pneumonic plague (1910—1911) and the collapse of the Qing regime at the
beginning, and the Chinese victory in the Sino-Japanese War at the end, appropriate
hygienic behaviours and habits expected of Chinese citizens in respective communal spaces
were defined and refined. China’s political decentralisation allowed localised, targeted
campaigns to proliferate, and the rise of commercial printing presses made it easier not
only for reformists to publish textbooks, pamphlets, posters, and newspaper columns for
educational purposes, but also for Chinese residents to voice their approval or dissent of
recent developments. What did systematic hygiene inspections at schools and factories look
like? How did municipalities get their residents involved in sanitation and disease
prevention? What could – and what did – an individual do if feeling unwell, and whom could
he or she consult? How did the devastation of total war affect or change hygiene reform
progress? While previous scholars suggest that Chinese leaders only mimicked public

Mary Brown Bullock, An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical
College (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Commendably, Angela Leung, Charlotte
Furth, and Iris Borowy explore the deep ambivalence in the political and intellectual relationship
between Chinese and Western medicine, exacerbated by local contingencies. However, other
monographs still assume that ideas with which to build and reform Chinese public health required a
technological transfer from the West and subsequent diffusion of ideas within China. Charlotte Furth
and Angela Ki Che Leung (eds.), Health and Hygiene in Chinese East Asia (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2011). Iris Borowy, ed., Uneasy Encounters: The Politics of Medicine and Health in China, 19001937 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009). 27.
9 An effective methodological example is Nancy Tomes’ Gospel of Germs, which demonstrates how
laymen commentators adopted and assimilated medical germ theory to prescribe domestic sanitary
behaviour in early twentieth-century United States. Nancy Tomes, The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women,
and the Microbe in American Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
4
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health infrastructure-building as a political and diplomatic tool, and that health concerns
were eclipsed by nationalistic ones, I consider the pursuit of public health as an intrinsic
and pure ends, and sincerely desired by the public.10 Receptions of initiatives and ideas
were shaped by contingencies of unique situations such as local customs and tangible health
concerns and conditions, rather than by ideology.

The lived experiences of a variety of Chinese residents, engaged in changing and practising
hygienic habits in their daily lives, are central to this project. My dissertation reveals how
acceptable, clean, responsible behaviours were defined through overlapping, transnational
networks of both medical professionals and laypeople, and how the proliferation of these
developments featured in the everyday lives of Chinese in the early twentieth century.

Sources and protagonists
The bulk of research for this dissertation was completed in the United States, China, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong during the 2019—2020 academic year. Specifically, archival sources for this
project were gathered from the Rockefeller Archive Center, Yale, Columbia, and Harvard
Universities, the Presbyterian Mission Archive, the Church of the Brethren Archive, the
University of Hong Kong and the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the American
Philosophical Society, Carleton and Oberlin Colleges, the Second Historical Archives of the
People’s Republic of China, the Shanxi Provincial Archive and Libraries, Academia Historica
(Guo Shi Guan) in Taipei and Xindian, the Kuomintang Party Archives, and the National

Ka-Che Yip, “Health and Nationalist Reconstruction: Rural Health in Nationalist China, 1928-1937”,
Modern Asian Studies 26, no. 2 (1992): 395–415; Bu, Public Health and the Modernization of China,
1865–2015.
5
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Central Library in Taiwan. Personal papers and correspondence of medical professionals
have been enlightening sources to view the routine and quotidian medical work they were
engaged in, and how they shared their ideas and concerns about China’s progress. An
ongoing collection of oral histories from individuals who were children in the 1930s and
1940s adds nuanced empirical evidence.

Among these sources are writings by the many hygiene and public health reformists – the
protagonists – I cite in this dissertation. Some were members of missionary organisations or
affiliated with Christian organisations, such as those working under the umbrella of the
Unitarian American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the Presbyterian Mission
Agency, and the China Inland Mission. Percy T. Watson and Lorenzo Seymour Morgan were
Unitarian and Presbyterian medical missionaries from Shanxi and Hankow, respectively,
but both responded to calls from the provincial and national governments of China to
contribute to the 1918 plague epidemic emergency. The Council on Health Education,
established in the early 1910s by William Wesley Peter, was affiliated with the Young Men’s
Christian Association and also received financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation.
Peter and his colleagues – Frederick Wampler of Shanxi, among other missionaries and
Chinese converts such as Dr. Y.L. Mei – focused their efforts on public education. They
travelled around the countryside giving lectures, published the bilingual Health magazine,
and collaborated with Fuzhou and Shanghai governments on “cholera parades” to reach out
to the wider population (1920 and 1931).

Much of my source material comes from the Rockefeller Archive Center. The Rockefeller
Foundation, already a global philanthropic organisation, established the China Medical
6

Board in 1914 to oversee the operations of the Peking Union Medical College (established in
1917) and its hospital. Over the next few decades, the Rockefeller Foundation and its
affiliates branched out within China beyond just this elite medical college. Several of the
China Medical Board’s staff, such as John B. Grant, the head of the public health program at
the College and Anna McCabe, head of public health nursing, sought out opportunities to
invest in the overall health improvement of China. Among these initiatives were the Peking
Health Station (1925), the Kao-Chiao Health Demonstration Area (1929), the Mass
Education Movement (1934), the North China Council for Rural Reconstruction (1935), and
other partnerships with the national, provincial, and municipal governments around the
country.

Republican China is notorious among historians as being fragmented politically. Various
iterations of “Chinese government” can be found in this dissertation, including the national
governments based in Beijing and Nanjing, Chinese-led provincial and municipal
governments in Shanxi and Beijing, and foreign-run concessions such as the Shanghai
International Settlement. Each maintained its own public health administrations with
different structures and priorities, even after the establishment of the central Ministry of
Health in 1927 in Nanjing. At the national level, the North Manchurian Plague Prevention
Service (established 1911), the Ministry of Health (1927), and the National Health
Administration (1928) were all iterations of national public health services that oversaw
and gave guidance to smaller administrations. The individuals who staffed these
government organisations often had close international ties. Wu Lien-teh, the director of the
North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service, was a Malaya-born, Cambridge-educated
ethnically Chinese bacteriologist who also established the National Tuberculosis
7

Association of China based on an American model. J. Heng Liu (Liu Ruiheng) was a Harvardeducated professor of surgery at the Peking Union Medical College before joining the central
government as Vice-Minister of Health in 1928. Hou-ki Hu (Hu Hongji), the Commissioner of
Health in the Greater Municipality of Shanghai in the 1930s, had graduated from Johns
Hopkins University with degrees in medicine and public health.

During wartime, many of China’s missionaries left the country. The central government
moved into the interior, where certain institutions were consolidated and others formed to
respond to the changing needs of a society at war. The National Association for Refugee
Children was established by China’s First Lady, Mayling Soong (Madame Chiang Kai-shek,
Song Meiling). The Hygiene Education Society, headed by Chen Kuo-fu (Chen Guofu) had
close ties with the wartime Ministry of Education, which was led by Chen’s brother Li-fu. It
organised many public events in China’s interior from 1938 onwards, and sponsored the
publication of many texts for popular education about hygiene issues. Overseas
organisations such as United China Relief, founded in New York, was an umbrella
organisation that joined together several others for fundraising efficacy. It helped to
support smaller social welfare initiatives by the China Nutritional Aid Council and child
welfare committees.

The dissertation also cites numerous published sources – textbooks, editorials, recipe
guides, and other texts for popular consumption – that were written or translated by
Chinese authors who were not affiliated with any of the above organisations. The variety
and richness of such material indicates the widespread ideas of hygiene beyond the
aforementioned government and international sources. I have included the names of these
8

authors as they appeared on book jackets and by-lines whenever possible, even when I have
not been able to verify their biographical details.
Dissertation outline
Chapter One is an extended case study of the province of Shanxi between 1918 and 1928,
and an intervention into previous scholarship which assumes that effective public health
was impossible before the establishment of national infrastructure in 1927. Beginning with
plague control in early 1918, Shanxi leveraged global-local partnerships into opportunities
for the development of localized public health campaigns. Exploring the public reception of
Shanxi’s targeted programs such as footbinding prohibition, water sanitation, and opium
addiction rehabilitation establishes the context for hygiene and public health reforms
nationwide from a grassroots perspective. Using archival sources from Shanxi, various
medical missionary organisations, and publications, the chapter functions as a “proof of
concept” for the dissertation – these hygiene initiatives gained popularity precisely because
reformists carefully addressed local concerns, and because the public recognized the
tangible benefits to their daily lives.

The themes apparent in the first chapter are then explored at length. Each following chapter
focuses on a specific communal space in which new expectations of hygienic behaviour
were formed. The chapters are focused on the home, school, kitchen, and public streets. At
each site, the maturation of hygiene teaching and practice was driven by, and indeed made
possible by, individuals at the local level, even when they mirrored national developments.
Chapter Two on “Domestic Hygiene” explores the evolving parameters of “home hygiene”
(jiating weisheng) as a marketing strategy, series of health innovations, and social
mobilisation tool. The “home” was fluidly open to the outside world, and simultaneously a
9

living, therapeutic, and exhibition space for hygienic modernity. Chapter Three on “School
Hygiene” investigates the process by which hygiene practices both in the classroom and
from the classroom (in which teachers and students were ambassadors of health) matured
in the 1920s and 1930s. Far from facing oppressive, national-government demands to
conform to hygienic standards, an educational institute’s ability to demonstrate hygiene
competence became a symbol of its usefulness and patriotism. Schools and administrators
were even able to use this status to leverage additional resources during wartime. The idea
that all Chinese people could dedicate themselves to a patriotic effort towards hygiene
progress is further explored in Chapter Four, “Kitchen Hygiene”. The chapter is a
chronological narrative of individuals’ evolving responsibilities to clean, cook, eat, and
nourish in the early 20th century Chinese kitchen, and how certain diseases became urgent
touchstones for the change in reformists’ priorities for kitchen hygiene at different times.
Finally, Chapter Five on “Street Hygiene” highlights how public concerns about the
cleanliness of public streets transposed onto anxieties about the powers of the various
iterations of government in Chinese cities. The endorsement and organisation of clean-up
events in public spaces (da sao chu and da qing chu) worked symbiotically to legitimise a
local government’s work, while also to promote mass participation and facilitate vital
statistics collections, and, ultimately, to streamline necessary capabilities and resources for
national defence. Together, the chapters are a comprehensive exploration of idiosyncratic
hygiene improvement developments and their participants, elevating lived experience and
local agency along the way.
***
For elementary school students in Yushe County, Shanxi, in 1940, daily examinations of face
and hand cleanliness were the norm. They would line up every morning to show their
10

classroom teachers the fronts and backs of their hands and, if one was unsatisfactory, would
receive a rap across the knuckles with “a two-inch wide plank of wood”.11 Later, as Mr
Zhang* entered middle school, he remembers sitting through daily morning lectures about
sanitation, vaccinations, nutrition, and sex education. Similarly, from an early age, Mr Liang*
also learned the importance of small, everyday behaviours such as hand washing, but
regular adherence was impossible – in rural Shanxi, water was scarce. In order to get to the
well, Liang’s father and uncle climbed down then up a steep, rocky hill, and the water they
were able to get was used for drinking, cooking, and the livestock.12 Despite a general
understanding of basic hygiene routines, persistent skirmishes between Japanese and
Chinese troops, the isolation of rural northwest China, and general poverty made it difficult
for families like Liang’s to prioritise the hygiene lessons they had been taught.

The impact of the Sino-Japanese War (1937—1945) on public health and hygiene extended
beyond Shanxi province or China’s northwest frontier. At the private Wuchang Chinese
University in 1943, kitchen staff maintained clean nails and hair, and students and faculty
were meticulous about fly prevention, but there were no proper bathrooms in the
dormitory buildings, nor were student quarters getting enough light.13 With wartime
overcrowding, financial difficulties, and infrastructure issues in old campuses, schools and
universities felt hamstrung in their ability to maintain previous sanitation levels even in
China’s more prosperous cities. In May 1941, the principal of the National Eighth Middle
School in Hunan wrote to the Minister of Education that the combined cholera and typhoid

Mr. Zhang, oral interview with author, December 2019. *not real name.
Oral interview with author, December 2019.
13 Report from Wuchang Chinese University to Ministry of Education, Second Historical Archives of
the People’s Republic of China [henceforth “SHAC”] 4/1927(2), 20 January 1943.
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vaccines sent from the Ministry had spent so long in transit that they had not only expired
but their bottles had also been damaged. “We are not sure if we will have enough [money]
to cover treatments for the summer [as the students will now be unvaccinated]. Please send
money instead so that we can buy medicine [locally]”.14

While these reports paint dismal pictures of wartime health conditions, an underlying
optimistic thread emerges. By the 1940s, China’s communities and individuals, over the
course of a few decades, had become accustomed to routine vaccination drives,
participating in mass street cleaning campaigns, school and home visits by doctors, nurses,
and midwives, and attending classes at local Health Stations. These anxieties that wartime
shortages would negatively impact hygiene conditions were in fact testament to the
significant progress of the early twentieth century. The time frame of the dissertation ends
with the Sino-Japanese War, when many of the protagonists became unable to continue
their work as before. However, throughout this dissertation, while the war often features as
an ominous interruption to the hygiene and public health initiatives and their efficacy, it
never disrupts the sincere interest and effort with which Chinese people worked towards
quotidian health improvement.

This dissertation reveals how acceptable, clean, moral behaviours were being defined
through overlapping, transnational networks of both medical professionals and laypeople,
and how the proliferation of these developments featured in the everyday lives of Chinese
in the early twentieth century. My goal is to construct a social history of hygienic reform to
show how specific ideas moved and shifted through regional and global networks, and were
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Shao Hua, principal of the National Eight Middle School, to Ch’en Lifu, SHAC 5/7192, 12 May 1941.
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subsequently adapted and localised for norms and culture. This study of public health in
Republican China is not a simple narrative of the clashes between Eastern and Western
medical cultures, tradition and modernity, superstition and science, nor the mechanisms of
Republican power dynamics. Rather, I centre the participation of grassroots Chinese against
a larger backdrop of a global process to raise communal health and standards of living. In
doing so, I propose that historians of science, technology, and medicine of the early
twentieth century consider the myriad types of international collaboration and innovation
at all levels of society. Moreover, we must pay closer attention to the lived experiences of
individuals and their communities.
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CHAPTER 1: FROM EPIDEMIC CONTROL TO LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH IN SHANXI,
1911—1928
In October 1928, Dr. Percy T. Watson, a doctor working with the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) at Fenchow Station, received reports of yet
another outbreak of bubonic plague in Lin and Xing Counties in the northern Shanxi
province. The two counties were no strangers to this deadly disease which had struck
multiple times over the past decade. The disease often emerged in its bubonic form during
the autumn harvest months and mutated into the deadlier pneumonic form towards the
middle of November.

Watson penned a letter to colleagues based in Beijing, requesting urgent funding and
logistical support for the overstretched members of his medical team. “The area infected
with plague”, Watson emphasised, “is easily twelve times greater than it has ever been
before”.15 A week later, Watson again restated the difficulty in carrying out plague control
work in Shanxi. While Lin County officials “have been most cordial”, it took effort to make
them see the importance of “medical details”. The Xing County personnel were much worse,
and, despite their legal reporting duties, “[had] never made any reports of plague in past
years”. Dealing with the Chinese populace was unpredictable – “[the area] is a very
superstitious country and isolated” – even though he noted that the Shanxi governor Yan
Xishan had been sympathetic to the missionaries’ plight.16

Watson Papers, Series 35C “Personal Papers and Memoirs” [Henceforth “Watson Papers”], subseries 18, Folder 4, Percy T. Watson, Plague Bulletin 1, 17 October 1928. Carleton College Archives,
Carleton, MN.
16 Percy T. Watson, “Plague Bulletin 2”, 25 October 1928. Watson Papers,
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Watson’s exchanges with his colleagues in Beijing revealed that Shanxi’s resources were
stretched thin in attempting to deal with the latest crisis, and that the medical staff at
Watson’s Fenchow Hospital seemed to be working almost independently, unable to count
on support from the provincial government. At Fenchow Hospital’s own expense, Watson
and his team had been making trips to plague-affected areas every autumn and winter,
usually finding no more than a few hundred cases, and were able to put an end to each
outbreak. This year, however, Watson wrote of the considerable additional financial
resources that needed to tackle an epidemic that could result in more than 2,000 deaths. “I
think that it is very important that the expenses necessary to control plague should not be
put on the local people… when the problem is vital to all of Shansi, not to say all North
China”.17

Just ten years earlier, the combined efforts of the American Board, the English Baptist
Mission, the Church of the Brethren, the Rockefeller Foundation, and Yan Xishan’s
administration had put a swift, decisive stop to a series of plague outbreaks across the
province. This remarkable collaboration continued into the 1920s with public health and
social welfare initiatives. From advising provincial hospitals’ establishment to quotidian
tasks such as conducting house-to-house medical examinations, medical missionaries and
their trainees had played key and sustained roles in Shanxi’s health system. It was due to
the success of plague control and other social initiatives that Yan gained the titled “Model
Governor” by the end of 1918. What, then, could account for the degree of Watson’s
desperation in the winter of 1928? Had Shanxi’s provincial public health system failed?

17
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This chapter begins with the epidemic of 1917—1918, follows hygiene reformists and their
initiatives throughout the decade, and ends with another serious plague outbreak in 1928.
While the onset of a widespread health emergency required Yan’s government to take swift,
decisive, and often oppressive measures, the aftermath of the plague control process
allowed for deeper societal change, not only to improve the health of Shanxi, but also to
assert and reinforce the administration’s sovereign power over the territory. To work with
the technocratic, yet authoritarian, provincial governor Yan Xishan, missionary doctors
needed to posit themselves as benign, valuable resources, to the point of becoming
employees of the province. But when the autonomy of the province was threatened, and
along with it, the collaboration between missionaries and their governor weakened, the
public health system of this independent province proved incapable of handling another
serious challenge.

1918 and public health in recent historiography
Histories of the development of medical and other sciences in Republican China often fall
among discussions of China’s modernisation. Far from receiving a simple transferral of
knowledge from “the West”, Chinese elites cleverly sought to apply new skills to
understanding their own local conditions and addressing the specific needs of Chinese
society and environment.18 Foreign-educated returned students in the late Qing needed to
creatively leverage their own experiences to be considered useful in a China that was still

In a split from the focus on hard sciences (especially military engineering) in the late Qing SelfStrengthening Movement, leaders at the newly created liberal arts universities hesitated to dictate
engineering and physics as the quintessential path to modernity. The development of “soft sciences”
such as geology and sociology suggests that these efforts were part of the wider nationalistic effort
towards modernity. See Ruth Hayhoe, China’s Universities, 1895—1995: A Century of Cultural Conflict
(New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1996).
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largely unchanged.19 Scholarship on medicine and public health in China during the early
twentieth century, however, is not as nuanced or localised. Existing scholarship indicates
that a reckoning between Chinese and Western medical traditions occurred during the first
two decades of the twentieth century, and that the latter had definitively won its exalted
place, evidenced by the establishment of the Ministry of Health under the Kuomintang. The
subsequent official antagonism towards traditional superstition inspired the creation of
institutions and bureaucracy based on scientific biomedicine.20 While other scholars do
question the dichotomy of the “binary opposition” between Chinese and Western medical
traditions, historians are still sceptical that earlier iterations of public health services such
as the North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service had any real impact.21 Prior to 1928,
asserts Sean Lei, the central government had actually been a “major barrier” to public
health.22 English-language scholars have paid more attention to systems of public health
provision that were developed in the 1930s, especially with regards to the Sino-Japanese

Jerome Ch’en was the first to take a lower-level, social history-esque look at the returned Chinese
students working within and against the confines of the Republican society to introduce their
educational experience. Y. C. Wang also highlights the diversity and number of returned students
working in all levels of Chinese society, including primary education, civil police, and in factories,
countering previous research on the esoteric and highly-intellectual nature of their work. It follows
that this work continued into the countryside. Frank Dikötter’s research on Chinese prisons shows
local governments, taking inspiration from a loose centralised framework, committed to effective,
modern reforms in their respective locales. More recently, Elizabeth VanderVen’s monograph reveals
the extraordinary numbers of foreign-trained educators even in the most remote of Chinese villages.
Jerome Ch’en, China and the West: Society and Culture, 1815—1937 (London: Hutchinson, 1979). Y. C.
Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872—1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1966). Frank Dikötter, Crime, Punishment, and the Prison in Modern China (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2002). Elizabeth VanderVen, A School in Every Village: Educational Reform
in a Northeast China County, 1904—31 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
20 See work by Ka-che Yip and Liping Bu.
21 Lei, Neither Donkey nor Horse: Medicine in the Struggle over China’s Modernity, 6—7. Sean Hsianglin Lei, “Sovereignty and the Microscope: Constituting Notifiable Infectious Disease and Containing
the Manchurian Plague”, in Furth and Leung (eds.), Health and Hygiene in Chinese East Asia, 88. Lei
asserts that the “historical defeat of Chinese medicine” occurred not because Western medical
techniques and knowledge could necessarily cure the pneumonic plague, but rather because of its
efficacy in “diagnosing and containing” infectious diseases.
22 Lei, Neither Donkey nor Horse, 66.
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War. Mary Augusta Brazelton, John Mott, and Nicole Barnes, among others, recently
investigated the distinctive, innovative medical infrastructures that were not only
instrumental in enhancing governmental legitimacy but had longer implications even after
the Communist victory in 1949.

The 1918 responses to plague in Shanxi rarely appear in historical literature. The epidemic
is afforded a few sentences in Liping Bu’s Public Health and the Modernization of China, in
which the author claims that the plague control measures in 1918 led to the “popularization
of science”.23 This conclusion and the use of the term “science” are imprecise, not to mention
anachronistic. As this chapter examines, while plague-prevention measures such as wearing
masks, notifying authorities of disease, and isolating sick individuals did gain more
popularity in Shanxi (whether due to popular interest, coercion, incentives, or a
combination), a review of the primary record reveals that such measures were pitched, and
reinforced, using language that appealed to common sense and existing norms, not lofty
notions of “science”. In other words, the idea that objective “science” spurred ordinary
people to change, or that belief in science necessarily followed behavioural change, reveals
modern-day biases. Besides Bu’s brief mention, the epidemic is only discussed in few
Chinese language articles.24 While Cao Shuji, Yin Zhibing, and others do assess the Shanxi
provincial government’s ability to establish quarantines and mobilise large numbers of

Bu, Public Health and the Modernization of China, 113.
Cao Shuji concludes that epidemic prevention was executed on the ground by local administration,
but required the direction of the central government as provincial administration had neither
efficacy nor ability to manage the project. Cao Shuji, “Guojia yu difang de gonggong weisheng: yi 1918
nian shanxi feishuyi liuxing wei zhongxin [Public Health in on National and Regional Level: the 1918
Shanxi Influenza Epidemic as Focus]”, Zhongguo shehui kexue 1 [The Journal of Chinese Social
Sciences] (2006). http://www.iqh.net.cn/info.asp?column_id=4826. Zhang Zhaoqing, “1917—1918
nian shuyi liuxing yu minguo zhengfu de fanying [The 1917—1918 plague epidemic and the response
of the Republic of China government]”, Lishi xiaoxue 1 [History Teaching] (2004).
http://www.historyteaching.cn/lsjx/show.asp?id=254.
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military, police, and local magistrates for plague control work, these articles use Shanxi’s
progress as a foil from which to view the incapability of the central government in Beijing.
In both these camps, devotion to “science” and deferral to “central government
administration” are idealised simplifications of the real decisions and contingencies that
Chinese reformists, medical professionals, and administrators had to make in 1917—1918.
Moreover, the scholarship does not consider the nuances of the political relationship
between regional governors and the central government in Beijing, and, somewhat unfairly,
criticises the beleaguered Beijing government for its inability to mobilise in the face of the
outbreak.

These trends in historiographical scholarship, regarding both Chinese public health before
1928 and plague-control measures in Shanxi more specifically, are problematic on several
fronts – firstly, they assume that there was a consistent state that existed before 1928 that
could have been representative of China as a whole; secondly, that there was little
possibility for public health implementation to be successful or effective in provincial and
smaller administrations under the so-called “warlords” in the fragmented geopolitical
system.25 The roles played and tactics used by physicians, nurses, police, local military, local
elite, and others to actually improve health, and the perceived successes and failures of their
initiatives, are largely missing. For the real impact of China’s progress in public health,
especially where Western biomedicine was concerned, additional layers must be
investigated.26

See Lei, Neither Donkey nor Horse, Chapter 3.
Even as Ruth Rogaski breaks down the “monolithic” Western medicine into a network of multiple
actors with whom “indigenous elites” interacted, the study never penetrates society further than the
upper crust of educated, capital-minded, elites. Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, 13.
19
25
26

Despite the recent publications of biographies of Yan Xishan in China and an increase in
online and popular history sources on his progressive administration of Shanxi, Englishlanguage scholarship has been scarce.27 Aside from military independence, Yan Xishan’s
efforts to consolidate power through building public welfare infrastructure have been noted
by many, but an updated in-depth study is needed. Donald Gillin’s 1967 biography of Yan
and Chinese sociologist Shen Guochang’s 2008 review of Shanxi’s educational institutions
both demonstrate the governor’s intentions to fundamentally transform the province in a
progressive, technocratic way, often through collaboration with missionaries and returned
students who had served as educational and public welfare advisors.28 Shen’s book is
sociological in discipline, comparing provincial directives on education and their practical
implications, drawn from reviewing government statistics. It shows increasing numbers of
mass participation and results of some of Yan’s most common social welfare, political, and
hygiene education campaigns. Opium, gambling, and foot-binding, the “three evils”, were
being suppressed effectively based on Yan’s vision of modernity.29 In contrast, Gillin
concludes that Yan ultimately failed because his initiatives were too structurally
conservative, ideologically “incongruous”, and did not offer enough tangible benefits for his
would-be followers. The sentiment is echoed by Percy Watson in his later communications

Biographies by Li Maosheng and Luo Chunpu, for example, focus predominantly on Yan’s life and
relationships and his administration’s implications for the Communist Party’s influence over Shanxi
and northern China. Li Maosheng, Yan Xishan da zhuan [Full biography of Yan Xishan] (Taiyuan:
Renmin chubanshe, 2010). Luo Chunpu, Yan Xishan zhuan [Biography of Yan Xishan] (Taiyuan:
Renmin chubanshe: 2004).
28 Donald G. Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1967). Shen Guochang, Shouben yu kaixin: Yan Xishan yu Shanxi jiaoyu [Maintaining tradition and
expanding new horizons: Yan Xishan and education in Shanxi] (Jinan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe,
2008).
29 “The Model Province from Within: Red Propaganda Only Menace to Province’s Record of Continued
Progress”, The North China Herald [hereafter “NCH”], 21 November 1925.
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with Gillin –the governor’s unwillingness to spend necessary money to truly reconstruct the
health system led to recurrence of epidemics and disillusionment by medical missionaries.30
However, Shanxi’s reforms were “the last systematic attempts… to bring about reform along
conservative lines” that evoked the Tongzhi Restoration and other late-Qing efforts. Unlike
later revolutionary efforts, these appealed more to the traditional society.31 As this chapter
also shows, reformists were disappointed that the progress made for the 1918 plague
control process seemed to be only skin deep. The province existed on a frontier of the
Republic, unique in both its strong relationships with foreign advisors and tepid connection
with the rest of China. A more focused study of Yan’s administration as civilian- and
welfare-focused is much needed, but this chapter, nor dissertation, cannot take on this
ambitious task as its goal; rather, I suggest that the lens of public health serves well as a
starting point for this research.

Instead, this chapter is a proof of concept for the themes of subsequent chapters of this
dissertation. Focusing on Shanxi’s public health and hygiene initiatives during the Yan
Xishan administration in the early Republic, it takes two major outbreaks of plague as
“bookends” and investigates how the global-local (“glocal”) collaboration that began with
the 1918 plague control progress evolved into a seemingly sustainable program of
provincial public health. Focusing on local governance and initiatives, the chapter assesses
the epidemic health crisis as a crucial test of a local system’s readiness. The episode then
became a springboard into the local development of hygiene-related interventions to
thoroughly change residents’ behaviours. While challenging, plague control work also gave
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Gillin, Warlord, 37.
Gillin, Warlord, 295.
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the provincial government and missionary doctors unprecedented opportunities. The 1918
outbreaks pushed the provincial government to demonstrate its ability to quarantine its
borders, produce definitive, quality medical texts from within the province, reinforce that
Shanxi was a progressive, autonomous territory, and create the foundations for locally
directed public health reforms in the future. Shanxi’s health interventions soon spread
beyond its initial military cordons, travel restrictions, and other quarantines, and into
schools, private homes, communal village spaces, and the military. The participatory
benefits for these new initiatives not only raised the profile of Yan and Shanxi, but also
Chinese people, to the national and global health communities as reports about the plague
control process were published widely in newspapers and journals such as The Lancet and
the New England Journal of Medicine.

Shanxi was perhaps ahead of its peers in implementing many of these hygiene-related
measures in the early twentieth century, especially with regards to the initiatives that
required individuals, families, villages, and other communities to take action to protect their
health at home or around their communal spaces. But what Shanxi put in place also
ultimately occurred around China, sometimes on smaller scales, but sometimes nationally.
Outbreaks of cholera and beriberi were evoked as urgent touchstones for change, through
which hygiene reformists justified various initiatives to change living and cooking habits.
Discussions of undesirable, unhygienic behaviours such as spitting in public streets were
imbued with anxieties of autonomy and legitimacy. Throughout the country, citizenry
became redefined with the addition of more stringent expectations for personal behaviour,
and schools, villages, and other communities leveraged their compliance as proof of
patriotism. Throughout this process of redefining “hygiene” in daily life in the early
22

twentieth century, the paradigms for understanding medicine, progress, modernity shifted
to encompass personal responsibility and individual behaviour. This was not a system in
which the singular authoritarian government was oppressive; as this and subsequent
chapters will show, the diverse group of Chinese reformists and their constituents were
incentivised by, and rewarded with, tangible benefits.

Shanxi is chosen for this proof of concept for several reasons. Firstly, the available primary
sources from American missionaries, in particular the ABCFM and the Presbyterian
Missionary Board, are easily accessible from the United States, and their considerable
presence in Shanxi mark the province itself as a uniquely glocal site of public health and
medical interaction. Secondly, Shanxi’s political stability – at least nominally, under Yan
Xishan – and the province’s non-alliance with Beijing and during the civil wars of the 1920s
suggest a degree of possible social progress that would have been difficult to replicate
elsewhere. Thirdly, despite copious contemporary praise for the Model Province in the
media, the epidemic of 1918 and Shanxi itself are woefully understudied in English
scholarship. Finally, Shanxi province is of personal importance to me, as it is where my
family and I are from. My ancestral homes (and family grave sites) are within two hours’
drive from Fenchow Station, Percy Watson’s base of operations. The local pride for this
period of history deserves to be celebrated.

The 1917—1918 plague outbreak
In late 1917, cases of some form of pneumonic disease began appearing in southern
Mongolia in the vicinity of the Yellow River. In Chahar province just north of the Shanxi
border, Dr. Wu Lien-teh (Wu Liande, also G.L. Tuck) of the North Manchurian Plague
23

Prevention Service and a colleague diagnosed the disease as pneumonic plague, but not
before it had travelled south via the river to Baotou by December 1917 and to Shanxi by the
end of the year.32 Along the Peking-Hankow and the Taiyuan-Chengting Railways, a handful
of infected victims reached as far as Nanjing. According to contemporary reports, the origins
were similar to those of the Manchurian epidemic of pneumonic plague in 1910—1911, as
carriers engaged in the fur and wool trades moved infected pelts across the borders.33

Contemporary commentators agreed that the demographics in northern Shanxi facilitated
the spread of the plague. Despite the isolation of the province, bordered on all sides by
mountains, the Great Wall, and the Yellow River, there was considerable human traffic, with
craftsmen’s goods and livestock moving across borders.34 Many living in the area were
members of a “floating population” – non-permanent subsistence trappers, merchants, and
other migrant workers who travelled often between villages. Coolies staffed most of the
low-cost, smaller businesses and contract farmers often worked in fields to make a living.
For every ten workers, the provincial government estimated, one or two lived (had families)
in neighbouring provinces.35 Bandits and brigands also “ravaged the countryside” each
winter, before hiding in walled towns and villages to avoid capture.36 For most of the early
republic, Shanxi’s “formidable natural boundaries” allowed the province to remain
autonomous while the rest of north China’s political system fragmented then stabilised.37

Percy T. Watson, “Pneumonic Plague in China”, The National Medical Journal of China 4, no. 2
(March 1918), 42.
33 Watson, “Pneumonic Plague in China”, 44.
34 Wang Chengji, (ed.) Shanxi sheng yishi baogaoshu [Report of the Shanxi Plague] vol. 1 (Shanghai:
Zhonghua shuju, 1919), 128.
35 Wang, Shanxi sheng yishi baogaoshu, 133.
36 Gillin, Warlord, 30.
37 Henrietta Harrison, The Man Awakened from Dreams: One Man’s Life in a North China Village,
1857—1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 131.
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But the province was an isolated territory with a history of localism and increasingly strong
local authorities, and presented a risk for the stability and legitimacy of both the newlyestablished national government in Beijing and its opponents. Shanxi’s precarious
independence was threatened time and again, especially during the civil wars in the
1920s.38

The first administration to attempt plague control in 1918 was the government of the
Republic of China, based in Beijing under then president Duan Qirui. Having received word
of cases of plague in Fengzhen, just north of the Great Wall border of Shanxi in Chahar near
modern-day Hohhot, Duan dispatched Western-trained doctors Wu Lien-teh (Wu Liande,
head of the North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service) and SP Chen (Chen Sibang, an
American Chinese bacteriologist at the Peking Union Medical College) to assess the
conditions. Wu headed to Fengzhen while Chen was later sent to lead a laboratory and
isolation hospital in Datong. The work did not go well for Wu, and he soon left Fengzhen and
ended his involvement with this plague prevention effort. In the meantime, Yan Xishan
received positive confirmation of the plague diagnosis from the Beijing bacteriologists in
Datong, along with the advice that there was no cure for the deadly pneumonic plague, only
prevention. According to the government’s official report, it was at this point that Yan
launched a province-wide effort to enforce border control, dispatching the military to assist
in traffic control of the borders: “it is necessary to ask the military to be stationed at the
passes, and do heavy inspection and quarantine”, Yan’s office wrote in a telegram.39
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From the beginning, the communications from Yan’s provincial capital in Taiyuan
intentionally contrasted his administration’s actions with those of the Suiyuan and Chahar
authorities who “did everything they could to conceal [the pneumonic plague]” in late 1917.
Yan was instead lauded for his emergency methods by missionaries, foreign governments,
and Beijing alike.40 The military cordons around central Shanxi and the Great Wall, and the
closure of sections of major railways, were instrumental in containing the plague around
these counties and ensuring that it did not reach the capital. Taiyuan, Datong, and other
major walled cities had their passes closed.41 At Shiling Pass just north of Taiyuan, all
travellers were “detained there for seven days before being allowed to proceed”.42 Shanxi’s
military telephone system, originally installed to facilitate the suppression of banditry
around the province, put all plague control teams “on the same line” and was particularly
praised by Dr. Charles W. Young of the Peking Union Medical College.43 In total, only “in
some ten or a dozen places” were infections found south of the stretch of the Great Wall that
runs across northern Shanxi, and “prompt action” prevented their further spread.44 Still,
there were mountain passes that that were not as easily secured or closed off, which were
popular with travelling migrant workers. Later, Wu Lien-teh wrote that shutting down the
railroad and major roads only encouraged travellers to use the smaller, harder-to-patrol
border crossings, and result in even more cases of plague that were harder to detect.45

Watson also compared Yan favourably to the Qing Viceroy Xi Liang, who had to contend with the
extraterritorial interests of both Japan and Russia during the Manchurian plague epidemic of 1910—
1911. Yan certainly had more leeway to assert his authoritarian control. Percy T. Watson, “Plague as
Civilizer”, Fenchow 1, no 2 (October, 1919), 6.
41 Watson, “Recollections”, 112.
42 “A typical case of neglect”, NCH, 9 February 1918.
43 Watson, “Plague as Civilizer”, 8.
44 Samuel Cochran, “Medical Work Chapter XXV: The Epidemic of Pneumonic Plague in 1917—18”,
China Mission Year Book (1918): 197—201, 200.
45 Wu Lien-teh, Plague Fighter: The Autobiography of a Modern Chinese Physician (Cambridge: W.
Heffer and Sons, 1959), 109.
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At the same time, missionary doctors across Shanxi, such as Watson, were called to conduct
“plague trips” into affected villages in the north of the province. Accompanied by soldiers
and local police, they took sputum samples for the Datong laboratory, directed burial
squads to properly treat corpses, and issued vaccines for locals. Charles Young also arrived
in Taiyuan in early January to become Yan’s key advisor, responsible for writing the official
communications and directives regarding plague prevention measures. In order to temper
the possible “disfavor” local populations might have at the anti-plague instructions, all
plague control directives in the province – composed by Young and translated and
transcribed by Yan Xishan’s medical secretary – were also printed and posted in Yan’s name
“and official seal”.46 Police warning announcements were made to the public: “currently
there has been an infectious disease which is spreading quickly and making people sick, it
lives in the lungs” and gave directions for what to do when symptoms were showing among
their acquaintances.47

The casualty toll for this highly virulent outbreak with an almost 100% fatality rate varied
according to the source. According to reports by Dr. Watson and the Shanxi government, it
was 2,667, but the North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service led by Wu Lien-teh
estimated it at 16,000. It is likely that the latter also took into account the casualties in
Suiyuan and Chahar, special administrative regions created by the Republican government
just north of Shanxi.48 The last case was reported on March 20, 1918. A second outbreak of a

Percy Watson, “Plague Reports”, n.d., 220. Yale University Divinity School Special Collections
[henceforth “Yale Divinity”].
47 Wang, Shanxi sheng yishi baogaoshu, vol 3, 150.
48 Wu, Plague Fighter, 109.
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similar disease, which resurfaced in mid-December 1918, began in Wangjiaping, west of Lin
County to the northwest of Taiyuan.49 The second, deadlier outbreak resulted in over 6,000
deaths, but it was unclear to observing physicians whether all the cases were from plague or
if the concurrent influenza pandemic had contributed.50
Disease maps and sovereignty in the Report of the Shanxi Plague
The definitive government-produced document about the course of the epidemic and
plague control work was published in three volumes in 1919. The Report of the Shanxi
Plague (Shanxi sheng yishi baogao shu) has rarely been examined in historical research,
aside from a few Chinese-language articles.51 The bulk of the first volume is made up of
quarantine reports for each of the twenty-eight plague-affected counties in northern Shanxi,
with accompanying maps that added a visual dimension to the work. The second volume
contains records of the telegrams sent between Taiyuan, Beijing, and various plagueaffected counties, and the third volume records functions of the Shanxi Plague Prevention
Bureau, printed materials for subsequent hygiene education for plague prevention, and the
speeches made at the celebratory meeting in April 1918. At the beginning of the first
volume are also multiple photographs of the plague control process, captioned all in
English.

The maps in the first volume are visually stunning both in their size and their detail and
serve an important political purpose. The first is a fold-out of the entire affected area

There is some disagreement to the exact date of the first infection of the Wang family – Watson’s
report in the China Medical Journal states December 12, while an article in the North-China Herald
states December 18. Percy T. Watson, “The Epidemic in Shansi: Pneumonic Plague or Influenza?”
China Medical Journal 33, no. 2 (March, 1919), 169.
50 Watson, “The Plague Epidemic in Shansi”.
51 Cao, “Guojia yu difang de gonggong weisheng”.
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(including Suiyuan and Chahar administrative regions) with detailed arrows indicating the
disease spread and a legend. It is likely that these maps served as examples of the success of
Shanxi’s recent cartography reform project. In 1917, Guo Xiangsheng, Chair of Liberal Arts
at Shanxi University and renowned educator, was appointed by the Shanxi Provincial Office
(Shanxi sheng gongshu) to lead its efforts to improve cartography in local gazetteers by
adopting “new methods of survey[ing] and mapping and ensure precision and prudence”.52
The use of the new “scientific” cartographic methods, including the addition of a legend and
keeping the maps to scale, was an argument about Shanxi’s progressiveness. As Zhang
Huizhi’s article stresses, it was not until 1929, eleven years after the publication of Guo’s
directory of Shanxi’s Gazetteers with the new maps (Shanxi ge xianzhishu fanli) that the
government of the Republic of China updated its guidance with regards to gazetteer maps –
“old maps are not accurate…this year’s should be made and printed by specialists using the
latest scientific methods”.53 After Yan Xishan’s launch of his social welfare initiatives, Guo
would go on to pen “Public announcement of the Shanxi provincial natural foot society”
(Shanxi quansheng tianzu zonghui gongqi) in 1919, and become a key figure in further social
education and opium eradication efforts.

Zhang Zhihui, “Guo Xiangsheng yu Shanxi fangzhi tu bianhui de jindai zhuanxing [Guo Xiangsheng
and the development of modern Shanxi gazetteer maps]”, Zhongguo difang zhi 12, no. 6 (2012): 46—
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Figure 1.1: Map showing spread of plague into Shanxi, with legend indicating the different
types of arrows for inside vs. outside of the province.
The compilers of the Report took great care to depict each of Shanxi’s affected twenty-eight
counties together (in a map of the province in its entirety, with no reference to the rest of
the country), divided into the three military cordoned areas, and individually. Different lines
and arrows are used to represent the direction of plague movement within Shanxi and
outside of the province to make the distinction clear. The map also shows two different
types of markings for the course of the plague – north of Shanxi, the lines are dotted, but the
arrows inside the provincial borders are at the ends of solid lines. According to the map
legend, the dotted lines are used for the spread of the plague outside of the province. The
dotted lines are seen crossing the Suiyuan and Chahar Special Administrative Regions and
south towards Shanxi. Established in 1914 by the Beijing government, these regions
contained many counties (now part of modern-day Inner Mongolia) that had been
historically part of Shanxi. This intentional differentiation between Shanxi from Suiyuan
and Chahar on the map is both an argument and complaint that territories such as Guisui
(Hohhot) and Fengzhen were no longer under Shanxi’s control, thus directly undermining
30

their ability to stop the flow of plague sooner. Thus, this failure, as the narrative description
explains, was on the part of the newly-established Suiyuan government (and, by connection,
the Beijing government for its establishment), which did not pay attention to the movement
patterns of its people.54 As the Report states, Shanxi’s administration had been split from
Suiyuan and Chahar’s, and could only appeal to the transportation authorities to request
that traffic be stopped along the Zhang-Sui (Kalgan-Suiyuan) roads. Shanxi could not take
action early because of the scattered and confusing reports of plague from the special
administrative regions, so it was not until the provincial government issued a quarantine on
January 9 that the plague prevention teams got to work.55 It is implied that had Suiyuan
remained a part of Shanxi, the plague would not have spread so quickly or south of the
Great Wall at all. Indeed, the comparison between the two jurisdictions’ early control
measures resulted in praise for Yan.56 Taiyuan, the capital of the province, is marked
proudly (and not to scale) by a white circle, indicating that there had been no cases of
plague in the city. In doing so, the provincial government claimed the territory represented
and asserted its territorial sovereignty.57
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Figure 1.2: Map showing the location of closed passes and military cordons established by
Yan's government.

Figure 1.3: Map of Shanxi and nearby regions, with Fengzhen (where Wu Lien-teh diagnosed
plague) clearly labelled as outside of the bold line of Shanxi territory.
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Following the province-wide maps are maps of every individual affected county and its
disease spread history. The maps of each county are accompanied by descriptions of
distances between key villages, narrative accounts of the spread of the disease, and
statistics about the plague’s impact. For example, Shanyin County, just southwest of Datong,
was attended by Dr. Frederick Wampler, a member of the Brethren Mission in Pingtingchow
(Pingdingzhou) in mid- to late-January 1918. The first case occurred at Xindaiyue, brought
into the county by travelling family members surnamed Liang. By January 19, it had spread
west to Wangjiajian and by January 27 to Hejiayao. Concurrently, the plague spread south to
Dongxiaohe and Gaoshangtong by January 22. Another visitor to Dongxinzhai, travelling
from a county to the east, also began another cluster of infections on January 21. In total,
there were 93 cases in January and 224 in February, and in some cases entire families of
seven or eight people were wiped out.

The degree of detail in this reporting is fascinating and impressive. Moreover, all the
information was collected into standardised forms for each of the counties affected by
plague. Modern-day scholars could call what the physicians did akin to “contact tracing” –
taking down detailed notes about each victim’s demographic information and dates of
interactions with others, and tracing how the disease was spread.
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Figure 1.4: Map accompanying the narrative and statistical description of the spread of plague
in Shanyin county.
After this detailed narrative epidemiology, the fourth section in the first volume is a
discursive analysis of the relationship between the plague and people’s customs,
livelihoods, and practices of hygiene. “It is necessary to examine what type of people are
prone to the plague” because it was clear that the residents in northern Shanxi – farmers,
merchants, and migrant workers – facilitated the spread of disease.58 The Report is
particularly critical of local customs which act as barriers to implementing the “hygienic”
measures that would prevent the spread of plague. Even the flippant behaviour of rural
Shanxi residents had its precedent in local custom; suggestions from the imperial court
during the epidemics of the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries were also ignored. The
Report condemns “self-proclaimed physician experts” who still “stubbornly follow with the
blind speech of how there is something mystical like the movement of qi in our encounter
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with this disaster”.59 It goes as far as to criticise people’s adherence to “Confucian concepts”
– the unwillingness of offspring to leave their parents alone to suffer from the plague made
isolation difficult to enforce. The fact that a whole family would perish from disease after
one person falls ill, due to a mistaken belief in Confucianism and that the ideal filial
responsibilities could not be broken, was deemed “inexcusable”.60 In this way, in addition to
the territorial claims, the Report also established a new, progressive provincial canon for
public health principles. Although Watson recalled that he had taken the initiative to travel
to Taiyuan to meet with the governor, the Report states that it was Governor Yan who had
first called on “doctors of various nationalities and missionaries” to become key personnel
in the plague control process.61

Figure 5: An image from the Report showing Chinese people's disdain of plague control teams.
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These doctors are featured prominently throughout the Report. Photographs at the start of
the first volume depict the teams at work and celebrating the end of the plague, with
captions labelling the work of the “burial squad” or “Sanitary Corps”. Doctors such as Ora
George Brubaker and Frederick Wampler are depicted in the photographs, uniformed
identically as the Chinese staff they were directing. In the third volume, the speeches made
by Charles Young at the celebratory event concluding the epidemic in April 1918 were
printed alongside, and even before, Yan’s own speeches. The group photo of the event
depicts Yan flanked with the missionaries and doctors who had collaborated with the
provincial government.

The publication of the Report marked Shanxi as an independent sovereign entity with a
modern and medical infrastructure, complete with the aforementioned embrace of medical
science as the provincial canon. In fact, the provincial government claimed ownership not
only of its health developments, but also the missionaries with whom it had partnered.
When Watson was “commissioned” by the central government to control plague in
neighbouring Shaanxi in late 1918, Yan forbade Watson to make the journey, because of the
seemingly arbitrary reason of Shaanxi’s reputation for banditry – “the Governor said he was
afraid the bandits would take me captive and demand of him that he pay a large ransom to
get me released”.62 Together, scientific research, along with the individuals responsible for
conducting it, constituted part of the province’s unique capital.
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As a text, the Report certainly fulfilled a contemporary propagandistic purpose for Yan’s
administration and its authoritarianism. As previously stated, recent scholarship has not
paid much attention to the document. In fact, it appears that even Wu Lien-teh was never
aware of its existence, writing that “no correlated report was ever published” in 1959.63
While not entirely surprising that it did not feature in Wu’s memoirs (he had cut short his
involvement hastily in January 1918 after a violent incident, nor did he read Chinese), this
comment does raise questions as to how much of an impact the Report ultimately had
among China’s medical community or as a guide for further epidemic prevention efforts.

Moreover, as a documentation of Shanxi’s plague year, the Report falls short as it makes no
mention of the second outbreak in late 1918, even though it was well documented in
missionary reports.64 Following a telegram from Yan in early January, Watson and two
assistants travelled to the affected villages in Lin and Xing Counties and collaborated with
the local Police Commissioner. Even though this later outbreak was deadlier, the reports
sent to the Ministry of the Interior were simply notifications of the incident’s end.65 Why did
Yan’s government choose to manage this later outbreak at such a localised level, and with
such secrecy? The Shanxi government did not even inform Beijing for three weeks.66
Perhaps the speed with which the disease was eradicated did not require central
government assistance, or the disease itself affected a much smaller, contained region. In his
article, Cao Shuji questions why the Shanxi government neglected to use more centralised
power to conduct a similar level of plague control measures for the 1918—1919 outbreak
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and subsequent outbreaks in 1928 and 1929 (as will be discussed later in this chapter). It
seems, according to Cao, that the formerly “national [centralised]” public health system in
Shanxi in early 1918 had now become merely “local” public health that required specific
villages and counties to manage their own epidemic prevention processes and make use of
their own contacts with military, police, and medical professionals that were made earlier in
the year.67 As Han Xue explains, Yan’s provincial government also used the epidemic
prevention process to strengthen village- and county-level self-governance infrastructure in
a model that utilised both Western-style “autonomy” and a Confucian system of “checks and
balances”. Successful examples of villages cooperating with missionaries and directing their
own plague control teams were manifestations of “autonomous village systems assuming
functions of modern… government”.68 This explains why Watson, but not the entire Shanxi
Epidemic Prevention Bureau, was called to conduct further plague trips in Xing County.
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Figure 1.6: Image from the Report. Yan is flanked by his military officers and the foreign
doctors.
Cao’s analysis of the 1918 plague prevention process and subsequent localised plague
prevention teams (also established to deal with cholera and other outbreaks around the
province) is critical; as Lorenzo Seymour Morgan pointed out when he was stationed at the
Datong laboratory, it was impossible to achieve any real success in the laboratory when the
local population remained ignorant and unwilling to cooperate. But the reporting of the
year-end challenge as an afterthought indicated that the Shanxi government chose to
demonstrate the ability of provincial personnel to manage crises without the need for
outside support. In other words, a vindication of the autonomous system established at the
start of the year, and it was assumed that local governments where plague was endemic
now had the resources to fend for themselves.

The Sent-Down Missionaries: Percy Watson and Lorenzo Seymour Morgan in 1918
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Dr. Percy Watson’s involvement in the Shanxi plague control process began in early 1918
when he received a telegram from Governor Yan Xishan on January 7. Watson and two
attendants and travelled five days before reaching Lin County, where the local Police
Commissioner was waiting for their assistance.69 Watson was one of several doctors and
missionaries who were recruited for this role. He mainly travelled to Lin and Xing Counties
in northern Shanxi, close to the Shaanxi border. He would return to these areas many times
before his departure from China in the 1930s.

As the director of the Fenchow Hospital, Watson had a small but efficient medical support
staff, many of whom were local Chinese converts who worked for the Fenchow
missionaries. To prepare doctors, assistants, burial squads, and military police for plague
control, Watson and the medical team at Fenchow Hospital were put in charge of training.70
The “burial squads” and “Sanitary Corps” were members of local police departments or
appointed by Yan’s military police and magistrates. Fenchow Hospital provided them with
the necessary equipment – “they wore gowns and masks and were equipped with iron
hooks with which the dead were handled”.71 A series of photographs in the Report depicts
these teams carrying out various tasks in the villages, often under the supervision of foreign
doctors.72

“A Plague Epidemic in Shansi”, NCH, 15 February 1919.
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Figure 1.7: Plague control team in full uniform.
While in the field, Watson also made observations of symptoms of the unfamiliar new cases
of pneumonic plague, interviewed survivors of the disease, and collected samples of plague
cultures to send to Beijing for testing.73 Plague doctors accompanied by trained police teams
helped to facilitate the relocation of entire families in order to isolate sick individuals,
disinfect houses, and bury the dead. Watson cites the localisation of Shanxi’s administration
as beneficial to the missionaries’ work, especially when it came to reporting plague cases in
each locality. Each “village president” was responsible for reporting cases, deaths, and
recoveries, and specific policemen were detailed to the villages to check their work. Unlike
with some other plague control teams in China, Watson asserts, the village heads in Shanxi
reported their information carefully and accurately as they were “anxious to maintain their
reputations” among the peers and constituents.74 To aid with contact tracing, one local
magistrate had each village head prepare lists of residents who were “in business in other
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parts of China” and “account for these men, either vouching for their presence in their
homes or in their places of business”.75 Missionaries appointed by Yan Xishan not only
supervised the reporting but also the compilation of the statistical information that would
eventually be included in the Report.76 Paul L. Corbin, a pastor with the Oberlin College
mission in Taiku Station (Taigu), travelled around southern Shanxi with an assistant for
several weeks in March 1918 to gather the data collected by local administrators in the
villages before heading to Taiyuan to formalise the reports.77

This collaboration allowed missionary doctors to conduct plague control work with
acceptance, or at least acquiescence, from local communities, even beginning to lay
groundwork for preventative medicine in the form of vaccinations. On their way to plagueinfected areas, doctors would administer the temporary prophylactic vaccine, sometimes up
to 10,000 doses per trip.78 Where there were schools, they “vaccinated all the school
children and assigned a public health nurse to stay and give the second and third shots”.79
Throughout 1918, missionary doctors moved beyond previous roles as last resort healers
for ailments that were untreatable by Chinese physicians. In fact, while Fenchow Station
was funded by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Watson and his
colleagues were paid by Yan’s government for any time spent on plague control.80
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Compared to another team of foreign doctors conducting plague control work in the
northern Shanxi city of Datong, the Fenchow and Taiku missionaries felt that they were
making impressive progress. Lorenzo Seymour Morgan, a Presbyterian missionary doctor,
and S. P. Chen, a bacteriologist at the Peking Union Medical College, were appointed by the
Beijing government to head up the Tatung (Datong) Plague Prevention Service laboratories
in early February 1918. Morgan wrote extensively of his experiences to his wife Ruth, with
whom he was based at a mission station in Haizhou. Facing hostile local elites who
undermined laboratory work, frustrated by lack of communication with the provincial
government, and hamstrung by some “idiotic obstructionists” who believed that suspects
should not be moved to the plague wards, the doctors did not even hear about some cases
until it was too late.81 In one instance, a local gentry representative intentionally mixed up
the slides for several ill patients and mistakenly sent one plague-free elderly woman to the
suspect hospital.82 Morgan even suspected that the “Defense Commissioner’s Yamen”
purposefully obstructed reports of illness from reaching the doctors, as officials denied any
new cases of plague suspects even though the his own “detectives” (presumably local staff
and contacts) proved otherwise.83

Morgan wrote, “the work here is local, too local to be of use especially since the people have
decided they don’t want it”.84 On the quotidian level, Morgan’s work as the “expert
bacteriologist” was underwhelming – aside from time spent waiting on “what turns up”, he
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stained and processed “about 12 to 15 slides” in his first week.85 Seemingly simple tasks,
like obtaining sputum from plague suspects so that the doctors could do testing work,
became difficult as local officials were not cooperative.86 The relationship between the
Datong hospital and the Shanxi government was also unclear – Yan, apparently under the
advice of Charles Young, at one point sent a plague victim to Datong to be treated but
seemingly with no further instructions. Morgan set out to meet the patient, but the man
died on the journey, the doctor settled back into Datong to await further instructions. Lack
of cooperation from local elites made it difficult for the medical professionals to conduct
further research with sputum samples, or head out to rural Shanxi to collect more.

The Tatung Service doctors became apathetic and ready to give up by the beginning of
March, despite excellent facilities, a dedicated and well-resourced isolation hospital, and
large support staff.87 Although Watson had written that rural Shanxi communities now
understood the efficacy of plague masks and practising personal hygiene, Datong residents
did not seem to be similarly inspired. The long stay of Morgan and other doctors never
eased local residents’ suspicions, nor helped the doctors to make progress. In fact, by late
February, Morgan wrote that the outward antipathy of Datong elites had now changed “into
active confrontation”.88 A proclamation was posted on the city walls in Chinese welcomed
Morgan to the city of Datong, condemning “foreign devil stock” for disrespecting the
“Dispensation of Heaven” that was the plague epidemic.
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“We hear, alas, of several of them (foreign devil stock) in a group, the head covered
with sack cloth, body covered with deep mourning, with a sanitary diaper over the
mouth, coming to inspect every house... This procedure is certainly not for the
welfare of our brethren. It is certainly not a good omen for this country”.89
The influential elite of Datong, a geographically- and historically significant city, resisted the
aggressive teachings brought by foreigners. Without authorisation and direct support from
local and provincial government, the Tatung Plague Prevention Service could not help but
antagonise local communities. By 9 March Morgan had become apathetic – “Let the fools die
if they want to. What do we care”. On March 12, Morgan wrote that his days still mostly
consisted of “loafing”.90 Not permitted to leave the city until the plague prevention service
was sure that it had no further work to complete, Morgan stayed in Datong until April.

Compare Watson’s journey, also, with North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service
Director Wu Lien-teh’s experience in early January. President of the Republic of China Duan
Qirui requested Wu’s attendance in Fengzhen, a town just north of the Shanxi-Chahar
border near modern-day Hohhot. The doctor and two “American volunteers” arrived by
January 3, and immediately set about establishing a quarantine and stationing doctors at
other transportation hubs.91 The difficulties arose when Wu and a colleague conducted an
autopsy on a plague patient without first attaining consent from the family, which attracted
the ire of the father and local villagers, leading them to “proceed to the living quarters of the
senior doctors in the railway wagon and set fire to it”. Wu was shaken but not seriously
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injured. At this point, Wu refused to work further in Fengzhen and returned to Beijing and
Harbin.92 Shanxi’s Report clarifies that this regrettable incident was the result of the closed
nature of Fengzhen and its governance and that the “political [power] of the Western
doctors attending the town was no match of the social obstacles” of its backwardness.
Shanxi’s ultimate officially supported measures, on the other hand, were “not like Western
doctors’ experience in Fengzhen, which all led to conflicts”; instead, Shanxi’s plague
prevention teams “did not antagonise the society”.93

The effective working relationship between the provincial government and the Fenchow
missionaries created a good division of labour – Yan and his military could control the
borders against travel from other provinces and leave the grassroots-level management of
the medical aspects of plague control to an internal force of missionaries with medical
knowledge and support from other Western institutions, such as the Peking Union Medical
College. Practitioners of Chinese medicine were shut out of the plague prevention process,
and missionaries observed that stories of the mystic qualities of Chinese medicine to cure
the plague had “rapidly disappeared”. Watson proudly reported that the death of several
Chinese physicians made it difficult for local Chinese to “ignore” the missionaries’
methods.94 According to Watson, the work of medical missionaries in Shanxi, in stark
contrast to that of Russian and Japanese plague teams during the Manchurian plague
epidemic of 1910—1911, adhered more to Chinese customs as not to “antagonize the
people”. Instead of mass cremation, the Shanxi burial squad “buried [corpses in heavy wood
coffins] eight feet down which was the custom in that part of the world” after an
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appropriately long isolation period (it was found that the cold weather would eliminate
plague bacteria after four to five days).95 The ratio of Chinese to foreign personnel on these
plague trips lessened the suspicion of rural populations, and Western doctors were careful
to demonstrate their concern and respect for cultural barriers – before local Chinese
allowed him to give them the plague vaccine, Watson demonstrated the injection on himself,
“two cc – one in each arm”.96

Just years earlier, the American Board missions were seen as undermining local customs
and administration.97 Watson was still sceptical that the Chinese would be able to cure the
disease without the aid of foreign medical professionals but was willing to adopt a less
authoritative position. In fact, Watson saw his role in the plague control process of 1918 in a
more transcendental way – the pneumonic plague, he wrote, had an advantage over any
other disease “in teaching the relationship of cause and effect in contagion”. Folk doctors
who claimed that they had cures almost always succumbed quickly to plague, and the high
mortality rate showed local populations that only personal hygiene and other preventive
methods, not “cures”, could save their lives. Plague, in Watson’s words, was a “civilizer” – it
forced the governor and the province to rise to, and remain at, a new level of
enlightenment.98

A decade of progress?
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Towards the end of January, Dr. Ora George Brubaker began penning plague-prevention
guides that would ultimately be adapted for the Chinese publications, including the
provincial Report and Watson’s later book Rules for the Control and Suppression of Bubonic
and Pneumonic Plague. In “individual precautions against pneumonic plague for Chinese
villages especially”, he wrote warning of the contagious nature of the pneumonic plague,
that people should avoid crowded gatherings as much as possible but follow “means of
protection” if they need to be “in close contact of the disease”.99

Brubaker’s advice suggests two agreements among Shanxi’s medical professionals – one,
that pneumonic plague was endemic and was likely to recur significantly in Shanxi villages,
and two, that individuals should be responsible for their own protection against the
infectious disease. During the winters when pneumonic plague usually occurred, villagers
were encouraged to prepare provisions and stay in their homes as much as possible.100
Brubaker exhorted readers to make and wear masks, wash their hands often, and change
their shoes in case infected sputum was transferred from room to room if they needed to
interact with the sick. Further, after burying a corpse “at least 8 feet deep” in a coffin topped
with lime, the room in which the victim had died “should be then sealed and kept closed for
three months”. Some measures seemed extreme; the extent to which individuals were
expected to protect themselves, report and isolate their sick relatives, and properly deal
with corpses was idealistic, especially considering rural areas’ socioeconomic conditions
and levels of education. However, this trend did become further reflected nation-wide in
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home-based hygiene initiatives, which will be discussed in later chapters of this
dissertation.

Included in the second volume of the Report is also a diagram for making masks which was
circulated around the province. Reading Brubaker’s plague reports in tandem with the
Report, it is clear that the diagrams and instructions were adapted and developed from the
missionaries’ suggestions. Charles Young wrote, “this is made by folding a piece of Chinese
cloth one inch thick and four by six inches in a piece of Chinese cloth one and a half feet
wide by three feet long. This is tied snugly about the face so as to cover the face from the
chin to the eyes”.101 In addition to the nose and mouth mask popularised by Wu Lien-teh
during the Manchurian plague epidemic in 1910—1911, Brubaker and Young suggested
adding another piece of cloth with small holes cut out for eyes to cover the entire face.102
With plain instructions including measurements and types of suitable material, villagers
were expected to create their own anti-plague equipment.

101
102

Charles W. Young, “Pneumonic Plague bulletin 10: Care of sick”. Corbin IV.
O.G. Brubaker, “Bulletin no. 7”, January 1918. Corbin IV.
49

Figure 1.8: Instructions and diagrams for making face masks from the Report.
As for “treatment”, something commonly sold by traditional medicine practitioners in the
province, Brubaker and his colleagues were resigned that “there is no medicinal treatment…
common sense, fresh air, isolation, quarantine are very essential”.103 In fact, the deaths of
Chinese doctors who boasted of their abilities to cure the plague vindicated the
missionaries’ strategies to local populations.104 For Brubaker, Watson, and their colleagues
in rural Shanxi, the 1918 epidemic marked a turning point for their work. They were now
contributors to provincial publications with their medical expertise. More importantly, their
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day-to-day work had also changed. As the next section shows, far from being seen as only
last resorts for dying Chinese sceptics, medical missionaries now had a new way of
approaching their hygiene outreach and evangelism through extolling personal hygiene and
responsibility and offering the Chinese easy solutions for their health problems. The
doctors’ less authoritative role, working under Yan in 1918, was symbiotic. The
missionaries’ contributions to Shanxi, and their collaborative alliance with the provincial
government, were cemented through the plague control process, and continued in a way
that would also benefit the missions themselves.

One such initiative that required this effective partnership was Yan Xishan’s “Natural Foot”
movement, which began in earnest in 1918. The front page of the Jinyang Ribao on April 8,
1918, reported the impending order from the governor banning footbinding. “Young girls
must be liberated; there will be heavy punishments [for not abiding]… the provincial society
for Natural Foot has organized for the printing of tens of thousands reports and regulations
to be distributed to households, which will be in colloquial Chinese”.105 In June that year, the
North China Herald reported that local magistrates would opposed the anti-footbinding
campaign would soon find the “political axe” fallen on their necks, “their duty discharged”
by the “progressive governor”.106 Throughout 1919, Fenchow missionaries visited 1,880
homes and examined 2,590 women’s feet, writing detailed reports on their sanitary and
health conditions.107 In contrast to a 1915 Fenchow report that designated “Shansi women
as the most terribly bound in all China”, the missionaries now wrote “it was encouraging to
see the businesslike method with which all details were worked out by the Chinese
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themselves”.108 In a report to the Ministry of the Interior in 1920, Yan Xishan wrote that
now, women do not bind their feet in the entire province, and the women’s association for
natural feet have become more developed such that they had begun lecturing around the
province regarding the benefits of natural feet on their own. In all 105 counties, Yan
reported, there are no girls under the age of ten with bound feet.109 Fenchow missionaries
were paid for their work; these funds likely came from the fines imposed on those who
insisted on binding a child’s feet, selling shoes for women with bound feet, or matchmaking
girls who had bound feet.110

A glowing 1920 profile of Yan Xishan in the Fenchow home journal was essentially a tribute
to his authority and an indication of the alliance.111 Acknowledging the strength of Chinese
tradition, the journal praised, “[Yan] is a standing proof that men of obscure origin can by
sheer merit still rise in China, as from ancient times, to positions of eminence and power”.112
English-language media in China was also impressed at Yan’s steps towards “founding an
enlightened public health service for Shansi”, by holding examinations for medical school
entrance.113 With “a Chinese as co-author”, Watson penned a book titled Rules for the
Control and Suppression of Bubonic and Pneumonic Plague, to be published only in Chinese
for easier dissemination.114 The Fenchow Station built roads with the assistance of the
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Shanxi government to improve infrastructure and ease travel for plague prevention.115
Shanxi University also established its own medical college and Yan founded a Chinese
medicine improvement and research association in order to “allow Chinese medicine to
follow the trends of the world and become more systematic and scientific”. Despite Shanxi’s
embrace of biomedicine and germ theory during the 1918 epidemic, this move indicates
that Yan Xishan acknowledged the economic realities of Shanxi residents and that it was
important not to antagonise local elites.116 When a new, larger Fenchow Hospital was built
in 1924, funded primarily through Chinese donations, speeches at its dedication ceremony
reaffirmed the missionary-government collaboration’s commitment to improving Chinese
health – “the hospital will not only diagnose and treat disease but will tell people how it may
be prevented”.117 The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions also
established a nursing school at its Taiku Station, with the first class graduating in 1924.118

Missionary organisations such as the Council on Health Education, affiliated with the YMCA,
found Shanxi communities accepting to their hygiene education agendas. The Child Hygiene
Campaign, led by paediatrician Vivia Belle Appleton, was “done under the auspices and
support of the local Chinese officials with the missionaries co-operating.119 Travelling across
the province, Appleton lectured to “thousands” of women and schoolchildren regarding
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personal hygiene and prevention of child mortality and was optimistic about the results.120
Appleton’s findings were later referenced in her study in the American Journal of Diseases in
Children in 1925, along with discussions about the dietary and exercise habits of Chinese
children.121 The sentiment that public health now needed to be a public endeavour with
personal obligation was shared. Even traditional conceptions of disease and their treatment
in Shanxi required communities to work together to rid themselves of “punishment… for
immoral behaviour”, so the missionary methods were not entirely foreign.122 Chang Kuan
Lien (Zhang Guanlian), author of the runner up essay in the 1926 “Medicine as a life work”
contest held by the Council on Health Education and the China Medical Board, wrote
“setting to work for the health improvement of the small districts, at first by their own
people, would be the best policy”.123 Chang concluded that virtually all of Shanxi’s health
problems were, above all else, caused by individuals’ ignorance. Responses to outbreaks of
infectious disease – whether public prayers to the Plague God or a fly-elimination campaign
– all required individuals to work together and recognise their social interdependence;
undoubtedly this alignment between biomedical and traditional priorities for community
protection made hygiene education an attractive and attainable initiative in Republican
China.124
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Advertisements for various health products appeared in Shanxi’s newspapers frequently.
Among them was “Dr. Williams’ Pink Pills for Pale People”, an American patent medicine
that was said to cure the patient of anything from anaemia to indigestion.125 For Chinese
audiences, the advertising of the pills was similar to that for any other medication or
supplement – the pills would allow the body to replenish its strength, and even traditional
doctors recommended their patients to take them to combat diseases such as jiaoqi, where
bodily weakness and pain were major symptoms.126 A resident of Shanxi’s countryside and
key figure in Henrietta Harrison’s The Man Awakened from Dreams, Liu Dapeng would have
seen advertisements for vaccination, cow’s milk, cod liver oil, and other health goods in his
local village newspaper, even if he was not able to, or did not want to, procure them.127
Patent medications were part of the new medical culture in China – neither fully Western or
traditional, their purchase allowed the individual to fix their own minor ailments at home
and develop awareness of their own bodily care.

Shanxi’s public health development during the 1920s also reflected a contemporary concern
among public health reformers in China – the debate about whether it was more efficacious
to focus on developing high-level, professional, medical education, or to raise the minimum
standards of hygiene education for the masses. John B. Grant of the Peking Union Medical
College wrote in 1922 that public health developments in Shanxi were incredibly positive,
but even so, “the Shansi administration is entirely unaware of the extent of the modern
public health scope and not knowing there existed facilities for public health training have
been sending… large numbers of students to study banking, education, and textiles but none
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to become proficient in public health”.128 In 1923, Frederick Wampler from the Brethren
mission and the Council on Health Education wrote, “that China is not united so that she can
wholeheartedly support a Central Government does not mean that smaller communities are
not ready to support measures for the public good”.129 Of the essay contest, the Council on
Health Education remarked, “every student who competed, probably learned more about
health than by hearing a dozen health lectures”.130 Grant and Wampler offered two
divergent, but related, opinions on the priorities of public health work in China, but both
were astute in their approach regarding Shanxi. Smaller communities could be enthusiastic
and optimistic about embracing real change, but there could simultaneously be a dearth of
elite professionals capable of directing the word on a greater scale, such as upgrading the
public health infrastructure permanently.

A critical assessment of the initiatives and policies for public health under the Yan Xishan
administration, such as that by Donald Gillin, finds that Yan was too conservative and too
incoherent in trying to make change – personal hygiene was taught without overhauling the
province’s possible provision of medical services, literacy initiatives were only focused on
Yan’s political ideologies, and too many wrongdoings were punished with fines and higher
taxes instead of the opposite being rewarded with incentives. As discussed earlier, Liping
Bu comments only briefly that the 1918 epidemic prevention process helped Shanxi
residents to accept science more readily, but without challenging the concept of what
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“science” really meant in this context. Just taking Gillin’s bird’s-eye or Bu’s deterministic
views obscures the lived experience of Shanxi people. Liu Dapeng was certainly sceptical of
many of the government’s initiatives as they encroached on his conviction about the
superiority of the Confucian moral order and was especially incensed that the province kept
issuing fines and raising taxes to pay for them. However, the trickling down of biomedical
products, practices, and services reached him and his peers in the villages, and their lives
certainly were fundamentally changed. His granddaughter’s feet were unbound, his children
were vaccinated against smallpox, and his friends invited doctors and purchased cow’s
milk.131 There was no sudden, violent, victory of biomedicine and hygiene over
Confucianism, mysticism, and folk beliefs; rather, Shanxi’s quotidian medical system was a
dynamic accumulation of products, practices, and understandings in a site of glocal
interaction.

“Just like the Anti-Opium Association of China at the beginning was proposed only by a few
enthusiasts, now it was reached almost throughout all parts of China”, Chang Kuan Lien
wrote in 1925 in his essay entry for the “Medicine as a Life Work” competition.132 Within
this decade, Watson and his colleagues were also incorporated into the provincial
infrastructure. Continued, systematic health reform work built on the foundations of the
plague control experience. By this point, Shanxi’s missionary doctors, previously operating
only in limited spaces, were now essentially employed by Yan Xishan to serve the entire
province. In fact, “when the Governor heard that [Fenchow doctors] might have to leave
China because of lack of funds for the work he offered to pay [Watson’s] salary” to stay
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on.133 They were early examples of Sean Lei’s identification of Chinese practitioners of
Western medicine – simultaneously “pioneers of public health and agents of the state” –
who would ultimately take over from missionaries as medical authorities at the national
level after 1928.134 Their not being strictly ethnically “Chinese” is not a disqualifier; rather it
adds a new dimension to scholarship on transnational and diasporic Chinese public health
that previous scholars have neglected.

The return of the plague
In September 1928, while Watson was visiting the Peking Union Medical College, he
received word of another pneumonic plague outbreak in Lin County. Watson returned to
Shanxi with a fresh batch of vaccinations and set out on another plague trip.135 By the end of
October, all three known forms of the plague – bubonic, pneumonic, and the most deadly,
septicaemic – had been found in Lin and Xing Counties. Urgent letters were sent to the
Peking Union Medical College for vaccines, supplies, and financial and physical assistance.
Plague had occurred almost yearly since Watson’s arrival in China, but the Fenchow
Hospital had been generally capable of dealing with the endemic rates that would perhaps
claim a couple of hundred victims a year. This time, however, the bubonic form of plague
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had overstayed its regular course into the winter, and the cold weather exacerbated the
person-to-person spread of the more fatal mutations.136

Watson felt unsupported and blindsided – “police investigations are not at all reliable”, and
his “inability to get any help in this task [was] disheartening to say the least”.137 Trips up
and down the Yellow River to monitor the situation at the Shaanxi border were punctuated
by runs-in with bandits. Simple, auxiliary tasks like taking milk to an orphaned child, wrote
Watson, “has done more to get cooperation than anything else”, as understanding of plague
prevention was still weak.138 While there was clearly “improvement” in the attitudes of local
officials to support and accompany foreign doctors on plague trips, and the Xing County
magistrate telegraphed Fenchow Station directly for advice on how he could provide
support to Watson, the increasingly unstable political system in northern China rendered
the high turnover of even the lowest-level local officials inevitable.139 The five doctors and
nurses from Fenchow Station were well-equipped, but were required to split their time and
efforts between controlling the outbreak and “gathering data for future use” to find a cure.
This was impossible, wrote Jean Curran in Fenchow, without a wider support network that
included the provincial – and ideally national – government.140

Lack of government support aside, the biggest issue, wrote Watson in mid-November, was
that the families of plague victims did not understand “that prevention is the only method
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when we have an uncurable [sic] disease like pneumonic plague”. Without adequate
personnel to quarantine large areas, Watson’s team was unsure “how many have run away
carrying then spreading the infection with them”.141 Surveillance was similarly difficult, and
travel within the region remained free. In eastern Shanxi, Homer Bright, a Church of the
Brethren missionary, wrote that “there seem to be more deaths than there was in 1918… in
twenty villages close together, and the Chinese doctors (government or military) and their
helpers seem to have failed in stamping it out”.142 Missionaries from Fenchow had written
to the North China Herald in October reporting cases of the plague, stating that there had
now been close to 2,000 deaths.143 However, just days later, the newspaper, followed by
international counterparts, dismissed the outbreak’s severity – foreign visitors insisted that
“Chinese reports” of the plague were “much exaggerated… and the authorities in the
affected areas anticipate that they will soon suppress the outbreak”.144 Mercifully, Watson’s
last plague trip in late December confirmed the end of this crisis. In total, the two counties
sustained deaths of 4,000.145

Set against the development of Shanxi’s modernising reforms during the 1918—28 decade,
Watson’s 1928 experiences read with shocking disappointment. Were Watson’s
expectations too high, or was Shanxi still unprepared? After all, the province’s management
of the 1918 plague marked Yan’s “wise leadership” in Shanxi, and even the beginning of his
“Model Governor” epithet. Shanxi’s development of public welfare and all forms of social
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education was considerable. Suppression of opium, gambling, and foot-binding — the “three
evils”— progressed according to Yan’s vision.146 The number of schools in Shanxi and their
total enrolment consistently ranked among the top three provinces in China. 113 sites for
“popular education” had been established, each presenting lectures to dozens of students
per week; educational touring groups were also a frequent sight in the countryside.147
Meanwhile, national public health was finally formalised under the Kuomintang’s national
Ministry of Health in 1928, a stated goal for which was the “prevention of epidemics”.148
However, the Ministry’s track record on rural health work remained underwhelming.149 As
the Ministry celebrated its first anniversary in November 1929, it designated “Prevention of
epidemics – plague in Shansi” as one of its key priorities, but it is unclear from the archival
record how much was actually done.150 It was not until pneumonic plague “caused a
catastrophe in northern Shaanxi” in 1931 that the central government forcibly
intervened.151 Even through the first few years of the 1930s, most public health work in
rural China was still conducted by private and local initiatives, and not by the national
Ministry of Health.152

Throughout the 1920s, hygiene reformists outside the Shanxi administration had mostly left
the province alone. The China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation had established
various health demonstration stations, clinics, and research facilities in other cities in China,
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including Shanghai and Beijing. In particular, the Peking Health Station, a collaboration
between the Board, the municipal government, and its police force, seemed particularly
promising as a site for hygiene education a free clinic.153 John B. Grant, head of the Public
Health and Hygiene Department at the Peking Union Medical College, had always been
optimistic about Shanxi’s progressiveness, especially as the governor’s efforts seemed to
align with his goals on improving the conditions for preventive medicine. His colleague
Roger Greene agreed and asserted that the province which “has had no change of
government during the past 18 years might offer an opportunity for public health work”.
However, Victor Heiser, the director for the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health
Board, doubted “the advisability of doing anything in Shansi because of its tenuous political
position, as the military governors tend to encroach more and more upon it”.154 The Chinese
Press reported in 1928 that the employment of Yan Xishan in the central government was
one of the “wisest moves” because of his administrative track record, but hoped that Yan
would be able to maintain his grip on both Shanxi and the Nationalists.155 Yan’s alliance with
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party, incidentally, would be tested just the following year,
and he would spend the rest of his career before 1949 struggling to maintain his hold on
Shanxi, including making a number of unpopular deals with the Communists and the
Japanese. Shanxi’s progressiveness and independence, which had won international praise
years earlier, was now a caution and liability for any other reformists or collaborators
attempting to work in the province.
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Thus, unsurprisingly, Watson and his team could only do damage control of the immediate
crisis in 1928. Fenchow missionaries were necessary to the provincial administration, but
they were often relegated to being employees of Shanxi, to tend to the most mundane, but
most urgent, tasks of immediate crisis control.156 In addition, Yan’s military support of the
Kuomintang in its capture of Beijing earned him a powerful post in the new government,
which would mean leaving projects for “reform and modernization” to local officials in
Shanxi.157 Watson was optimistic that Yan could introduce some of the “outstanding
features” of Shanxi in his new position as Minister of the Interior following his appointment
on October 23, 1928, but also expressed some concern “as to the fortune… [of] Shansi in the
absence of his firm control”.158 Indeed, the 1928 outbreak occurred during Yan’s sojourn to
Beijing in his new capacity. The acting governor in Taiyuan denied Watson’s request for
additional support and limited the types of personnel who could stay to monitor plagueinfected areas after Watson’s team left for new locations.159 As Cao writes, often Lin and
Xing County administrators were only able to call on some locally stationed military who
had been trained in the earlier plague prevention process. Moreover, by this time, Shanxi’s
longstanding autonomy had been threatened and Yan’s efforts to maintain it – for example,
by raising taxes for military spending to prevent invasion from other regional armies during
the civil wars of 1924—1925 – had alienated local populations.160
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In the few studies of the 1918 plague epidemic, Chinese scholars create a centre vs.
province dichotomy in which the outbreaks only served to highlight the ineffective central
Beijing government of the early Republic.161 To claim that both sides were inextricably
dependent is likely a reflection of modern anxieties of the twenty-first century in the face of
SARS and other modern, global epidemics. Many today would not hesitate to assert that the
COVID-19 pandemic was exacerbated precisely because the too-powerful control of the
People’s Republic of China’s central government, which suppressed local autonomy,
innovation, and information dissemination. The solution is more and freer global flows of
knowledge and capital unhindered by political restraints. The missionaries of 1918 were
predecessors to new global actors who promote public health, crossing over provincial
borders with a medical gospel that, in some Chinese provinces like Shanxi, became heavily
incorporated into local statecraft. But throughout the 1928 epidemic, Watson suspected
that Fenchow missionaries had only been indispensable to the provincial government in a
rather mercenary way, merely to facilitate the select reforms envisioned by Yan Xishan.
Shanxi could only advance far in its public health reforms and plague control successes
because of local autonomy in health governance, but this structure became fragile as the
political realities and priorities in Republican China undermined the collaboration between
autocratic leader and his foreign employees.

As Lei writes, “national” public health did not exist in China prior to the establishment of the
Kuomintang government and the “national” government was actually a barrier to public
health. But this should not have to mean that public health did not exist; rather, regional and
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local autonomy in early Republican China allowed for progressive developments, free from
the interference of the national government. Shanxi’s scientifically informed medical
infrastructure remained owned, managed, and operated by Shanxi itself, and its
shortcomings were exacerbated when the province could no longer support the system. The
missionaries who resided within the provincial borders, though foreign, had to declare their
loyalties to the province, but were at the mercy of the political vagaries of its leaders. As the
next chapters show thematically, to best make legible and encourage participation in their
initiatives, Chinese hygiene reformists worked within specific, non-political, communal
spaces around the country. By focusing specifically on “the kitchen” or “the classroom”,
Chinese participants were grounded locally to their communities yet also engaged in
globally-circulating ideas of health and hygiene, often also driven by commerce. Ultimately,
they would also show their dedication towards meeting and affirming the definitions of civil
and hygienic citizenry that were required as China headed towards war.

65

CHAPTER 2: DOMESTIC HYGIENE AND PROTECTING THE NATION
In Jie Li’s 2014 book Shanghai Homes, an elderly family neighbour fondly recalls her
childhood home in Shanghai’s International Settlement in the 1930s. The multi-storey
dwelling was inhabited by a multi-generational family with considerable socioeconomic
upward mobility. It was part of a housing compound built by a British real estate company
in the late 1920s, designed to “[interweave] commercial openness with residential privacy
into an intimate labyrinth” with modern retail stores fronting buildings with traditional
courtyards and décor.162 Parents and children slept in separate bedrooms above a large
kitchen and a guest “hall” and “pavilion” often used for mahjong gatherings.163 Each house in
the complex was “built of wood and brick… equipped with a gas stove and a flushing
toilet”.164

The patriarch of the family, a manager at the British American Tobacco factory, was
certainly considered wealthy. But while the family’s spatial dwellings seem
uncharacteristically large or unattainable for most Chinese at the time, the emergence of
similar real estate developments and the commercial and social infrastructure around
which they were designed indicates the normalisation of such structures. Not only were
certain spaces within the home designated for specific inhabitants to perform specific tasks,
but, as Frank Dikötter writes in Things Modern, urban lives in China in the 1920s and 1930s
followed the trend of houses themselves being gradually sealed “off… as glass windows,
solid doors, stone or concrete walls and fixed layouts created more rigid boundaries with
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the outside world”.165 Spaces were created for these specific purposes, both private and
communal, and the physical space opened up opportunities for “modern” Chinese people to
explore and refine their actions and obligations towards each other.

While classrooms, streets, and restaurants, discussed in later chapters of this dissertation,
fall into the category of “communal” spaces easily, but for the context of the “home”, the
designation of the term stands to be explained. Through hygiene reform movements, homes
fulfilled varied hygienic functions. This chapter examines types of homes – private houses,
dormitories, villages, camps – and the individuals’ responsibility in maintaining them as
hygienic spaces. Not only were they sites for sleeping, dressing, childrearing, and personal
protection from natural elements, but they also were accepted as clinical settings in which
the sick can be treated and recover, and even as exhibition sites for entertaining guests and
displaying symbols of progressive hygienic modernity as part of a nation-building process.

The segmentation of China’s newer homes also allowed for a group of main actors – women
– to emerge to direct the hygienic modernity of these spaces. As Helen Schneider writes in
Keeping the Nation’s House, the rise of domestic management as an academic field in China’s
universities refined the expectations for cleanliness, orderliness, and “modernity” in private
households. While women were expected to bring these lessons to their and others’ private
homes, the professionalisation of the discipline created external references to how
everyday lives should be regulated. Concurrently, in Japan, women’s groups concerned with
“Daily Life Improvement” urged their peers to “draw on their domestic talents as teachers
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and rational homemakers”.166 Those trained in the domestic sciences were not merely
wives, mothers, and scholarly experts, but expected to manage larger “projects of social
reform and help to engineer a better China”.167 Increasingly towards the middle of the
century, they were also taught how to dress wounds, administer injectable medications, and
dietary nutrition science. They were made responsible for the physical health of their
families and communities. Hygiene concerns related to women were increasingly discussed
in public fora – as Tina Johnson and Yi-Li Wu write, hygiene magazines by the 1920s
ensured that “motherhood, pregnancy, childbearing, and infant care were no longer private
family concerns”. Moreover, the tandem rise in professional programs for midwifery,
domestic management, nutrition management, and school nursing, drew on public
resources, and redirected the aforementioned issues as “vital to the future of the country,
and thus appropriate targets of public policy”.168

In Ruth Rogaski’s seminal book, she defines “hygienic modernity” as a set of discourse and
practices defined in the cosmopolitan treaty port of Tianjin that led to the situation for the
self and its place within a modern, strong nation. Often, as this chapter shows, hygiene was
both the subject and object of the process of “modernity”, evoked at the intersection of
health, fashion, and material progress. “Hygienic modernity”, in which “science”, and often
“hygiene”, was well-known as both a fashionable mindset and a commodity, was achievable
by material wealth. After all, “commerce rather than propaganda made [hygiene practices]
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into an everyday practice”.169 The proliferation of advertisements for patent medications,
cleaning supplies, vitamins, and other commodities that were sold evoked the consumers’
consciousness about health and hygiene and the home provided a space for them to be used
and displayed. However, often, participation in commerce and consumerism also had
political implications. Sheldon Garon’s study of daily life in Japan not only blurs the
distinction between public and private, but also highlights the symbiotic “social
management” relationship between people and the state, much more nuanced than it was
linearly repressive – interacting with both the state and the individual, a group of actors
driven by commerce and the media mediated political participation. The Chinese state
certainly promoted aseptic childbirth and modern midwifery as a “crucial component of
state building, modernization and economic growth”, as examined by Johnson and Wu.170
But on a more fundamental level, it was the popularisation of fashionable products and
services deemed “modern” rather than some intangible belief in science and national
strength, that brought hygiene practices into everyday life and into homes.171 It helped, as
Chieko Nakajima writes, that Shanghai’s businessmen devised ways in which “’being
healthful’ could add market value to their merchandise”.172

Homes were also utilised by local authorities to make assertions and demonstrations about
hygiene ad local practices. For example, Maurits Meerwijk shows in his forthcoming book A
History of Plague in Java that Dutch colonials believed that the most “permanent” form of
plague control was home improvement. By literally “building out” the rat, sealing off
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bamboo house frames with cement or sheet metal, health officials and builders could
prevent rats from nesting in homes, and thus prevent rat fleas from approaching people.173
The remodelling of these bamboo dwellings in Java served not only as medical interventions
but also as sites of spectacles – specifically, to demonstrate the scientific progressiveness of
a colonial regime and to begin a more thorough overhaul of natives’ behaviours. Ultimately,
these homes were not so “private” – they were subject to colonial oversight, cultural erasure
and uniformisation, and photos of the renovation process were further used in propaganda
materials for the colonial health authorities to make even deeper interventions.
Furthermore, as this chapter shows, physical domestic structures were segmented, and
instructions were given for each to fulfill some hygienic criteria. Nancy Tomes’ lively
descriptions of American housewives’ distrust of throw pillows and shag carpets as carriers
of microbes and Meerwijk’s investigation of authorities’ official lists and diagrams for home
essentials are certainly inspirations for this chapter. Much like the human patients under
Michel Foucault’s clinical gaze, the home became dissected into discrete parts, and along
with each was ascribed a diagnosis and a set of instructions for its hygienic improvement.
As this chapter will show, rural hygiene initiatives in China further put homes on display as
exhibition and demonstration sites, further “communalising” the home as objects of
hygienic modernity.

What was exhibited included not only the homes and their physical constructions, but also
the condition and behaviour of the inhabitants. Women and younger children – before
school-age – were the focus of many home hygiene policies, commercial products, academic
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courses, and other initiatives. A person was expected to purchase and use cleaning
products, develop a teeth-brushing habit, and wear appropriate, laundered clothes. Chieko
Nakajima’s investigation into Shanghai entrepreneurs’ promotion of hygiene products and
practices shows how their efforts often capitalised on contemporary political movements
and patriotic rhetoric about modern civility and the unified Chinese nation. With the
professionalisation of domestic management, courses for childrearing, and nutritional
management, the home was also turned into a therapeutic and clinical setting whenever the
necessity arose. Women, in particular, were expected to maintain its spatial cleanliness,
foster developmental health for children, and also heal those who were sick.
Responsibilities grew for Chinese women to not only pay attention to the hygiene of their
clothing and appearance but also to bring these lessons into the home. As Helen Schneider
writes, the professionalisation of domestic management programs in Chinese schools and
universities gave women simultaneously the important mandate, and the power and tools
needed, to improve health, efficiency, and morality for Chinese people. Cleaning homes
would “start with individual housewives and spread to the entire nation” both practically
and symbolically, as China’s strength relied both on the physical health and moral
enthusiasm of the people.174 Towards the middle of the twentieth century, especially by the
start of the Sino-Japanese War, the home had become a medical space. Physical homes,
especially along China’s east coast, were threatened during the war, but the expectations of
home hygiene were carried forth through the work of women and the expansion of nursing
care during the wartime. As Nicole Barnes writes, women were the new state
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representatives who “expanded the reach of… health institutions into people’s homes”,
imbued with special powers to enter homes and “effect individual bodies”.175

With this scholarly foundation, this chapter takes a deeper look at the evolving parameters
of “home hygiene” and “family hygiene” (jiating weisheng) as a marketing strategy, a series
of health innovations, and a tool for social mobilisation. While the materiality and design of
homes played a role in shifting ideas about the physical homes as hygienic spaces, the
hygiene of the “family” and its constituents were the main focus of hygiene reformists’
initiatives. Thus, this chapter explores home renovation, at-home therapy, clothing, and
childrearing to expand individuals’ domestic responsibilities in hygiene. Seemingly
paradoxically to new trends in constructing and redesigning modern homes as private
spaces for families, the “home” was actually fluidly open to the outside world, and its
inhabitants became simultaneously students and instructors in the hygienic modernity
movement through their participation, compliance, and consumerism. The home became a
living space, a therapeutic and curative space, and also an exhibition and demonstration
space for hygiene lessons to others.

Getting treated and getting well in the home
The Chinese home had long been looked at as a source of filth and pathology. Dwellings and
their inhabitants, representatives of the “Sick Woman of East Asia”, needed to be changed
for China to progress. Throughout Republican China, several reform efforts attempted to
address this shortcoming, such as the New Culture Movement and the New Life
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Movement.176 For them to be successful, individuals needed to transform their living spaces
and habits – even though legislation was needed to “secure the proper construction… and
provide careful inspection”, faster action could be taken.177 Home hygiene, according to the
Council on Health Education’s series published in the late 1910s, consisted of five factors:
living conditions, diet, daily schedule, disease prevention, and aid. The fortunes of the entire
country were dependent on the work of “those who are concerned with home hygiene”.178
Often, like in plague control measures in Java, progress began with improving and
renovating physical dwellings. However, contemporary authors often blended their
directions with language and concepts that resonated with Chinese audiences, familiar with
concepts of feng shui. For a home to be hygienic, it needed to have “suitable climate,
beautiful scenery, clean air, good location, modest customs, and convenient transportation,
and all six factors not negotiable”. Author Long Xihu wrote that each of these would affect
people’s health, behaviour, and mood, and thus it was important to set a good foundation.179
Long proceeded to take a comprehensive tour of each of the building blocks of a house –
from the altitude, to the placement of windows, to internal storage, pointing out the
dangerous and ideal forms of each element. Home hygiene improvements were not just
temporary fixes, wrote Wu Zhibi, but would impact many generations. The paint colour of
walls needed to be neutral, and windows needed to occupy at least one-tenth of each wall’s
surface area, because “natural light can not only light up the room, but also kill germs”.180
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Another author wrote in a household hygiene guide titled “Weisheng xue ABC” (the ABCs of
hygiene) that each surface – floors, walls, ceilings – must be kept dry to discourage the
breeding of germs.181 To maximise ventilation, the walls needed to be positioned as
conduits, causing outside air to come to “push at the air pressure on the indoor walls
towards the opposite side and out the windows”.182 The Council on Health Education’s
Health Picture Talks also warned readers of the dangers of living in close quarters, without
ventilation, near a tuberculosis patient.183 District government offices also issued diagrams
and instructions for people intending to build or renovate their own houses, including
guidelines on sizes and materials to be used for each room and how to improve water
treatment.184 Dwellings “protect people’s lives” from not only the elements but also human
risks, such as burglary, wrote Shen Qichun, referencing the literal meaning of the two
Chinese characters that make up the term “weisheng”.

Each home was a small community, a Yunnan provincial hygiene inspection service asserted
in a column, and “there is a need to point out how to organise public health… and how to do
it easily” in each of these small communities.185 Wealthier Chinese could consider hiring a
cleaning service, many of which were advertised in newspapers. The Far East Cleaning
Company had branches in Shanghai, Nanjing, Hankow, and Qingdao, and would “disinfect
rooms, wash glass, vacuum and wash carpets, paint, polish metals, and kill bugs”.186 But
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really, to keep a home clean, only a few very simple tools were crucial: a broom, a duster,
metal pan, rags, and a mop. They needed to be maintained, but not fancy or expensive – the
rags could just be old towels or clothes, and the duster and broom could share a handle.187
Instead of purchasing a feather duster, cloths should be used instead for dusting – the
former was actually “undesirable as [it stirs] up the dust…. Increasing the bacteria in the
air”.188

The importance of keeping homes clean was compounded by the fact that, despite a
growing number of hospitals run by both governments and missionary organisations in
China, many people still preferred to be treated and rehabilitated in their homes. Mission
hospitals at the turn of the century had difficulty achieving standards of hygiene that their
own doctors and nurses found satisfactory. Hospitals, with their foreign, unfamiliar-looking
furnishings, also alienated Chinese patients – at the Church Missionary Society Hospital in
Ningbo, patients were often found sleeping on the floor instead of new, iron-spring beds. To
make patients more comfortable, the London Missionary Society Hospital in Shanxi built
one long k’ang instead of individual beds, and the Methodist Episcopal Mission Hospital in
Fuzhou allowed patients to supply their own food and bedding to make the transition from
home to hospital easier.189 During summer months of year, especially in southern China,
hospitals were crowded with patients and their family members who would stay – often
sharing a bed with the patient – to tend to them.
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Efforts such as these were made to adhere to Chinese norms and values, and Chinese
medicine practitioners also began to set up in-patient hospitals to their own advantage.190
Hospitals accommodated Chinese patients by adapting ward layouts and even the menus,
but for some, such as many women, hospital visits were near impossibility. Inpatients in
Chinese hospitals were three times more likely to be men than women, and doctors and
nurses found it difficult to persuade Chinese women, many of whom could not leave duties
at home to extended stays in a hospital.191 In addition, while local custom was considered by
missionary hospitals, admission policies took agency out of the patients’ hands with regards
to their physical comfort, treatment options, length of stay, and even “how dying and death
were dealt with”.192 Furthermore, observers noted that mission-run hospitals in China often
attempted “careful adherence to what is done in the West without much attempt at
adaptation”. David Edsall, Dean of the Harvard Medical School, observed the Peking Union
Medical College Hospital and critiqued the administration’s disregard for the “striking
differences as to the kinds of disease seen… the differences in therapeutic measures
necessitated… [factors that] demand that different slants be given to the teaching and to
other activities” in order to indigenise biomedicine.193 Rather than training them all in the
College classrooms, Edsall recommended that students needed a better understand and
“closer contact with conditions of life”.194
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Home visits had been performed regularly by missionary medical professionals since the
nineteenth century, as they tried to mimic traditional Chinese outfits in which outpatients
consulted pharmacists or called visiting doctors to their homes.195 By the twentieth century,
missionary medical bodies, in cooperation with municipal governments, developed largerscale hospitals that provided inpatient services as well. In large part, it was considerations
about Chinese patients’, especially women’s, reluctance to visit hospitals, clinics, and
dispensaries, that led organisations such as the China Medical Board to offer – and maintain
– more medical services inside private homes, even well into the twentieth century. The
“first Health Centre for children”, opened in 1921 in Changsha, found the services of a public
health nurse crucial to not only assist “at the weekly consultation, but also visits the
children in their homes and gives further instruction there”.196 Starting with its
establishment in 1925, the Peking Health Station created a “Public Health Visiting” service
employed a number of nurses who would conduct daily visits to homes “by stimulating the
individuals with whom she comes in contact, to appreciate health and to formulate habits
which are conducive to health”.197 The majority of the visitors were concerned with
maternity and child health, visiting new mothers in their homes to follow up on antepartum
care and educating mothers on how to take care of their newborns.198 The visitors were
trainee “graduate” nurses (of the PUMC School or Nursing or other nursing schools in
China) who had also complete a course in Public Health Visiting at the Peking Union Medical
College. By 1930, the number of total visits had increased from 2,343 [in 1925??] to
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25,126.199 Each nurse “made an average of 2,000 visits per year” as part of the home
service.200 The next year, there were 34,565 home visits.201 The number dipped after 1933,
when students at the School of Nursing of the Peking Union Medical College were no longer
required to participate in these visits, as many were “overloaded with classes and had a
very limited time for any practical training”.202

Previous experience by other medical missionary organisations confirmed that home visits
were expensive and their benefits difficult to scale but led to more engagement among local
communities. In 1907, the Oberlin Shansi mission station at Taiku reported that “visits to
[locals’] home take much valuable time that can ill be spared. As the work becomes better
known, we are gratified to see that more patients are willing to come and live in the hospital
while being treated”.203 By 1930, the budget for public health visiting came to constitute
two-thirds of total expenditures of the Peking Health Station, which included the costs
associated with training new visitors.204 Ida Pruitt, head of the Peking Union Medical
College’s Social Department, and Anna McCabe, Head of Public Health Nursing, were among
those who believed in the program’s mission. Because of China’s bad conditions of health
knowledge at home, staff had “no choice but to dispatch the fullest trained Public Health
nurses into homes… Health nursing should be made complementary to the work of the
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department of hygiene and public health but should not be controlled by it”.205 Proponents
of the Visiting program insisted that, more importantly, a public health visitor would teach
the women in each home “the adequate care of the sick in the home, by demonstrating
skilled nursing care, and instruction in personal hygiene, sanitation and the prevention of
disease”.206 The visiting service was “an excellent field for students to demonstrate their
ability as ‘health salesmen’” and families could advertise “the services of the Health Station”,
directing people to the curative services of the Peking Union Medical College Hospital.207
The public health nurse who conducts an “instructive” home visit was “preaching the gospel
of ‘healthfulness’ of person, home, food, shop, factory, school, street and of the community
and its health problems”.208 In 1925, 80% of visitors to the regular clinic came as a result of
a previous home visit. As Gertrude Hosmer pointed out, the style of public health nursing,
with its focus on health “instruction” differed widely – and proudly – from traditional
“nursing care” (“a temperature taken, a bath given… the patient made comfortable in some
way”).209 The public health nurses in China had worked to implement a new system.

By 1930, the visiting service included not just routine home visits, but also visits to health
club meetings in local neighbourhoods, visiting schools, factories, and communicable
disease reporting. In 1930, the visiting nurses set up a “little home demonstration” at a local
family’s home for the children and their neighbours, making sure that their health outreach
“integrated with the life of the home and the community”.210 When the Station received
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reports of smallpox and other communicable diseases, public health visitors conduced
“house-to-house canvas for vaccination… in the poor districts” to ensure that there will not
be further spread.211 By the early 1930, all visitors had been trained in specialisations, were
graduates instead of students, and assigned directly from the Health Station rather than the
nursing school. Furthermore, as the services offered by and contracted by the Public Health
Visiting service expanded in scope, they strayed further from the elite medical education
endeavours of the Peking Union Medical College. To some, the goals of the two institutions,
both China Medical Board fundees, were in fact at odds with each other. “There is danger of
attempting impractical measures which in time will exasperate the people and kill their
confidence in the Station”, wrote Kao Chun Che, a social worker at the Peking Health Station,
in 1934. Che noted that the longstanding relationship between local families and visiting
nurses allowed for better diagnosis of not just medical, but also social, problems, and
subsequently efficient referrals to social welfare organisations. Improving these social
conditions would establish a necessary precondition for Chinese to have the “luxury” of
exploring hygiene, and then to seek out the elite medical facilities of the PUMC.212
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Figure 9: The Peking Health Station's Travelling Clinic Staff
Building on a history of public health visiting, and the experience by which homes in Beijing
were used as practicum and demonstration sites for best health practices, the Peking Health
Station even reinforced its capacity for training highly specialised nurses who could
effectively serve local communities better than their peers in hospitals. The services offered
by the public health nursing staff expanded quickly, both in type and area of service in
Beijing. In 1931, John Grant wrote the Station’s report to draw attention to “the increase in
the number of home calls by the visiting service, particularly when it is recalled that in 1925
certain informed physicians advised against establishing the service on the grounds of
unpracticability [sic]”.213 The service had become a mainstay in the Rockefeller’s offerings in
China, and instructional for the development of the Kao-Chiao Health Demonstration Center
in rural Jiangxi and the Ting Hsien Demonstration Area of the Mass Education Movement in
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north China towards the middle of the 1930s, to be explored in greater detail later in this
chapter.

In Kao-Chiao, public health visiting services were to be offered from the beginning –
biweekly in schools to “stimulate activities…. And to create health conscience”, in factories,
and in homes, as the administrators realised that visiting would not only be education but
also fulfill disease reporting purposes.214 Often, school nurses would be required to visit the
homes of their students, too.215 Newborns and children in these homes had “defects” –
crooked or rotting teeth, swollen tonsils, trachoma – would have them caught and corrected
quickly during the visits. By its second year, the staff at Kao-Chiao had corrected 2,128
defects in children, and positively reported that this free service reassured parents to “more
readily… cooperate with us”.216 Still, despite the close cooperation with local government
and the Station’s offering of free delivery services, midwives encountered difficulties as
“rural peoples often have some suspicions for all things modern…. The old midwives will
have opportunity to continue their practice secretly beyond doubt”. The Shanghai
Municipality considered placing heavy fines on families that hired traditional midwives or
violated the Registration Act for recording births, but the Kao-Chiao administrators agreed
to “not do anything drastic” and continue paying “more attention to instruction and
demonstration”, as people would naturally “learn the value of clean delivery” through the
Demonstration Area’s suite of offerings.217 Started in September 1929, the travelling clinic
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consisted of a doctor, nurse, and sanitary police team touring in two wheelbarrows
throughout the district.218 It greatly resembled the travelling health demonstration teams of
the Council for Health Education throughout northern China in the 1910s and early 1920s,
but with an added mandate to vaccinate local people. Before Kao-Chiao’s travelling clinic
arrived in a nearby village, the village chief would distribute posters, and notify the
residents. Most importantly, they would locate a suitable house with amenable residents in
which health demonstration activities were to take place. Local homes had become sites for
exhibition and education, with the intention that the familiarity between inhabitants and
their neighbours would be the best inspiration for making the same changes in their own
homes.

While Kao-Chiao’s health visits and in-home hygiene education depended on trained
professionals, the Mass Education Movement initiatives, started by James Y.C. Yen, took a
different approach. Since 1926, the Mass Education Movement demonstration area in Ting
Hsien had launched innovative attempts to deal with rural poverty through literacy,
agricultural techniques, hygiene, and village governance. Led by C. C. Ch’en, a 1929 graduate
of the Peking Union Medical College, a Health Demonstration area was opened in Ting Hsien
across 72 villages with a total of 80,000 population.219 Much of its programs and institutions
resembled the Peking Health Station, especially at the central health station with its clinic
and preventive vaccination and educational activities. But while the Peking and Kao-Chiao
health demonstration areas lacked trained public health nurses to conduct home visits for
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patient treatment, care, and deliveries, Ting Hsien’s public health department employed a
different type of health visitor – “Village Health Workers”, laymen with a very short course
of training committed towards the improvement of health in their own villages. The 1929
proposal of the Public Health Department, written by H. Y. Yao, outlined the exacting duties
of the workers. They would conduct “periodical sanitary inspection” in all homes to improve
“cleanliness, measures against flies, lice and bed-bugs, habit of using individual towels,
improvement of light, ventilation and toilet” at the homes of their neighbours and peers.220
As C. C. Chen, director of public health of the Mass Education Movement, wrote in 1935,
Chinese people needed a reorientation of their attitudes towards the value of laymen in
effecting real change. “Too often a technical man is inclined to think that all technical
achievements are obtainable by the efforts of technical workers alone… but in order to
change the living conditions of the mass of people by trained workers alone, there must be a
sufficient number of the latter”.221 China’s short time of experience with “scientific
medicine” meant that it did not make sense to create a division between curative and
preventive medicine, as it had occurred in the West, nor to spend disproportionate time and
resources to train professionals. Instead, the Mass Education Movement aimed to make
“farmers themselves first aware of their problem, arouse in them a sense of responsibility
for it, and then set them to work on it”.222
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The Village Health Workers were graduates of the People’s Schools in Ting Hsien,
recommended by village elders, and graduates of a ten-day course at the Subdistrict Health
Stations. During the training, three main topics were covered: “methods of registering
births and deaths, technique of smallpox vaccination and the use of a “First Aid Box”.223 The
“advance guard in the fight against ill-health”, also carried copies of hygiene education
posters to bring to farmers’ homes, and instruct them how to “Take Frequent Baths”, “Avoid
Opium”, “Get Rid of Lice”, among other lessons.224 They were also responsible for designing
and instructing their peers on how to construct sanitary drinking wells. Among the most
successful of the Village Health Workers’ interventions was that of smallpox vaccination.
Village Health Workers familiar with each village, accompanied by nurses, would travel
there and set up in the centre. After making some fanfare about their arrival, they would
ensure that only when there was a large crowd around that a Village Health Worker
administer a “superficial prick” to a volunteer to start the vaccination process.

Maximising vaccination numbers for the short window of time when the “weather was
neither too cold to take off overcoats nor warm enough to keep the villagers busy in the
fields”, Ting Hsien was able to avoid calamity during an epidemic in the spring of 1933, with
only three cases and one death known throughout the 80,000 population.225 In addition of
the 10,000 first aid treatments given out that year, “only 4% were found to be incorrect”,
and that there was no decrease in required services from the Village Health Workers.
Subsequently, the number of outcalls made by the Sub-District physicians could be reduced.
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The experiences of Ting Hsien in the early 1930s proved that individuals with only minimal
training could be effective vaccinators, especially if they were familiar with local people and
customs. Vaccination, first-aid, and basic clinical care would also soon be incorporated into
the curricula for schoolteachers in Republican China, to be discussed in further detail in the
next chapter.

Moreover, the Village Health Workers served as “health extension agents” who could not
only assist medical professionals at higher levels make interventions to prevent disease and
infection, but also entice more individuals to seek higher education in medicine and join
medicine-related professions.226 John B. Grant, a member of the Advisory Council and on the
Public Health faculty at the Peking Union Medical College, had agreed with the general
principles of the work proposed but was sceptical about linking the project to the Medical
College. Grant believed that Yao’s program was too ambitious yet relied too heavily on
individuals not properly trained in public health work, noting that the expectations were
similar to that from “a PUMC graduate of decided mediocre ability and without special
health training”.227 Nevertheless, the Medical College’s Public Health Department continued
to collaborate with the Ting Hsien health department. In 1932, Peking Union even sent
graduate doctors and nurses in public health, along with administrative personnel, to the
demonstration area and participate in the Village Health Workers’ training.228 In April 1936,
the North China Council for Rural Reconstruction, a collaboration between the Chinese
government and several missionary organisations in the region, adapted some of the
curriculum practical training from the Mass Education Movement to reinforce professional
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medical training programs for other medical schools. The Council was particularly inspired
by the “enlistment by the Movement of university interest in its training program” to use
village health as training opportunities for undergraduate and graduate students, while also
making the village health workers more professional.229 With the Japanese invasion, Mass
Education Movement demonstration areas in Shandong and Jiangsu, based on the Ting
Hsien model, were abandoned, and the administrators of the North China Council for Rural
Reconstruction moved, along with many of north China’s universities and medical schools,
into the interior. In 1939, several students from National Kweiyang Medical College and
post-graduate nurses from the National Health Administration’s training institute worked at
the newly-established Tingfan prefecture Health Demonstration Area, near Guiyang.230

The Village Health Workers’ endeavours reflected the same trends in home hygiene
initiatives in other parts of China: they first entered homes to ensure that people’s spaces
were clean and offered familiar and approachable techniques to ensure the hygienic
suitability of these living spaces. Treating minor ailments and infections in these homes
reinforced the fact that these spaces could be made sufficient for curative purposes. Then,
their work would have a spillover effect for vaccination drives and other mass educational
efforts for hygiene concerns.
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Maintaining domestic hygiene in the home and on the body
“In the busy streets with flying sand and rocks, if you don’t wear glasses, you can get
glaucoma”, wrote Shen Qichun in Weisheng xue ABC, before reinforcing that “clothing fulfills
cloth hygienic and practical purposes”.231 As an extension of a person’s residence, his or her
clothing would have to protect from invasions of harmful agents. Undershirts, or hanshan
(literally “sweat shirt”), especially for men, were popular around the world in the early
twentieth century. Chinese clothing businesses, in addition, developed a product called the
weisheng shan, or hygienic shirt. There were seasonal varieties depending on the climate
and usage, but its main function was seemingly to keep the wearer warm and dry. In a
personal essay, a writer in Shishi xin bao excitedly explained that his aunt’s recent gift to his
father, a thick, cotton weisheng shan, was so warm that father would not need to wear a silk
padded jacket for the coming winter.232 An advertisement in the same newspaper for Yong
Zi brand weisheng shan states that if wearers are asked if they were cold, they would always
reply “inside I am wearing Yong Zi brand weisheng shan, how could I be cold?” A weisheng
shan could ensure that skin stays warm, dry, and protected from dust, all at the same time.
“Imagine if moistened skin becomes contaminated with dust”, Shen wrote, “how dangerous
would that be!”233

Chinese innovation in this undershirt industry started at the turn of the century with
production factories in the Shanghai International Settlement producing socks and shirts. In
1924, a company started by five returned students in Shanghai named Wuhe Weaving Mill,
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began to mass market its products and advertise them creatively.234 Among its products
was the popular Goose Brand sweatshirt and other weisheng shan varieties. “Goose” was
chosen as the brand’s icon because the bird’s feathers were always clean and white, and no
matter how many times the shirts were washed, they would remain clean and white. The
shirts would also be as warm as geese’s undercoats.235 The Chinese version of The China
Times, a mainstay newspaper of the Shanghai International Settlement, advertised Wuhe’s
weisheng shan, priced at one dollar and 30 cents each, and other domestically produced
cotton goods, side-by-side with imported soaps and cleaning products.236 By 1936,
Shanghai’s companies were selling 60,000 dozen sweatshirts and weisheng shan, many of
which were exported. Goose Brand shirts were considered so excellent that fakes of the
product were made and sold in Paris.237
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Figure 10: 3D advertisement for Goose Brand weisheng shan using a series of geese along the
street.
Not all undergarments designed to protect and keep the wearer warm were made equal or
were for everyone’s use – in the 1929 first issue of the Shanghai Medical Weekly, a writer
warned women to not unthinkingly buy in to fashion trends that would negatively impact
their health. According to an anecdote, a woman in labour suffered a miscarriage “due to the
tightness of her weisheng shan”, which could not be easily removed. The writer understood
that women who were in labour also considered themselves “civilised and attentive to
beauty”, but needed to be careful not to wear tight undergarments that would also impede
breast milk production and babies’ development.238 While bras, corsets, and other imported
garments designed to bind women’s chests and tighten their figures were available in
China’s urban department stores by the 1930s, their reception, even to the cosmopolitan
young, was “unpredictable”. According to Antonia Finnane, both bras and the northern
Chinese “little vest” (doudou) had been designed to flatten women’s breasts under form-
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fitting clothing, were no sooner deemed fashionable than decried as bad for women’s
health.239 Goals for this “hygienic clothing” discipline and calls for Chinese women to unbind
their feet in the early Republican period were mutually beneficial and morphed together
into a “clothing change” movement. In a 1928 issue of Weisheng Bao, on the topic of
“women’s health”, unbinding feet, slimming the bust, and cutting hair were all issues
discussed from the perspective of hygienic studies.240 In hygiene journals and advertorials,
profiles of modern women declared their preference to wear comfortable cotton weisheng
shan instead of “old-fashioned” doudou or “unhygienic” bras.241

Domestically produced shirts by companies such as Wuhe were apparently more suited for
the Chinese body, climate, and, increasingly, values. Made of cotton, sweatshirts were
believed to be more breathable, warmer, and cheaper than silk fibres and less constrictive
than imported undergarments. There were also Goose Brand weisheng shan specially
invented for each season in each Chinese climate.242 A guide produced by the Hubei Health
Bureau notes “Traditional Chinese clothing is too loose, which means the wearer cannot
keep warm, while Western-style clothing is too tight, and can uncomfortably compress a
person’s organs, leading to problems with breathing and other diseases”.243 Thus, wearing
domestically-produced undergarments was symbolic of more than just indications of one’s
progressive understandings of hygiene and health, was symbolic of a deeper commitment to
the important task at hand – serving people’s, and the nation’s, health, inside and out. As
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China headed into war with Japan in the late 1930s and early 1940s, hygiene guides
explicitly drew out the analogies of dirt to aggression, the body to the nation, and clothing to
protection. In 1933, on the anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, one of the
founders of Wuhe wrote in an advertorial, “Goose Brand can protect the wearer from
external aggression. From the perspective of the human body, we then think about the
aggression against our country. The Chinese people should unite and jointly oppose foreign
aggression”.244 A failure to carefully launder dirty clothing would not only be “lazy” but
negate the items’ benefits – dirty clothing would not be able to “fully absorb a person’s
sweat” and make the wearer uncomfortable and prone to disease.245 Improper clothing and
living conditions would also render people to neglect their other duties or reproduction,
childrearing, and exercise.

With the launch of the New Life Movement in 1934, appropriate dress and personal hygiene
regulations were codified and rationalised using traditional Chinese understandings of
morality. The Movement’s focus on “frugality”, discussed further in the Kitchen Hygiene
chapter, pushed Chinese people to achieve cleanliness without lavish spending. Instead of
buying new, fashionable, furnishings and clothes, they should “use simple, old things”. When
making clothes, women should “avoid using imported materials” but ensure that each item
is clean and made with care.246 Cleaning the home and maintaining good habits and a
regular schedule was important for all people. While it might have been too expensive to
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purchase new undergarments for poorer, working people, the regulation of hygiene in the
home and on the body was something achievable by all, and could even help to equalise
hygiene and health disparities between the rich and poor, urban and rural. Reinforcing that
hygiene practices should be popularised and domesticated in all homes, the Wuchang city
government posted on a public notice for cleaning campaigns, “We do not need to go as far
as to look under a microscope to check for germs every time we eat a mouthful of food. All
we should be doing is cultivating good hygiene habits”.247 A Shanghai Health office
reassured “working class” families that their improvement of hygiene would not cost
money, and in fact smoking, drinking, and purchasing meat less would be beneficial
financially.248 In fact, prevention of diseases would “save you and your family strife and
losses in other ways”, the Yunnan New Life Movement association published, heavily
implying the financial costs to disease.249 An article titled “My Hygiene Creed” in Weisheng
Ban Yue Kan invited all Chinese around the world to “join a discussion” on how to “wash off
the Sick Man of Asia” title through their own practice of personal hygiene. Further, the
article asserts, while some may consider the better health metrics in the United States and
Europe as resulting from the care of more doctors, the author reminds the reader of the
heyday of Chinese civilisation in the Zhou and Han Dynasties, when China fought off
barbarian invasions. Then, Chinese medical care and principles played a role in the
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country’s strength. Perhaps, now, there could be a role in for Chinese common wisdom,
too?250

To learn how to fulfill their responsibilities and elevate the hygiene standards of their
families, women could also attend classes and workshops at the Peking First Health Station
and the Shanghai Kao-Chiao Health Demonstration Area on how to clean, arrange furniture,
provide their own prenatal care, and diagnose and treat minor ailments in other family
members. The Peking First Health Station already hosted a regular “Mothers Club” since
1925, but in 1928, Anna McCabe, a nurse with the Peking Health Station, recommended the
establishment of a “Baby Health Station”. To “keep in touch with our delivered mothers and
babies”, McCabe wrote, it was essential for the mothers to know that they could gain
something, or learn something, from returning to the Station: “health classes could be
conducted, and the adequate care of babies taught and demonstrated”.251 In 1931, the
Station implemented a regular Home Hygiene class. The Shanghai Kao-Chiao Demonstration
Area, another China Medical Board collaborative project, brought together women and
children from the rural district to attend “Mother’s Conferences” and participate in lectures,
discussions, and demonstrations of hygienic clinical care at home. As souvenirs for their
participation, the mothers were given photographs of themselves and their children at the
demonstration site.252 Health guides reminded mothers that even with serious illnesses
such as measles, many therapeutic actions could be taken without leaving the home: “keep
the child in bed… keep the room darkened for the eyes of the child”, were two among other
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arrangements that would add to their comfort.253 The Health Stations were exhibition sites
that demonstrated what Chinese women would bring back into their own domestic spheres.

To prevent oneself from getting sick at all, one needed to abide by a few simple principles:
take in sunlight, quit eating unhealthy snacks, and rest well after work.254 These instructions
for daily hygiene were advocated as important parts of domestic life. Physical exercise and
sports, in particular, would bring families closer together as all members could gather for
this important ritual.255 Weisheng ban yue kan regularly published guidelines for physical
exercise at home, including how to make use of door frames, walls, and other structural
components to stretch and improve posture.256 Even simple tasks such as cleaning the home
– “making the bed, washing dishes, and sweeping the floor” – could be leveraged as
opportunities for a woman to exercise, symbiotically supporting her other hygienic duties
around the home.257 Exercise was also important for individuals to maintain control over
their own bodies – “muscles atrophy if we spent all day sitting down”, and would help
regulate food and digestion.258 Recreational exercise would also “repair the waste caused by
a day’s labor”, and help prevent “mental and nervous breakdowns” caused by “mental
worry, monotony of life”.259

While these smaller, individual actions may have seemed trivial to many medical
professionals, especially those at missionary hospitals, they are indicative of sincere efforts
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for hygiene improvement in China’s homes. Paediatrician V. B. Appleton wrote in Health in
1924 that “patent medicines are a menace to the public” as they crease “false hopes” for the
consumer, who then put off consulting real medical professionals until it is too late.260 Even
so, their marketing in Chinese newspapers and magazines reveals the market with an
ongoing interest in health, and dialogue across Chinese medical entrepreneurs in a
transnational context. Products such as Sine Pharmaceutical’s Zymasun Yeast Tablets and
Two Girls’ Florida Water (founded by German and Chinese entrepreneurs in Shanghai and
Hong Kong, respectively), were advertised side by side with notices for vaccination drives,
doctors’ editorials, and advertisements for dentists and optometrists. The products, while
potentially having the impact that Appleton feared, also bridged the gap between clinical
biomedicine and Chinese conceptions of how individuals could enhance their own
wellness.261 Taking the tonic Zymasun in the summer, for example, would not only clear the
bowels and treat digestion, but also create a “nourishing” and “spirit brightening” effect for
the taker.262 The impact of these patent medicines is beyond the scope of this chapter, but
deserves attention as a key way by which Chinese were encouraged to improve their
personal health.

Thus, personal hygiene practiced at home – for example, brushing one’s teeth then putting
on a weisheng shan under a dress every morning – were acts that indicated a deeper
engagement with the consumerist and political exhortations of hygiene improvement in
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Republican China. It was ironic, but immaterial, that Goose Brand weisheng shan was
designed to be the innermost layer of clothing yet touted to be crucial for national defence
against external aggression. The home, family, and the body had all been fluidly connected
to the outside world through propaganda, media, and commerce, that the connections
between home and personal hygiene and communal responsibility remained strong and
clear.

Taking care of babies, the future of the nation
“Our country has never paid much attention to hygiene”, asserted an editorial written by the
communications department of the Kuomintang’s Fujian Party Affairs and Direction
Committee in 1929, “and regarding life and death, we only have the idiom ‘Life and Death is
fate’ [shengsi you ming]… we have dismissed life and death into the boundary-less world of
superstition and mysticism”.263 But the most common knowledge that was necessary for a
healthy society, the editorial continues, is for common people to understand that “if a
people is weak, it does not have much hope of making a healthy next generation”.
Hereditary diseases – colour blindness, psychological and nervous illnesses, strokes,
syphilis, and alcoholism, among others – would ensure the destruction of an entire family
tree after just four generations after the women were unable to produce healthy babies.264
Hygiene reformists’ focus on babies and childrearing was not new in public debates, and
Chinese governments certainly had an impact in establishing midwifery schools, school
hygiene, and other institutions that would ensure sanitary conditions for newborns and
young children. But specialisation training for medical professionals took time and
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resources The Peking Health Station inaugurated a “Baby Health Station” in 1929, a room
set up to resemble a nursery and a clinic to which mothers could bring their babies to be
weighed, “preparation of foods could be demonstrated and taught, health classes could be
conducted, and the adequate care of babies taught and demonstrated”.265 The China Medical
Board now considered how the impact could be broadened to reach more than just those
who chose to visit the Station. How could hygiene education be accomplished cheaper and
faster?

Better baby contests became popular events at state and county fairs in the American
Midwest in the early twentieth century. At these events, parents could bring their babies to
be weighed, checked by a nurse for defects, given a quick check-up, and maybe even
vaccinated against smallpox. Winners of each competition were given prizes. One young boy
in England won 1,000 pounds in the National Physical Welfare Competition and a
sponsorship deal with Allenbury’s Foods.266 In spite of the any potential discomfort from
parents or medical professionals in assessing children essentially as livestock, entering a
Better Baby Contest was often a rare opportunity for a family to consult a paediatric
medical professional, then still a growing specialty. Following the events’ successes, writes
Annette Vance Dorey, missionary organisations began adopting the same approach and
brought contests to urban, poor environments to intervene in areas with undesirable health
conditions.267 An easily exported effort to “save children” around the globe, everywhere
with a missionary presence, similar models were taken outside the United States, and to
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China most notably by the Council on Health Education and the YMCA.268 In China, the YMCA
began with “home betterment programs” in urban areas to address issues that were specific
to women and their lives. These programs resembled the Home Health Clinics’ offerings at
the Peking Health Station and other organisations focused on care of children, with
mothers’ clubs, children’s clinics, hosting a variety of lectures, discussion groups, and
demonstrations. Among them were better-baby contests, held to “illustrated approved
methods of infant care by awarding prizes to the healthiest entries”.269 Contests in Shanghai
even included different categories for “Chinese, Western, and Japanese” children.270

Figure 2.11: Advertisement for Allensburys' Foods with the winner of a healthy baby contest.
According to Margaret Tillman, these contests were “imbued with cultural significance” in
the Chinese New Culture Movement as well as their roots in Christianity. Unlike the
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American examples, there was not so much an underlying goal for eugenics, but instead, the
contests illustrated “the ways in which Chinese child savers and Christian [facilitators]
echoed May 4 discourses concerning modern childhood”.271 The China Hygiene Education
Society, chaired by Chen Kuo-fu, was established in 1935 as a vehicle that would popularise
“general awareness of weisheng” in individuals’ lives.272 Among its goals was to bridge some
gap between clinical care in China’s public health system and the hygiene education that
would be available to children as they entered schools. Family and home hygiene –
especially as it concerned children under the age of six, was the Society’s priority as it
proposed the creation of a “family education research committee”, national preschool
education facilities, and training for parents of young children. In a letter report to the
Ministry of Education, the Society lauded the efforts around the country towards “using
scientific methods of research and investigate best health standards… on the one hand
making good hygiene habits, on another improving this society to progress”, but lamented
the lack of attention paid to hygiene inside homes that would affect small children.273 Its
solution was to make these matters part of public education and demonstration, and the
decision to hold healthy baby contests around the country in each of its chapters helped to
fulfill this goal.

Reception of better baby contests was generally positive, in China and in the United States.
As Dorey writes, they elevated the profile of children’s health, and “stimulated the
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proliferation of child health centers and pediatricians”. They also helped to turn the focus of
medical interventions away from disease and mortality and instead “to prevention and
medical management of normal healthy children development”.274 For mothers and their
children, participation in healthy baby contests also presented chances to win prizes. In
January 1934, the Council on Health Education in Hunan, in collaboration with the HunanYale Medical College and the Hunan provincial government, organised a Healthy Baby Show
as part of a larger hygiene education event. Babies were weighed and measured, and
doctors tested teeth and eyes while assistants kept them distracted and happy while the
examinations continued. Volunteers and assistants also demonstrated the correct ways to
wash and dry babies’ clothing, using a simple clothing line that can be found commonly in
homes.275 The Hygiene Education Society’s events offered sponsored prizes from local
businesses, including health products, food, books, diapers, and other sundries. In a 1936
contest there were 300 shortlisted and 10 commended babies from each of the five age
categories from birth to five years old.276 Watson’s pharmaceutical company held an annual
children’s health contest in Hong Kong with over 400 participants competing for cash and
product prizes in 1939.277

Better baby contests reflected how the Chinese hygiene reformists’ community of medical
professionals, Christian advocates, and commercial businesses interacted symbiotically. As
Chinese governments and organisations adopted the practice in the 1920s and 1930s,
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following from YMCA models, the contests helped to serve other agenda. They were efficient
venues for collection of statistics and information about newborns and children in rural
areas and were often followed by vaccination drives.278 Moreover, government
organisations took the opportunity to establish partnerships with business sponsors and
medical schools and attract and train local physicians almost as government-endorsed
contractors. Without being obviously intrusive, better baby contests were still health
interventions. They were potentially more attractive to poorer Chinese people as they came
with material incentives, and more attractive to governments and missionary agencies
because of the spectacle that accompanied each event.279 As the next chapter on School
Hygiene discusses in further detail, preventive hygiene soon became part of the duties for
children and their teachers as the education system increasingly turned towards using them
as agents for public health promotion.

The start and the course of the Sino-Japanese War certainly disrupted domestic life, to the
point that the ideal, hygienic “home” described in the early part of the century was no
longer conceivable, not to mention achievable. The refugee crisis in many Chinese cities
created new concerns about hygienic living not covered in the earlier household renovation
guides. More basic concerns, such as vaccination against smallpox, returned to
cosmopolitan areas such as the Shanghai International Settlement as the refugee crisis
worsened in 1938.280 Charities and child protection agencies around the country faced
financial difficulties and “unreasonable” prices, especially with medications and
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foodstuffs.281 The National Association for Refugee Children also faced an increase of new
and returned residents who required assistance, and difficulties in determining their
vaccination records and other health information.282

However, baby health contests continued to be held, along with other large-scale,
sensationalist events that required public participation. Concerned with an existential
threat to the Chinese race, children’s health became an even greater concern during
wartime. At the same time, government health organisations launched a series of other
mass-participation campaigns such as cleaning drives and nutrition demonstrations, which
all helped to coordinate statistical gathering of Chinese health conditions and further
mobilisation during a period of total war. These will be discussed in more detail in later
chapters. In September 1938, the Hygiene Education Society applied for funding from the
Ministry of Education to hold a Health Baby Contest in China’s interior. In its application
letter, the directors of the society explained that its expertise in planning and holding such
events could be used to better babies’ health conditions in Changsha, Hunan.283 The society
further applied for assistance of 2,000 to 3,000 yuan in 1941, citing its ongoing
collaborations in holding the contests in Jiangsu.284 At the Xinzha Health Demonstration
Area in Shanghai, 130 children and over 300 of their family members participated in a
“Healthy Children Contest” in May 1941.285 Health exhibitions targeted towards women
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included healthy baby contests to encourage greater numbers in participation, and
organisers used the opportunity to diagnose children’s diseases, undernourishment, and
give nutrition and other health advice. The purpose of the “Maternity Hygiene Exhibition
Tour” in 1942, in which over 60% of babies entered in the contest were found to be
undernourished, was to “promote the importance of children’s health to families”. Even
“ordinary housewives” could learn a lot about how to maintain children’s health without
spending much money – to attain more Vitamin D in the fight against rickets, for example,
there was no need for expensive cod liver oil – merely unbutton one’s undergarments and
let the body soak up the sun for fifteen minutes.286

Throughout the war, better baby contests had become “indigenized”: Chinese doctors and
nurses, not just missionary ones, took up the mantle to treat and reward children, and
Chinese companies became the events’ key sponsors.287 While still critical of “traditional”
customs and their failures in hygiene, government-sponsored home hygiene initiatives
during the war also emphasised Chinese innovation, spirit, and potential, continuing to
expound New Life Movement values and mobilisation institutions. Adding to the spectacle
of health exhibits and baby health inspections at Fujian’s tenth anniversary celebration of
the New Life Movement, a local performance group brought ancient weapons to
demonstrate traditional Chinese sporting forms.288 The contests had evolved into a
“technique” that had increasingly become familiar to Chinese women and their families.
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They presented easy ways for medical professionals to impart not only medical knowledge
but also explications of political or commercial agenda, especially with advice that were
catered towards both their target audiences and the national agenda of wartime survival.

Tillman’s research on better baby contests asserts that they, more than “other arenas of
reform… defined the realm of future-oriented potential and reflected hopes for the nation’s
survival”.289 In a series of educational videos to be produced in 1946 and 1947 by the
Ministry of Education, the stories of mothers and children were upheld as key examples for
model hygienic behaviour. A series called “The Good Child” (hao haizi) features a girl called
Xiulan who exemplifies all the progress of personal hygiene – she opens her bedroom
windows for ventilation first thing in the morning, exercises in the yard with her mother,
defecates at the same time every day, and passes her school hygiene inspection with flying
colours. At night, before bed, Xiulan and her father read through a poster with two health
habits hanging on her wall and check off her achievements of the day on a personalised
checklist. Xiulan, presumably a child who had lived through the Sino-Japanese War,
understood her own individual importance – as a child, female, and future mother – to
practice, and be accountable for, her hygienic behaviours. Despite her young age, her daily
routine at home and school and her personal diary were all part of this greater exhibition.290
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Figure 12: An excerpt of Xiulan's personal hygiene journal with a checklist of her daily
responsibilities.
In the next chapters, I show how such spectacular, participation-driven events – with buy-in
from local and national governments, educational and industrial institutions, local and
transnational businesses, and individuals and households – proliferated throughout China
throughout the Republican era. During the wartime, their methods were firmly adopted by
the Nationalist government and other Chinese organisations, and events even increased in
number especially in the Chinese interior. Every part of Chinese daily life had been opened
up to be scrutinised and graded in the public square, as hygiene and national survival
concerns became intertwined in the government rhetoric. The roles of the individual –
especially that of women – also evolved as they were given increasingly important
mandates in progress towards hygienic modernity. From mere housekeepers, they became
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responsible for exhibiting hygiene trends in their homes and on their bodies, to becoming
experts in home therapeutic care, to being the ultimate responsible party for children’s
health and the future of China.
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CHAPTER 3: SCHOOL HYGIENE AND THE NEW HEALTH AMBASSADORS
In September 1922, John B. Grant, Associate Professor of Public Health and Hygiene at the
Peking Union Medical College, finally saw the realisation of a long-term project – a six-week
intensive special course on Educational Hygiene for educators and school administrators in
Beijing.291 Grant had been writing to the directors of the Rockefeller Foundation’s China
Medical Board for years, stating the need for laymen-targeted hygiene education in China.
Grant conceptualised this program as vastly different from the elite, professional medical
education for doctors and nurses offered at the Peking Union Medical College. In 1918,
Grant offered his suggestions on teaching personal hygiene in elementary and middle
schools – “attempts at sanitary education should never lose sight of the fact that to be
effective it must be direct and rational”. In fact, focusing just on curative medicine, as had
generally been the case with medical missions to China until that point, would undermine
the status of Western medicine as wholly capable for the health needs of the Chinese – “the
best of Western medical science should be presented… any presentation [that] does not
include preventive medicine with the proportionate emphasis… is not showing Western
medicine in its true light”.292

The 1922 Special Course ended on an optimistic note. Participants signed on to resolutions
to grade the facilities in their own schools for hygienic standards (kitchens, dormitories,
“insuring of certain minimal standards of ventilation”, and others) and to stop the
dissemination of “totally inadequate hygiene texts for schools”. They discussed possible
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initiatives that could “correlate… with Chinese conditions” and the specific conditions of
their own schools and left the program considering the formation of a unified body to carry
on such work. School administrators envisioned inviting members of Beijing’s growing
medical community – staff at the Peking Union Medical College, trainees at the Peking First
Health Station (established May 1925) – to their schools and making sure the buildings
were up to code and the facilities were sufficiently clean. For Grant, using Rockefeller
resources to teach and hold accountable those in authoritative positions to improve school
hygiene, in addition to the running of the elite Medical College, was more than worthwhile.
It was imperative, he believed, to prioritise “extra-mural” health education work outside of
the Medical College itself. “The Medical School will not be emulated as a whole for some
time to come in China, but the fundamentals will”.293

Grant was concerned about the scale of his training course, and that the “political chaos” in
China during the mid-1920s presented barriers.294 How could Peking Union and other
missionary hospitals and medical schools around the country provide for sustainable
education of hygiene and preventive education if Grant’s own institution seemed to have
entirely different missions? As an educator and doctor, Grant believed in the power of
public education for public health; the child of Protestant missionaries, he emphasised
community development; and as an administrator, he was concerned that the paucity of
medical professionals, clinics, and funding around the country could never keep up with the
existing rate of infectious disease cases, placing a financial and technological advancement
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burden on such organisations as the China Medical Board. Grant, though an elite faculty
member of a foreign university, was not alone in trying to launch education of hygiene and
preventive medicine in China’s elementary and middle schools. In fact, as this chapter
shows, local initiatives to produce and spread classroom hygiene lessons came from myriad
actors, from provincial governments, to missionaries, to international organisations. “School
hygiene” (translated literally as xuexiao weisheng) a term borrowed from English sources,
matured and morphed into more than just the teaching of hygiene habits to children
(weisheng jiaoyu), but also came to encompass the responsibilities of teachers, students, and
educational institutions as ambassadors of hygiene improvement and public health
provision especially during the Sino-Japanese War (1937—1945).

The ability of concepts and institutions to become adopted and hybridised in the Republican
Chinese context has already been explored by recent scholars such as Chieko Nakajima,
Sean Hsiang-Lin Lei, and Mary Augusta Brazelton. In particular, these studies lay a
foundation to show that Western-initiated hygiene concepts were neither excessively
foreign to nor in conflict with native ones, and that public health reformists took care to
ensure their acceptability in Chinese society. Both Chinese and biomedical institutions coexisted, according to Nakajima, “without much intellectual or cultural anxiety”.295 The goal
of this chapter, however, is not just to provide more examples of the acceptability of myriad
hygiene concepts to the Chinese population, but also to highlight the “school” as a particular
site on which hygiene improvement initiatives were able to flourish. To this end, a
consideration of the school’s “usefulness” is necessary; as public health mass campaigns
ramped up in modern cities and states, according to Michel Foucault, the unit of the family
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becomes an instrument for governance.296 While the previous chapter on domestic hygiene
addresses the role of women in the home, school students, similarly, became empowered to
become ambassadors in this Foucauldian sense, especially after the establishment of the
Kuomintang administration, the launch of the New Life Movement, and the start of the SinoJapanese War. In fact, the direction that students’ school learnings should be brought home
to their families even establishes the distinctive site of the school as a key layer in health
governance. In the Chinese history field, Nicole Barnes’ exploration of the concept of
“intimacy” in wartime nursing care has been particularly enlightening – as nurses in
wartime China were essential for “building the nation as an emotional community”,
teachers and school nurses played similar, unifying roles in peacetime.297 Furthermore, as
the chapter shows, the lines between teachers and nurses as health instructors become
blurred after the start of the war as teaching college graduates were expected to take on
additional primary care duties for their charges.

In this chapter, “school hygiene” refers to three aspects that together describe the
experiences expected of a teacher or student in a classroom environment – the
incorporation of hygiene teaching into academic curricula and what concepts were taught
and how, the standards of a hygienic classroom or school environment, and the
participation of students, teachers, and staff in maintaining clean communal spaces and
providing health services. Using “the school” as a general category, this chapter shows the
trajectory of the maturation of hygiene practices both in the classroom and from the
classroom. The 1920s and early 1930s saw a proliferation of hygiene textbooks for the use
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of even the youngest schoolchildren. While these were often imported, translated, and
general in their content, they created models for students’ own personal behaviours. Later,
the formalisation of nursing and basic medical knowledge into teacher training courses
indicated an expansion of the types of services expected of educators. Finally, during
wartime, schools became centres of hygiene outreach. Far from facing oppressive, nationalgovernment demands to conform to hygienic standards, an educational institute’s ability to
demonstrate hygiene competence became a symbol of its usefulness and patriotism. Schools
and administrators were even able to use this status to leverage additional resources during
wartime.

School hygiene thrived during Republican China primarily because it was primed to do so,
supported by missionary and international organisations, local and national governments,
and intellectuals, all of whom found the classroom to be a fruitful and politically-neutral site
for hygiene education and collaborative activity. In addition, the drive to not only translate
but also to nativise hygiene texts gave school hygiene its scalability and helped to
standardise the national government’s agenda towards hygiene initiatives around the
country. As Ruth Rogaski writes, the state learned to deploy meaningful and familiar
language and in doing so elevated certain aspects of the definitions of the term weisheng.298
At the same time, however, school hygiene administration marked the success of local
governance and became an effective, visible way for smaller scale administrations to
demonstrate their ability for progressive initiatives and local mobilisation.
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“The Logical Place for Educational Hygiene”
While Grant may have stood out among his peers at the Peking Union Medical College, his
opinions on wider-scale hygiene education were not unique among China’s medical elite.
Wu Lien-teh, then head of the North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service, was a plaguecontrol veteran who had played a leading role in managing the 1910—1911 epidemic of
pneumonic plague in Manchuria. Working mostly alongside, yet sometimes against, clashing
imperial designs on Manchuria, Wu was frustrated with the helplessness and cluelessness of
the Chinese public that allowed the plague to exacerbate in the first place. Wu called
repeatedly for the creation of a central health authority that would eliminate the “wasteful
and backward” practice of employing both “native trained and western-trained medical
officers” in curative-focused hospitals, and instead spend those resources to teach hygiene
more widely and consistently to school-aged pupils. Proper sanitation should be
undertaken, wrote Wu, under the supervision of “leading physicians and business men as
well as the police authorities”, and “leading citizens” should take a role in creating “social
leagues” for peer education.299 In 1914, William Wesley Peter, an American doctor affiliated
with the Young Men’s Christian Association, was chosen by its Lecture Department to
perform a lecture series around the country, accompanied by lantern slides, posters, and
pamphlets for participants to take home. The Tientsin (Tianjin) Association of the YMCA
already had some success through such activities – working with government-run
secondary school students in January 1913, the Association “placed 50,000 health calendars
in the homes of the people… distributed by 384 students of 20 Government schools,
organized as a social service league.300 In a letter requesting funding support from the China
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Medical Board, Fletcher Brockman, a national secretary for the YMCA, indicated that the
Tianjin program was so successful that the students expressed their desire to go to medical
college in the future – in other words, become potential fee-paying students of the Peking
Union Medical College itself.

Thus, the idea that school and classroom environments, and indeed lecture-style teaching
itself, could become good conduits of hygiene messages was not novel to the missionary and
foreign medical community in China even before Grant’s Special Course. Shanxi’s governor
Yan Xishan had also been praised for encouraging pre-medical education in his own public
health work. In a letter supporting additional funding for Peter, his newly formed Council
on Health Education, and a new lecture and pamphlet series, Roger Greene, Resident
Director of the China Medical Board, cited the recent experiences of plague prevention work
in Shanxi. To control the 1917—1918 pneumonic plague epidemic in the province’s
northwest, the Peking Union Medical College had deployed Dr. Charles Young as an advisor
and educator to the provincial governor Yan Xishan, who, seeing the need, had then
prepared “students [to be] ready to send to our medical school”.301 Among Chinese leaders,
Yan seemed particularly devoted to mobilising youth for hygiene campaigns. A report by the
Shanxi government in 1920 stated that the province’s anti-footbinding campaign had been
steadily successful in the past eight years. The success was apparently in part due to the
work of female schoolchildren, who on their school breaks would perform lectures
regarding the harms of bound feet, under the slogan “the benefits of natural feet (tianzu) are
clear, and everyone is to be proud of natural feet”.302 Missionaries from the American Board

301
302

Roger Greene to Wallace Buttrick, 22 August 1918. RAC/CMB Inc/FA114/Box 8/Folder 90.
Yan Xishan to Ministry of Interior, 7 July 1920.
114

outpost Fenchow Station, who had been employed with pay by Yan since early 1919 to
conduct door-to-door home medical examinations of young women’s feet, wrote widely of
their admiration of the ingenuity of public education on this hygiene issue. Male youth were
also expected to show their support for this new development: “All young men students
[were] exhorted to declare themselves as being in favor of women having natural foot”, and
wear buttons stating “Natural Foot Society” and “I will not marry a woman having bound
feet”.303 Boy and girl scouts were also deployed to carry floats and exhibition posters during
the June 1920 Cholera Parade of Fuzhou.

Despite these small efforts of outreach successes in various parts of the country,
Brockman’s stated priority for the development of lecture scripts, posters, lantern slides,
and other promotional materials still seemed urgent. In Fujian, a province that “offers
possibilities… as no other province in the country does” because of its familiarity with
cholera and plague, 1,000 Chinese dollars were raised by the Reformed Church’s Amoy
Mission to print “handbills for house to house distribution”, but Brock was concerned that
the funding would run out.304 Despite praise from then President of the Republic of China Li
Yuanhong, the plans for following up on the 1920 Fuzhou parade, which included public
lectures and distribution of pamphlets, were stalled as other critics among the medical
missionary community cited financial concerns.305 On the contrary, wholesale vaccination
drives at schools were considered valuable practice in large part because vaccines were
cost-effective and most existing schools and clinics had facilities that were sufficiently
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bright and well-ventilated.306 Despite Shanxi’s successes in running regular public health
classes, the specificity of which demonstrated the awareness of the local government to the
urgency and utility of hygiene education, the provincial administration was, according to
Grant, still “entirely unaware of the extent of modern public health scope and not knowing
that there existed facilities for public health training”.307 When given the choice, provincial
governments would send promising candidates abroad to study industrial or financial
disciplines, which made it more important for China to develop its own curriculum. Percy
Watson, the medical director of the Fenchow Station, was similarly despondent during his
visits to plague-susceptible villages around Shanxi’s countryside to vaccinate children –
although he and his colleagues were able to reach a high volume, the missionaries were still
mere mercenaries in this unsustainable practice.308

Grant, Greene, and others at the China Medical Board supported the work of the Council on
Health Education, but they were concerned about the scale of an organisation mainly known
for publishing a series of ten simple “Health Habits” posters for use in missionary-run
primary schools. The Council’s lecture model was that of a travelling educational caravan,
with a physician, nurse, and dental hygienist on staff, and could not ensure any follow up.
Peter himself lamented that school hygiene could not be effective if there were no good
statistics and accountability after each parade or public lecture, especially from Chinese
public schools.309 To other commentators, the bottleneck to progress was in the lack of
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printed material. Hoping to create a more robust written record for school hygiene training,
the Council on Health Education’s quarterly bilingual publication Health, published a
Chinese language schedule for the types of activities and lessons that its staff would
introduce into schools during a series of visits. Over eight lessons, presenters from the
Council would demonstrate classroom sanitation, hand-washing, and perform dental checkups on the students.310 The publication of Health as a bilingual magazine, aimed at reaching
laypeople through accessible language, advertisements, and short stories, was a
commendable but short-lived undertaking, completing its run in 1926 after just two years.

As Brockman suggested in a letter to the China Medical Board, “The preparation of suitable
literature will be difficult. In order to be most useful it should be attractively written, in
good Wenli or classical style. To find men who are master of the style, and who know
anything about modern medicine, is difficult. This is a different problem from that of the
preparation of medical text-books, where we ae not so dependent upon the style and where
a foreigner can supply the material to a Chinese writer”.311 Teachers at English-language
missionary schools were often also left scrambling for teaching materials. While E.R.M. from
Tai’an, Shandong, found the Health Habits posters distributed by the Council on Health
Education useful, she was still in want of a “very simple, illustrated and practical Hygiene
Book” to use as a teaching text.312 Fortunately for educators like E.R.M, the publication of
educational materials for hygiene was a task enthusiastically taken up by Chinese writers,
as discussed in the next section. Administrators and teachers-in-training were introduced to
new standards of schools with hygienic facilities and services. While classical Chinese was
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quickly disavowed as the language of choice, lesson plans more detailed and concrete than
the YMCA’s posters and pamphlets appeared in elementary and middle school textbooks as
students themselves were increasingly expected to become not only subjects of, but also
conduits for, hygiene education.

Clean facilities, hygienic curricula
What, according to reformists in China, did a hygienic school look like? What should such
schools teach or feed, and how should they train, their students? What should China
prioritise – facility management, teacher training, or targeting children for hygiene
campaigns directly? “School hygiene” seemed to be incredibly ambitious – not only did
schools themselves need to change their classrooms and playgrounds, students and staff
also needed to inherently understand and follow hygiene principles and maintain them.
Simply providing each school with physicians and nurses was not only expensive but also
inadequate and unsustainable. Grant, writing about the increases in the numbers of medical
professionals in 1922—1923, explained that just because the number of clinics and
hospitals per capita had been rising, it still did not mean that the average Chinese person
would visit them more without any intervention.313

The same could be said for the ad hoc health campaigns, lectures, and exhibitions put on by
such organisations as the Council on Health Education. While the results of Fuzhou cholera
parade and children’s classes at the Peking Health Station were generally positive, they
were not designed to be anchored in Chinese schools or local communities. A collaborative
project between the Peking Metropolitan Police Department and the Peking Union Medical
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College, the Health Station was predominantly a training and teaching facility for medical
and nursing students around northern China, in the form of a free clinic for local residents.
In April 1924, W. W. Peter wrote to Roger Greene, excitedly updating the China Medical
Board on the progress of the Council on Health Education’s work. With fellowship money
received from the Board, “we have begun to work in three day schools where the teachers
are very keen to teach Health Habits… health campaigns are being carried on by local
people in many of the large cities, to which we are most cordially invited to give lectures
and demonstrations”.314 But the work of the Council, heavily reliant on the China Medical
Board as a funding partner, was slowing down towards the middle of the 1920s. Peter’s
four-month trip away from the organisation’s headquarters left it in disarray with “lack of
clear understanding of the plans”.315 The “Medicine as a Life Work” essay competition for
university students around China, developed by the Council for Health Education and
funded by the China Medical Board, proved to be too foreign and too elite to demonstrate
real “accomplishment of our Ends” and ended after three annual sessions.316 In fact, all but
four of the entries to the inaugural contest were from Peking Union Medical College
students. Then, Y.L. Mei, tapped to be the next director of the Council on Health Education to
replace Peter, did not seem interested in such a post that demanded educating laypeople on
hygiene, preferring to spend his time “equally divided between clinical works in the London
Hospital and the research in public health administration”.317
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Grant, Peter, and their peers were concerned about “the present unstable condition of the
Chinese Government”. Unable to see an end to China’s political problems in 1924, Grant
even hoped for the remote possibility that political rivals in the national government would
come together to create a Ministry of Health, a dream that would not be realised for years to
come.318 However, even in spite of the larger national climate of political instability, smaller
regional efforts developed their own initiatives to making school hygiene sustainable,
before there was even the possibility of making them national. The aforementioned Peking
Health Stations, the Shanghai Kao-Chiao hygiene demonstration area, and the Ting Hsien
mass education movement are all such examples. The National Association for the
Advancement of Education’s 1925 annual conference at Shanxi University in Taiyuan, was
particularly lauded by missionary doctors as proof of the provincial government’s progress
in implementing school hygiene.319 While the history of school hygiene had not been very
long, wrote P.Z. King (Jin Baoshan), Director of the National Health Administration in
Nanjing in a retrospective piece, “in the early years of the Republic we attempted to mimic
schools in the West. There were quite a few physicians placed in schools, but after the
students’ diseases were treated, there was no attention paid to other aspects of hygiene,
including education”.320 According to King, it was in 1926 that the municipal police
department in Nanjing set up a committee to detail the scope of work for improvement of
hygiene education, and select schools for trial runs, a system that was introduced to Fujian,
Guangdong, Hubei, and other provinces within the next three years. By 1937, there were
over two hundred thousand students at schools with such hygiene programs. As this
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program spread to each new city, it was often with a collaboration between the local
committee, police department, individual schools and educators, and local medical schools.

As King noted in his brief history of hygiene education in Republican China, cities and
provinces around the country had long been successful in their own initiatives. In fact, the
work of the Peking Health Stations, Shanghai’s Kao-Chiao Demonstration Area, and the Mass
Educational Movement demonstration area at Ting Hsien, while funded and directed
primarily by foreign sources, required significant local government support. In October
1929, Grant reported that one school in Beijing so far had begun using a teacher to screen
for cases in trachoma with successful results, and that he was looking forward to seeing
what would happen in Kao-Chiao with the wider rollout.321 In 1930, the Peking Health
Station designated two Beijing primary schools to pilot a student health monitor program,
in which students “look after the health habits of their fellow students”.322 The overseer for
the Kao-Chiao hygiene work, a bureaucrat in the Department of Public Health in the
Municipality in Greater Shanghai, wrote that teachers had conducted on average six
physical examinations of students per hour and that in one month, 1,121 students had been
examined and treated.323 The Nanjing Health Education Committee reported that it had
begun its eighth session of a hygiene lecture series for people’s schools in January 1935.324
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In addition, while consulting doctors and nurses took a break for the winter, the Committee
was to focus on editing guides for schools to hold hygiene lectures and correcting students’
physical defects, and making sure that each school was stocked with blank health report
forms, pamphlets, and basic medication.325 Schools in the greater Shanghai metropolitan
area were required to fill out a sixth-page monthly hygiene work report, the instructions for
which were included in the September 1934 issue of the fortnightly “health” magazine
Weisheng ban yue kan. Among other things, schools were to note down the frequency of
their staff hygiene meetings, public speeches, communications with parents, along with the
numbers of students inoculated with cowpox, physical defects corrected, and sick cases.326
Schools that collaborated with, or had been visited by medical professionals from, Beijing’s
Health Stations or Shanghai’s Kao-Chiao hygiene demonstration area received resources
and aid from not only their respective municipal governments, but also the Rockefeller
Foundation, the local police, and nearby missionary universities and hospitals. The
collaboration ran smoothly on their localised scales. In fact, the opening of two urban and
school units near Kao-Chiao was delayed for several months exactly because administrators
at the new national Ministry of Health were unfamiliar with the situation and could not
appoint appropriate personnel. The Rockefeller directors of the project, led by John B.
Grant, agreed that it would be in good faith and “wise to give precedence” to the Ministry’s
needs and delay for the time being.327
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Despite projecting limited and unpredictable results from ad hoc health parades and school
hygiene visits, missionary and other foreign doctors were seeing some successes in their
direct collaborations with schools. In 1924, S. M. Woo, a former director of the Canton
Department of Health, arranged for medical examinations of 3,200 students and 35 mission
schools in Suzhou and Hangzhou.328 The next year, Woo’s team expanded the program to
public Chinese schools and conducted sanitary inspections and surveys of seventy-two
schools in eastern cities, introducing a grading system that was later adopted by inland
cities during wartime. Woo and his staff visited schools, inspected the facilities, then
interviewed the authorities on their provision of “school medical service”, “health teaching”,
and “school sanitation”. Woo himself was impressed with the “cooperation of the heads of
schools” and the “improvements… effected with commendable haste” after the inspectors’
recommendations.329 Thus the high numbers of cooperating campuses indicates that school
administrators saw some tangible benefit in conducting these sanitary surveys, without
government intervention or directive. Woo’s report ends concludes on an optimistic note –
“the majority of the school compounds are quite sanitary compared with the neighborhood
conditions”.330

The Peking Health Station Demonstration Center held two school clinics “with an
attendance of over 100 children from a nearby government school” in September 1925.
After the children underwent physical examination, the staff collated the results and
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planned systematic follow up home visits.331 Even though conducting individual surveys
and physical examinations was time- and labour-intensive, the results from such initiatives
reassured China’s medical elite that Chinese educators were interested in, and proactive
about, improving school hygiene.

Initially, Chinese medical professionals had not only mimicked Western practice of
employing school physicians, but certainly also looked to the West for examples of a
comprehensive guide to school hygiene. Walter E. Roth’s “The Elements of School Hygiene
for the Use of Teachers in Schools”, published in London in 1886, was one of the first efforts
to compile and organise school administration, facilities, and teaching into one volume such
that “it may prove acceptable alike to teachers as to pupils with the average amount of
intelligence”.332 C. Voonping Yui (Yu Fengbin), a missionary-educated physician and
translator of a number of medical texts into Chinese, was undoubtedly influenced by Roth
and other such textbooks from English language sources. Indeed, Yui’s 1928 similarly titled
Elements of School Hygiene, which laid out everything that a school administrator would
have needed to know and do for the improvement of school hygiene, could only be thus
titled as homage to Roth’s work.

Yui’s book would have served as a guide to establishing the structural bureaucracy of school
hygiene, as it includes specific information on how mealtimes should be arranged
(“students who eat too fast cannot [gain the nutritional benefits from] chew and swallow
slowly; in American schools students are required to sit for at least fifteen minutes for

Gertrude S. Hosmer, “Peking Health Demonstration Center”, Health 2, no. 4, (December 1925),
21—22.
332 Walter E. Roth, The Elements of School Hygiene (London: Balliere, Tindall, and Cox, 1886), Preface.
124
331

meals), the best placement of desks and chairs, hand how to conduct physical tests (height,
lung capacity, vision, etc.), among other administrative tasks.333 Common infectious
diseases, symptoms, treatments, and incubation periods are presented in a handy table over
two insert pages. The guide also includes a script that could be used to motivate those who
were reluctant to diligently participate in cleaning.334 Unlike a book on sanitary
construction of schools published by the Jiangsu Department of Education ten years earlier,
Yui wrote in his preface, this volume would instead teach any reader “easy methods to
implement hygiene”. Compared to Roth’s book, Yui’s also includes a few key updates and
additions, such as its inclusion of how to distinguish between mentally weak children, and
another chapter on youth military training. A newer introduction to the medical world at
the start of the twentieth century, mental hygiene had gained traction by the 1920s as a
discipline that could initiate diagnosis and treatment from childhood to create healthier
adults.335 China’s civil war in 1924—1925 and the Northern Expedition were also recent
reminders of the necessity for wartime preparedness.

Structural questions and teachers’ manuals aside, Yui and other contemporaries still needed
to construct a solid curriculum for what the schoolchildren would need to learn. By the late
1920s, Chinese medical professionals, such as Hou-ki Hu (Hu Hongji) from the Shanghai
Health Department, were still concerned that the “health text books in the primary schools
are far from being satisfactory”, and reported that teachers often had to call on ad hoc
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health lectures from physicians and nurses to supplement their lessons.336 While Hu may
have struggled with finding textbooks, the historical record shows that in the 1930s, with
ease of access to publishing houses like Shanghai’s Commercial Press, aid for publishing
from the YMCA, the China Medical Board, and other organisations, Yui and other writers
produced numerous volumes of school hygiene textbooks aimed at youth in China’s schools.
Textbook writers and other authors attempted to eliminate the foreignness of hygiene
messages and put them into easily-understood forms for children’s consumption. An article
in Weisheng ban yue kan, lists some traditional Chinese proverbs to do with personal health
and hygiene. “Taking a thousand pills is not as good as sleeping well alone for one night”.
“After the ninth of September [Chongyang Festival], let the doctor have idle hands; everyone
should eat carrots and there will be no diseases”. Students of hygiene reading the article are
reminded that these were “good for research purposes” as they show how much the Chinese
have always paid attention to hygiene; they are warned that some “are not logical, and even
present paradoxes to science” – to which point the author, a doctor at the Baiquan Rural
Hospital, marked the offending proverbs with “disagree”.337 In a different issue, the
magazine’s “Life of Little Bear” cartoon series includes one depicting the title character
overeating candy and climbing a tree to eat all the apples. He rushes home with a stomach
ache and is fed medicinal oil and put to bed by his mother. The final panel of the cartoon
shows Little Bear writing on his blackboard tablet “smart decision no. 1: never be a
glutton!”.338
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Homework and take-home assignments involved asking students to reflect on hygiene’s role
in their and their families’ lives. John Grant’s proposed syllabus for a Rockefeller-funded
mass education institute was paired with “a card… on which the health habits are listed
with spaces for record of [students’] daily performance”, adopted early on that hygiene
education needed additional practice for success.339 A multi-volume series titled “Revived
Textbook for Hygiene Education”, written in 1934 by Shen Baiying (1897—1992), a
primary school principal and prolific textbook author, was just one of many classroomready lesson and homework guides. Each lesson – twenty per volume, on per week
throughout a school year – has a main text, two-to-three “think” questions, and some
practical homework tasks. For volume 7, lesson 9 (upper primary school level), students are
asked to “design and improve a method and place for the disposal of rubbish”.340 Middle
school students were taught more advanced topics such as first aid and basic disease
transmission science. Students were asked to consider the social implications of a disease
like tuberculosis: “Think: there are a lot of people whose bodies are very skinny and cough
all the time. What disease is affecting them? Can this disease be spread to other people?”341
In a different textbook series, upper primary students completed exercises in a chapter
titled “care of children and exercise”, “Do you like your younger siblings? Do you take them
outdoors to play? Is it easy for babies to get sick?”342 Their homework assignment for the
unit was to create a schedule for the daily life of a healthy baby. Other projects in the series
included “prepare one suitable list of everyday foods” and “remind family and friends to
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keep their windows open”.343 These tasks, related on the textbook’s lessons, often required
that students do their own research or investigations of their familial facilities. If followed,
the schoolchildren could very well become ambassadors of the textbook’s messages, and
leaders in hygiene in their homes, and especially among younger family members, as well.

With their newly acquired knowledge about hygiene, students were expected to participate
in ensuring that the facilities of their schools were up to standard. While Roth’s Elements
almost seems to treat children as inherently fragile, decrying competition and stress as facts
that would lead to unhealthiness, Chinese textbooks unanimously promoted the initiation of
cleaning competitions on schoolgrounds. According to “Hygienic Life at School” (1933),
before each government-directed cleaning campaign, students should take the initiative to
put up posters and slogans to encourage participation. They should seek out their teachers
to act as guest speakers and judges, to award prizes to those with the best cleaning
outcomes. At the same time, schools should provide masks, brooms, cloths, water jugs,
cleaning chemicals, and other equipment to all participants and ensure sufficient supply.344
Other student leaders should be appointed to supervising the cleaning of blackboards and
other classroom activities. In Beijing, for example, the School Health “Demonstration”
schools, an initiative of the Peking Health Station, required each to appoint several student
“health monitors”, who would explain “the importance of following the rules and the danger
of violating them” to peer offenders.345
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In fact, schoolchildren’s abilities to lead hygiene improvement activities extended beyond
the school and the home. The People’s Education Centre (minzhong jiaoyu guan) of
Zhenjiang, Jiangsu, worked with a local elementary school to prepare a slide presentation
for teaching the necessity of safe drinking water. Students from the school in Xinhe village
posed in various scenes depicting them experimenting on unclean water, promoting clean
drinking water to their classmates, starting to work on building a clean well, and finally
celebrating with the villagers after its completion.346 Before each public viewing, a student
representative was to announce to the audience: “Aside from showing us the importance of
drinking clean water, this presentation will also help us learn how to uphold public morals
and serve the society”.347 Similarly, one 1934 issue of the Commercial Press’ popular book
series for primary school readers Xiaoxuesheng wenku titled “Campaign to Eliminate
Mosquitos and Flies” details the story of Qiaotou Elementary School in Qiaotou Village, a
small but accessible community just outside of Shanghai. The young and progressive
principal created a student government organisation to address local concerns in the
society, and the students, after some discussion, decided to start a fly killing campaign to
address the fact that local residents did not feel safe from disease. “There is a child in
America who has caught 121,000 flies! And there are other cities in which people don’t see
any flies. Let’s make this happen here too!”

The narrative then goes on to explain the steps taken by the team to promote its proposal to
kill then feed the flies to poultry livestock to keep them plump, and then to secure enough
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fly swatters and sticky traps for all participants.348 The students on the committee were
directors, promoters, and suppliers of cleaning products; the participants included many of
their elders – “farmers, workers, businessmen, and old women” – who were nevertheless
enthusiastic. The final illustration in the book is striking – a young schoolboy stands at an
auditorium podium backed by a portrait of Sun Yat-sen and flags of the Republic, speaking
emphatically to an audience of adults at the celebratory meeting of the success of the
campaign. “We hope that fly elimination campaigns will continue to spread, from our village
to the entire county, to the entire province, to the country, to the entire world… only if we
identify our enemies, and work hard to eliminate those enemies, will we reach the final
victory of mankind!”349

Figure 3.13: Meeting to celebrate the success of the fly elimination campaign.
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The symbolism of his message is clear – the idea for fly elimination started from the mind of
a precocious schoolchild, who then explained the rational, tangible benefits of his proposed
campaign, and successfully led the community towards solving the problem. Qiaotou’s
experience with fly elimination fulfils Grant’s criteria that hygiene education initiatives
needed to be “direct and rational” to be effective.350 For the local community at Qiaotou
Village, there was no need for microscopes, scientists, or even law enforcement – once
explained, it was clear to all residents that the improvement of hygiene in their
neighbourhood had clear, tangible benefits.

Teacher-nurses
While the proliferation of hygiene textbooks for even the lowest levels of primary schools
was, for the most part of the 1930s, not among government efforts to print and disseminate
them, the Ministry of Education’s plans for teaching college curricula show its meaningful
efforts to integrate hygienic education courses. If teachers were expected to follow or create
hygiene courses, they first needed to be trained. An early example occurred in Beijing from
July 2 to July 21, 1928, the Beijing Bureau of Education held a summer health institute for
primary school teachers, hosted at the Peking Health Station. With a total enrolment of 50,
the students who passed with honours could be given an increase in salary and
recommended to “take charge of health work in respective schools”. The course had echoes
of John Grant’s pilot program years earlier – these teachers were to be trained to become
first aid responders, diagnosticians of common diseases, dieticians, and schools’ sanitary
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inspectors.351 The municipal government, with the aid of the China Medical Board and the
national government, signalled its interest in developing school hygiene administration at
the local levels.

A 1938 textbook for teacher colleges, written by a faculty member from Shanghai Medical
College and a doctor with the Mass Education Movement, laid out the expectations of those
undergoing teaching training. A preface written by F.C. Yen (Yan Fuqing), Director of the
Shanghai Medical College at the time, was confident that the volume “can be used as the sole
reading material for [teaching] hygiene education”352 This textbook had a much wider scope
than Yui’s Elements of School Hygiene, covering topics clearly outside of the scope of school
facilities. A chapter on “Maternal Health” reminds students that “it is necessary to find a
midwifery expert to deliver the baby. Do not use a traditional style midwife or relative”.
However, pre- and post-natal care for the mother, bathing and feeding a newborn, and even
cutting and bandaging the umbilical cord are tasks in which teacher college graduates
should have competency.353 Photographs from Shanghai’s Kao-Chiao demonstration area
clinic and the Nanjing Health Bureau are distributed throughout the book, with nurses
demonstrating the correct ways to bath a patient, teach a toddler to wash his hands, and
cook soy milk. In addition to studying from the textbook, student teachers should gain
appropriate practical experience in “first aid”, “directing health check-ups for height and
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weight”, “inoculating [children] with cowpox”.354 The student teacher, after this training,
could act in a supervisory role for other school staff such as cooks and nursing assistants.

While this textbook is just one example of rising interest in hygiene education courses, there
is evidence to show that teaching colleges increasingly did incorporate sport and hygiene
education courses into their curricula. These modules fit within a larger “Citizenship
Education” elementary school curriculum that had been re-announced by the Ministry of
Education in 1940.355 Updated for wartime preparedness, reinforced in the rhetoric of the
New Life Movement, Citizenship Education retained its moralistic overtones and stressed
responsibility and practicality in China’s national reconstruction.356 Physical education
classes were designed to “develop physical fitness, improve mental and physical health, and
stimulate the nation”. Hygiene courses aimed to have teachers-in-training not only
understand the “relationship between health, happiness, and strength of nation”, but also to
go as far as to gain knowledge and skills in “medical knowledge to help alleviate medical
conditions in rural areas where there is not sufficient provision of medicine”. An ideal
graduate of a teaching college, therefore, would be able to provide first-aid and basic
nursing care, recognise and prescribe simple Chinese and Western medicines, administer
vaccinations by injection, and still be in charge of directing school cleaning efforts. The
conclusion of the curriculum announcement reads: “students should understand clearly that
this [training] is important for national defence, to have health knowledge and habits, to be
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able to manage hygiene issues among larger populations, and to teach them”.357 In a 1940
speech to the Kuomintang’s Central Training Corps, P.Z. King reiterated the five
responsibilities of teachers: leading classroom hygiene lessons, health examinations, testing
for antibodies and vaccinating, environmental sanitation, and staff hygiene.358 Teachers
were also tasked with outreach – inviting students’ families and parents to talk to them
about any student health concerns and sending out a once per term letter regarding
students’ health details. If a student shows up at school sick, teachers should play the role of
epidemiologist – “visit the families and pay attention to what they need to keep the
environment clean”.359 Teachers were especially key hygiene workers in village schools
where trained physicians and nurses may not be available – the Ministry of Education could
make available medication, vaccines, posters, and pamphlets, but it was the responsibility of
teachers and students to use children’s health as a key issue to promote hygiene to more
people locally.

Schools also became sites on which health and hygiene teachings were opened to the public.
In addition to further expanding the roles of teachers and students in these settings as
hygienic models for the rest of society, they were also now expected to become hygiene
ambassadors as well. Lectures, movie showings, and other types of hygiene outreach
activities that used to be run by health station clinics, were now moved to schoolgrounds.
Even missionary-run medical schools, previously exclusive sites of professional medical
development rather than public health stations, opened their grounds to public activities. In
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September 1938, the Society for Health Education in China requested funds from the
Ministry of Education to support a west Hunan healthy baby competition to be held at a
missionary medical school and run by local high school students.360 Despite continuing
disruptions to the school hygiene bureaucracy after the start of the Sino-Japanese War,
doctors and nurses appointed by the Shanghai city government went to ten primary schools
in Shanghai (including the International Settlement and the French Concession) to judge a
city-wide healthy baby competition in April 1941. Out of over 200 participants, 136 babies
were deemed healthy and awarded prizes by the city government.361 According to P.Z. King,
since 1936, student-run hygiene teams at high schools in Jiangxi, Fujian, and Hunan had
been regularly hosting public lectures on their campuses.362 An elementary school in Anhui
in 1937 was lauded by the Ministry of Education as it held a public class to make first aid
equipment such as masks and gauze to donate for use on the front lines, and solicited
further donations from nearby technical schools to support soldiers.

The high level of competency required of teachers-in-training, and new and increasing
expectations for schools to open themselves up as hygienic demonstration spaces,
underscores trends in the development of school hygiene by the 1940s. Deploying teachers
and students as hygiene advocates was not only cost effective, but also ensured that the
people on the ground understood local dialect, customs, and other conditions. With the
proliferation of educational materials, especially those printed and published around the
country by commercial presses and distributed through missionary and independent
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networks, schools were well equipped to take on this important role, especially as China
was heading into total war.

Wartime hardships
In March 1943, the Twenty-Second National Middle School of Chongqing submitted an
optimistic, enthusiastic report on its current hygiene conditions. Based on a series of
regulations that the municipal government had announced the previous year, the school
administration had been working towards improving both personal and public hygiene of
its community. Students were already committing to brushing their teeth and washing their
faces once every morning, “drinking boiled water at appointed times during the day”, and
reinforcing among themselves a “labour service” punishment policy whenever anyone
“litters or spits on the ground, or carelessly rub dirt on the walls”.363 Staff and students
swept, mopped, and weeded the grounds on a daily or weekly basis, but the school
administrators complained about the lack of finances for better facilities and resources. The
only tools they had, the report states, were “brooms and cloths”, and the campus lacked
sanitation basics such as disinfection solution and lime. While successful in local
collaborations to hold hygiene movements and promoting involvement, the school could
not afford cabinets, screen doors for toilet stalls, or to build showering rooms. Soap had
been rationed, and students at the National Twenty-Second Middle School in Chongqing
could only use warm water to wash after their regularly scheduled haircuts.364
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The private Wuchang Chinese University (later Wuhan University) reported similar
infrastructural issues in January of the same year. The classrooms did not have enough light,
and the dormitories were kept clean but there were no bathrooms in the same building. A
report made to Ch’en Lifu, Minister of Education, suggested that the most urgent solution
was to build a new dormitory for women as the existing one was also not getting enough
natural light. While individual students and staff were making efforts – the cook and kitchen
staff at the university had clean nails and hair and were meticulous about fly prevention – it
is clear from these reports that with wartime overcrowding, financial difficulties, and
infrastructure issues in old campuses, schools and universities felt hamstrung in their
ability to improve sanitation levels. Gertrude Simon, a Lutheran Deaconness in Enshi, Hubei,
wrote directly to Madame Chiang Kai-Shek with an urgent message about a local middle
school’s shortage of medicine: children from some “government schools came to [our
Lutheran orphanage] for medicine. We only have enough medicines for our own use. Could
the government see to it that all these schools receive medicine enough to treat its
pupils?”365 This dissertation also opens with the recollections of the Mr Zhang and Mr Liang,
children during the 1940s. Both told me about their hygiene curricula at school – basic
principles, daily checks, courses in sexual education, meetings with travelling nurses, and
vaccinations against smallpox, and, when needed, plague. However, despite the
comprehensiveness of their theoretical hygiene education, wartime shortages made it
difficult for anyone in their communities to put these lessons into practice.

While these reports paint dismal pictures of wartime conditions, an underlying optimistic
thread emerges. By the 1940s, China’s communities and individuals, over the course of a
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few decades, had become accustomed to routine vaccination drives, participating in mass
street cleaning campaigns, school and home visits by medical professionals, and attending
classes at local Health Stations. These anxieties that wartime shortages would negatively
impact hygiene conditions should in fact be seen as testament to the significant progress of
the early twentieth century, during which the standards for hygiene at China’s schools had
risen significantly. The National Kangding Normal University, for example, required all
students to undergo physical examinations for nutrition, lung capacity, eyesight and other
health metrics before matriculation.366 Local governments were concerned about
demonstrating to the central Ministry of Education that the hygiene organisations of each of
their school were up to scratch, especially as a response to the Ministry’s recirculating a
1941 document “Standards for school facility hygiene”. The Qingbi District Observation
group’s report makes it clear that schools were also to be graded on the strength and health
of their hygiene administrations – “can they organise cleaning competitions quickly and in
time? Are those appointed to hygiene work capable? Are the student organisations selfsufficient?”367

Numbers and frequency of hygiene contests in schools seem to have increased after the
beginning of the war. Competitions that pitted students and staff against one another based
on series of hygienic standards became most common method for educational institutions
to not only encourage hygienic habits but also to keep premises clean, at little to no cost.

“Weishengbu zhendui qingjie weisheng, yufang jibing, yaopin fenfa deng wenti yu suochu danwei
wanglai gonghan ji youguan wenshu [National Health Administration correspondence with various
work units regarding sanitation, immunisation, distribution of medications and other matters]”,
SHAC/5/1929 (2), 1944.
367 “Qingbi qu gexiao qingjie weisheng guanmotuan diyici guanmo baogao [first observation report of
the Qingbi District school sanitation observation]”, SHAC 5/1927 (3), April 1943.
138
366

Often, they were not voluntary. The Ministry of Education asked all counties to hold hygiene
competitions among schools in January 1944 and attached instructions in a document titled
“School health maintenance competitions”. Xiamen University appointed university faculty,
including the headmaster and his wife, to conduct a check of student dormitories every
month and reward points to the three cleanest rooms. These points would go towards the
students’ general academic and performance appraisals.368

Moreover, students, as well-educated ambassadors, were expected to take part in
community health development. Teachers-in-training now put their nursing and medical
skills to the test of practical application. The Northwest Normal University in Lanzhou and
its students became the de facto public health providers in the area, funded with a budget
for 10,000 yuan per month to provide vaccinations (250 smallpox, 205 cholera/typhoid,
470 diphtheria), conduct glaucoma examinations (320), and other preventive work. Each
month, around 200 students in the teacher college consulted, observed, and learned from
medical professionals at the attached university, then were sent around the city to perform
glaucoma examinations on their own.369 The “émigré intellectuals” at the National
Southwestern Associated University, a provisional wartime campus in Kunming
incorporating students and staff of several Beijing-area universities, launched their own
crusade for “local betterment” through a fly extermination campaign when they realised
that their local business proprietors did not hold their restaurants to the same high levels of
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hygiene standards. The arrival of these university students also brought social services such
as a health station in rural Lijiang.370

Thus, hygiene competitions, community engagement, and wartime service met at an
intersection in China’s schools and universities in the 1940s. As frustrations mounted
among China’s students in Kunming and Chongqing, who were “enjoined to continue
studying” in spite of financial shortages, frequent air raids, and lack of educational
resources, those in charge of school hygiene were not immune to neither the frustrations
nor the consistent calls for social mobilisation for the war effort.371 Hygiene inspections at
the National Women’s Normal University included checking the progress of machine repair,
production operations, and military support services such as textiles and cobbling.372 Along
with sanitation competition reports, a summer 1944 order from the Ministry of Education
required that schools send in forms detailing what types of facilities they already had for
medical and health purposes, and to assess each institution’s war preparedness.373 In his
speech on wartime hygiene necessities, P.Z. King noted that houses, clinics, and offices of
any hygiene team, including those at schools, should be ready for immediate use for war
purposes at all times.

While hygiene-related competitions were not uncommon in all public spaces in China (baby
health and street-cleaning competitions around the country were also held regularly),
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school sanitation competitions were direct assessments of communal capabilities, and
became a useful barometer for how each school or university could use its own personnel
or resources to aid in a wider, national-level war effort. Conversely, it was precisely through
the preparedness and independent capabilities of these small-scale hygiene teams at
schools and universities that the central government could take regional and local
experiences and scale them nationally.

***
In October of 1945, during the few months of peace after the Japanese surrender that
August, the high council for national defence [guofang zuigao weiyuanhui] met to discuss
how to improve athletic education in the country, as people’s nutrition had been on the
decline as a result of the war. In order so that young people could become soldiers with only
some brief military training as in the United States, facilities and capabilities for athletic
education needed to be improved. This comprehensive plan for athletic education at all
levels would not only bolster sports teaching at primary and secondary schools, but also
require each county and city to set up sports halls [zhongzheng tiyu guan], host
performances and competitions and invite famous athletes from around the world to raise
interest in sport. More importantly, teaching colleges needed to have training courses to
create good sport teachers, and the Ministry of Education should construct a national sport
teaching training institute and open a “central military athletics school [zhongyang junshi
tiyu xuexiao] to foster talents for branches of the military.374
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The focus on athletic education, while not uncommon during previous decades, seemed to
be an extra pronounced priority for national defence after the end of the war. The
Kuomintang government understood that there were still profound instabilities on the
continent – in the north of China, the Chinese Communist Party had occupied base areas
with a population of approximately 100 million, and the Soviet Union still had control over
formerly Japanese-occupied Manchuria. In addition to soldiers, the national defence
administration also recognised an urgent need for more nurses. In June 1946, the high
council published another plan to expand nursing education to all schools and at all levels,
“not only to use for the country, but also to ensure family hygiene, and improve children’s
health”. All female students in high schools and above were to begin taking courses in
common principles of nursing care, and every province and city was to establish a two-year
elementary level nursing school.

Thus the directives from these announcements were also a call for provincial, municipal,
and county-level governments and bureaus of education to demonstrate their willingness
and capability to participate in the next step, longer-term, war-readiness efforts. If fact, the
name of the suggested sports centres – “Zhongzheng”, the adopted and preferred name of
Chiang Kai-shek – would require local governments to take a side in indicating their
loyalties.

This new proposed system for athletic and nursing education was perhaps nationalised in
theme and ultimate goals, but the recommendations were localised in scale. Each
recommendation, besides a Ministry of Education-run national sport teacher training
institute, would be implemented by smaller, localised committees that were expected to
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consult individually with the National Health Administration, jointly hired experts, and
other appropriate committees. There are echoes of locally-directed systems for hygiene
education that had occurred all around China since the start of the century. This time,
however, education had expanded beyond elementary schools and simple disease
prevention tactics. “Hygiene” was now a common enough term in school-based pedagogy
that, in the form of athletic education, the central government could assert its overt
militaristic goal.
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CHAPTER 4: KITCHEN HYGIENE, SANITATION, AND NUTRITIONAL NATIONALISM
The city of Fuzhou in June 1920 was the site of an epic battle between Mr. Cholera and Mr.
Health. The former, a sickly-looking, eight-foot-tall bamboo puppet that had a permanent
following of “flies and odors”, cackled as he was pushed through the streets on a float. Mr.
Health, a plumper figure with rosy cheeks, swooped in to save the people of the city from
the dangers of cholera. As he fought, he communicated remedies and hygiene advice, voiced
by students with megaphones. In another puppet display, a fearsome “Cholera”, visited
upon Mr. Wise Man, who “with a cheerful expression” batted Cholera away and showed that
“with proper health precautions one can be side by side with cholera and still live”.375 This
parade was held through a collaboration between the YMCA, its affiliated Council on Health
Education, the municipal government, and corporate donors. News reports after the event
recorded that more than 330,000 people came to see the parade.376

Fuzhou’s decision to host this 1920 cholera parade was not out of the blue. More common in
the summer, cholera often struck port cities along the coast and the Yangtze River every
year. In the 1919, the city experienced an epidemic with an estimated 19,000 deaths.377 The
outbreak that year also had particularly harsh reverberations, as it travelled along the river
and with passengers along train routes to inland cities, leading to a death toll of 300,000.378
By all measures, the 1920 parade seemed to make an impact in the busy treaty port. Followup investigations showed that “even in the homes on small streets there is a decided
difference in the cleanliness of all food used”, and “one seldom sees water-soaked fruits
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being sold on the street”.379 The positive results of the weeklong cholera prevention
campaign were evident even a year later, when a riot broke out among 8,000 eager viewers
of a cholera education film who attempted to rush into the screening. In addition, “melon
and meal dealers” all around Fuzhou began to use screens to keep out flies from their
shopfronts and cover their merchandise.380 Similar public education initiatives for the
prevention of cholera were launched in Shandong and Ningbo, with positive feedback from
the local Chinese population. In Ningbo, the doctor in charge of cholera treatment for more
than 9,000 cholera patients was presented with a “silver-plated shield with complimentary
characters on it” by local elite Chinese as a gesture of gratitude. “The contrast is great
between the action of the Chinese during this epidemic and one sixteen years ago… truly
China is awakening and open to suggestions from her friends”.381

A few years later, William Wesley Peter, the Shanghai-based head of the Council for Health
Education and director of the Fuzhou program, published an overview article of the
campaign and other Council activities in the China Medical Journal. The comprehensive
guide to the Council’s work included not only a summary of the cholera parade and followup work, but also plans, budgets, and promotional materials. By this time, as Chapter Two
has examined, the Council on Health Education had created a set of “Health Habits” charts
for everyday use and was well known through its travelling caravan model of hygiene
education for putting on lecture series around the country. With a focus on “Broadcasting”
health rather than “curing” (as in a clinical setting) or “controlling” (as with epidemic
control), Peter was signalling a new way forward for missionary medical personnel in China
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to disseminate information to a much larger number of people. The Fuzhou parade was a
perfect illustration of these new tactics. While it was indeed a spectacle, its innovative
intention was actually to target smaller, more private aspects of everyday life. Each float in
the parade used common household objects to demonstrate what an ordinary family could
do to keep their food safe, accompanied by voiceover explanations in easy-to-memorise
slogans. 300, 000 pieces of “illustrated cholera literature” were distributed throughout the
week so that participants could bring written reminders – “boil your water and cook your
food. Eat it hot from clean dishes…” – back to their homes.382 The Fuzhou municipality
sourced and paid for vaccinations, but the focus was on assigning personal responsibility
for the hygiene of each individual kitchen, restaurant, food stand, market stall, and dining
area.383 “The people among whom we work will benefit through being enabled to make
greater progress”, wrote Peter.384

This chapter focuses on the “kitchen” as a space – both literal and symbolic – that
underwent hygienic reform in Republican China. The kitchen referred to not only spaces in
which food was stored and prepared, but also served, eaten, and shared. “Kitchen hygiene”
education began as innovative methods to facilitate cholera prevention in Chinese cities
such as Fuzhou through the reform of food preparation and kitchen sanitation habits. Based
on a globally-circulating, scientifically-, politically-, and popularly-defined ideal vision of the
hygienic kitchen, provincial, municipal, and individual entities mediated their
interpretations and realizations of these clean spaces. Their efforts emphasized the ease
and practicality with which individual households could keep their cooking and dining
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spaces free of microbes and disease vectors. With these efforts came a proliferation of
cleaning guides, recipes, and advertisements that championed clean and whole foods and
cooking methods that maintained the natural “food value” integrity of ingredients.385 Over
the next decades, concurrent with a global clean-eating movement, nutritional science
advancements, popularization of New Life Movement (1934 onwards) virtues, and the start
of the Sino-Japanese War (1937—1945), hygiene reformists in China then turned their
attention towards the prevention of tuberculosis and beriberi. As full-blown war with Japan
began, Chinese authorities needed to quickly vaccinate and disinfect water sources to
prevent cholera yet again, and public campaigns for kitchen hygiene saw a resurgence.
However, this time, such efforts were accompanied by nutrition advocacy, the content of
which had become particularly Chinese and patriotic. In the ideal Chinese kitchen, nutrition
thus became the corporeal counterpart of what began as an environmental hygiene
movement, and the pursuit of kitchen and dietary hygiene a way in which every individual
could easily and patriotically participate in scientific progress.

The conceptual framework of kitchen hygiene, much like the term “hygiene” itself,
underwent a transformation that made it increasingly more encompassing, more
“scientific”, and instructive for both private life and expectations for modern citizenry. As
Ruth Rogaski has examined, weisheng encompassed much more than just “hygiene”, but
rather “hygienic modernity”.386 Reformists certainly intended for kitchen and dietary
hygiene reforms to foster a sense of personal responsibility, but the reforms’ contributions
to public health were perhaps more diffuse than those to the development of meanings of
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the “self” and its place within a strong, modern nation. The modernity of a public health
system, writes Tom Crook, “resides in its complexity”, “a shifting assemblage of interacting
parts and practices” of those doing the would-be modernizing reforms and the initiatives
themselves.387 Kitchen hygiene reformists included, but were more diverse than, Rogaski’s
Tianjin elites – they were also medical missionaries, publishers of hygiene journals,
advertisers, teachers, students, and women. The scope of their reforms was also not unique;
for example, kitchen hygiene mirrored the development of “domestic management” as a life
science and academic endeavour for women, as Helen Schneider has examined. Chinese
women intellectuals who designed and promoted home economics programs were aware of
similar global trends and set out to “find practical solutions to help Chinese women meet
the responsibilities of domestic management” not only at home; their new skills had wider
implications in society – women who studied “cafeteria management and nutrition… [would
be prepared for] work in hospitals, in school dining rooms, or in restaurants as
managers”.388 Later, with the establishment of the New Life Movement women’s
organizations in the 1930s and 1940s, kitchen hygiene and domestic management
initiatives often coalesced into defining the “markers of a civilized society” and the ways in
which individuals could align themselves with wartime production.389

Cholera prevention before the kitchen
Of all infectious diseases that could reach epidemic proportions, the one most closely, and
for the longest time, associated with the kitchen, was cholera. The idea that cholera
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prevention could be linked to food preparation or eating habits had staying power, even
after the discovery of the waterborne cholera bacillus, and the development of a
prophylactic vaccine by the late nineteenth century. European colonial governance and
“Christian activism” in Asia and Africa continued to link cholera susceptibility to natives’
“culture” – “cleanliness, airiness, good food”.390 As British colonials in India wrote, what led
to increased risk of contracting cholera was not exactly what one ate, but also the attitude
and care with which one prepared and consumed food, suggesting a conception of disease
and prevention that combined humoral aetiology and personal choices.391 Although the
disease presented issues for European colonists in Africa and other parts of the world as
well, cholera could not shake off its “Asiatic” designation and racialised susceptibility, which
pitted sanitation and hygiene against “traditional” practices in Asian cultures that were
“inimical to health”. In 1924, Charles Winslow and Z.W. Koh, affiliated researchers with the
Yale-in-China hospital in Hangzhou, published results from a study which proved that
overseas Chinese suffered a much higher degree of infant mortality compared to the nonChinese living in similar conditions. Koh concluded that “sanitation… like most institutions
has its limitations. Personal hygiene possesses much of the rest of the health protection
field”.392 Tuberculosis, another disease that medical professionals would later also target to
eliminate through kitchen hygiene reforms, was also considered to be more deadly to the
Chinese globally than any other race, even when compared to Native Americans and African
Americans in the United States.393
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Medical professionals in China at the turn of the century undoubtedly blamed disease
transmission on the “dirty individual”, and especially so in contrast to the considerable
sanitary progress being made elsewhere. Conversely, often feeling hamstrung by the costs
of building safe water mains yet threatened by the lack of progress with native populations,
European colonials and missionaries turned their efforts to safeguarding their own health
instead. “What could be done, like the boiling of water, had to be done by the people
themselves”.394 Reports about a Shanghai cholera outbreak in 1926 highlighted the stark
contrast between the “few foreigners” affected among those living in the French Concession
and International Settlement and the several thousand Chinese cases, with hundreds of
deaths, in the Chinese section of Shanghai, “dependent upon the Chinese-owned and
controlled water works company”.395 Even if the Chinese were not biologically weaker in
the face of cholera, it seemed that their living habits were certainly putting them at risk.
Foreign residents could, and did, protect themselves in their own enclaves by maintaining
their own kitchen hygiene and avoiding Chinese food at social events, on ships sailing down
the Yangtze River, and even in hospital wards.396

Authorities around China before the 1920s had chosen to tackle cholera outbreaks in
several different ways, including constructing seasonal hospitals and small-scale water
sanitation projects. Cholera was familiar to Chinese society, but its prevention was sparse,
ad hoc, and hardly institutionalized. It was in this context that reformists, along with local
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governments, promoted the kitchen as a desirable hygienic space and taught the individual
to exercise agency. By all measures, the 1920 parade seemed to make an impact. Follow-up
investigations showed that “even in the homes on small streets there is a decided difference
in the cleanliness of all food used”, and “one seldom sees water-soaked fruits being sold on
the street”.397 “[M]elon and meal dealers” all around Fuzhou began to use screens to keep
out flies from their shopfronts and cover their merchandise.398 Similar initiatives also drew
positive feedback. In Ningbo, the doctor in charge of treatment for more than 9,000 cholera
patients was presented with a “silver-plated shield with complimentary characters on it” by
the local elite as a gesture of gratitude.399

Peter’s article also highlighted the need, and desire, for more preventive tools in health
education. Authorities around China before the 1920s had chosen to tackle cholera
outbreaks in a number of different ways. Only recently in the 1890s had British colonials in
India started to use prophylactic vaccines in large-scale drives, especially after popular
therapies such as purgatives were proved to be counterproductive.400 Starting in 1912,
Shanxi’s provincial government treated river water in various rural areas as part of a rural
irrigation program.401 The 1919 epidemic in Fuzhou inspired the creation of an Anti-Cholera
League, which facilitated the collaboration between the municipal government, the Council
on Health Education, and local Christian institutions to set up the 1920 parade. In Shanghai,
the Chinese Isolation Hospital and the designated Cholera Hospital treated Chinese cholera
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cases, and the former was entirely funded through a provincial government fund and local
donations, albeit overseen by a missionary doctor.402 Often, missionary hospitals had to
operate seasonally – regularly during most of the year and turning all operations over to
cholera treatment during the summer months.403 The Red Cross Society also opened its own
cholera hospital in Shanghai in 1913, which only operated during the summer.404 Businesscentric and concerned with safeguarding the investments of its foreign residents, the
Shanghai Municipal Council had established the practice of conducting regular inspections
of slaughterhouses and market stalls before the turn of the century, and completed a new
“state-of-the-art” water supply and sewage system by 1883.405 But these actions of the
Council were strictly for the maintenance of business efficacy, and did little to address
public facilities or set general guidelines. Cholera was not unfamiliar to Chinese society in
the early twentieth century, but its prevention was sparse, ad hoc, and hardly
institutionalised. It was in this context that reformists, along with local governments,
promoted the personal kitchen as a hygienic space in order for the individual to exercise
agency to prevent him or herself from the disease.

The shift by hygiene reformists to focus on personal responsibility in food preparation and
consumption could thus be interpreted as the next step of a racialized, colonial, civilizing
mission, especially as it was led by missionary boards and the YMCA. Alternatively, it was a
stopgap for the failure of Chinese and treaty port authorities to safely upgrade hygiene

“Chinese Public Isolation Hospital”, 1914. Folder 420, Box 22, FA 114/RG4, RAC.
L. K. Larsen, “Medical Reports of the Chinese Customs Service: Public Health of Antung,
Manchuria, 1919”, China Medical Journal 34 (1920), 676.
404 “The North-China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette”, 1913.
405 Isabella Jackson, Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China’s Global City (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 167—8.
152
402
403

infrastructure or enforce sanitary laws. As Chieko Nakajima writes, Shanghai elites
launched mass educational hygiene campaigns to mitigate the damage of city
administrators’ inability to build new infrastructure.406 But commercial- and print-driven
interest in hygiene and individual education actually grew in tandem with, and not in spite
of, state-run initiatives: laboratory research for cholera prevention and therapies, the
establishment of infectious disease hospitals, and the increased manufacturing and
distribution of vaccines. As Chinese citizens’ expectations for government services
increased, so did their own consciousness about personal hygiene and responsibility.
“The Tiger is Coming”
Following the Fuzhou success, large-scale cholera prevention campaigns continued in
Chinese cities. Shanghai’s International Settlement, French Concession, and the Chinese
municipality collaborated on a 1931 parade. They used sensationalist methods – dozens of
stretchers with “dead bodies” with giant models of flies swarming around them carried
through the streets – to indicate what would happen when the health advice was not
taken.407
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Figure 4.14: “The Unclean Way of Eating” followed by a “corpse” on a stretcher. Countway
Library of Medicine, Yale University
The theme of the day had a clear message – the parade was an admonishment of the ways in
which Shanghai residents had thus been derelict in their hygienic duties. More importantly,
it was also a demonstration in how each individual could and should take personal
responsibility, using simple methods, in their own homes. Having observed the models of
both exemplary and incorrect examples, the public was now also expected to point out and
correct bad behaviour as they recognised it. The joint forces of the three Shanghai
administrations, chose, in this instance, to educate (and scare and shame) their
constituents. Overall, an estimated 625,000 people were in attendance, and this became one
of the largest hygiene education public events to date. On a smaller scale with an attendance
of twenty thousand, Jiangxi’s 1935 summer cholera campaign, an initiative of a local New
Life Corps or Schools Hygiene Team (xuexiao weisheng dui) during the New Life Movement’s
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popularization, featured radio broadcasts, theatrical performances, and a citizen cleaning
initiative.408

Written promotional materials instructed that people could not allow social niceties or
carelessness to prevent them from following proper hygiene advice when the “scary
summer [comes] back” with cholera in tow each May and June.409 The Council on Health
Education’s companion pamphlets for their travelling lectures tackle the “agents” of cholera
– flies, raw water, sick people, and uncovered food – in a series titled “Health-Picture Talks”,
(weisheng tushuo). Illustrated panels are accompanied by narrative descriptions and catchy
rhyming couplets to help readers remember the advice. A picture of several men socializing
in a tea house is captioned: “on the surface everything looks orderly, but think about this
teacup, this smoking pipe: how many people will drink from it? How many people will
smoke from it? One cannot be sure that every person is healthy”.410 A first-hand account by
a Shanghai resident, written after a visit to a literature professor friend’s house, described
alarm at the stubbornness of Shanghai’s elite to disregard public health advice and insist on
keeping their bathrooms close to their kitchens “for visitors’ convenience”.411 Hangzhou’s
residents were also asked to refrain from visiting the sick or mourning the deceased in
homes that were likely contaminated.412
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For restaurants and other food services, the Ministry of the Interior released a series of
cleanliness guidelines in 1928 in its government bulletin. Chefs were expected to cut their
hair and nails regularly, wash hands after using the bathroom or scratching their noses, and
refrain from “coughing or yelling towards pots and bowls while cooking or carrying
food”.413 The kitchens themselves also needed to conform to higher hygiene standards,
including screens and traps for flies and rodents and a daily cleaning of floors. For waste
disposal, the guidelines suggest that the water used to boil rice and vegetables be sold for
pig feed, and not be dumped out on the ground. 414 The Ministry of the Interior’s public road
health stations (weisheng gonglu zhan) developed a set of investigation forms for grading
the environmental hygiene statuses of restaurants, public wells, and other facilities in each
jurisdiction, including conducting a rodent count in every kitchen. 415 The comprehensive
list of guidelines for restaurants in Shantou included regulations for kitchens as well as
dining rooms. A restaurant that failed to provide fly traps, white-coloured uniforms for all
staff, or spittoons for customers, among other requirements, would be fined up to ten yuan
for each offence. 416 The municipal health administration in Nanjing announced in 1930 that
any restaurant could be subject to a hygiene inspection at any time. 417
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Figure 4.15: Cook opening a steamer basket in a restaurant in Baoding, Hebei. Source:
photograph (1933—1946) by Hedda Morrison, courtesy of Harvard-Yenching Library of
Harvard College Library, Harvard University.
Often, descriptions of cholera recalled the frightening puppets that were the stars of the
Fuzhou parade. A pamphlet from the Hangzhou government warns “esteemed readers” that
“cholera will soon become another uninvited guest to the Hangzhou area, and just thinking
about last year’s situation is so painful”.418 Cholera was an “invader”, and could sneakily
lead one to “sink into a trap” if not careful.419 The apt phonetic transliteration of the word
“cholera” as “tiger plague” or “tiger fierce pull” (hu yi , or hu lie la ), referred to its speed and
violence that executed its victims within a few hours; it also perfectly aligned with its more
popular, traditionally-derived name, “sudden turmoil” (huoluan).420 In a graphic description
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of the suffering of a cholera victim, the “tiger plague” was personified as “an enemy of the
people”.421 Its special agent, the common fly, was an intentional agent of destruction, and a
“murderer”: “green-bellied, red-headed, often clothed in filth; contaminated with bacteria
from food, transmitting sickness as fast as the wind blows”.422 In a poster produced by the
Council on Health Education, a child eats his dinner while a fly of equal size feeds from the
other side of the bowl.423 According to a Rockefeller Foundation report, “there is reason to
believe that gastro-intestinal diseases in China cause at least 5 deaths per 1,000 population
per year and that most of this is fly-borne”.424

Fortunately, prevention against this malicious disease and its vectors was achievable. “To
sanitize our cooking utensils”, wrote Shi Cui in an editorial, “we simply need to boil
them”.425 Primary school students’ efforts to sanitize drinking water in Xinhe, Jiangsu, were
documented in a series of lantern slides that showed easy, step-by-step instructions in
images and accompanied narrations.426 A Hangzhou resident who received a “The Tiger is
Coming” pamphlet could provide a necessary public service by simply reading, memorizing,
and “showing [this] to others, or reading it to them if they are illiterate”.427 Participating in a
fly elimination campaign was arguably the best way for an individual to prevent cholera,
“maintain public morality[,] and serve the society”.428 Fly and mosquito control had in fact
been a significant undertaking for many Chinese city governments. Beginning in 1922, the
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Nanjing government detailed 5,000 dollars and two dozen policemen to the health bureau
for fly larvae elimination in public water sources and latrines every summer.429 The city of
Hangzhou called on its residents to “do their duty” and “actively reduce flies: use swatters,
water traps, and covers to prevent flies from getting near food”.430 After killing flies, one
should “simply throw bodies into the fire or drown them to eliminate the germs”.431 Armed
with fly swatters and clenched fists, the students and faculty of a school in Shandong posed
for a photo with the caption, “Notice is hereby given that any fly who appears… does so at
his own risk… by order of the FLY ELIMINATION CAMPAIGN”.432

Scholars of modern China may be sceptical about the effectiveness of groups of individual
people killing individual flies, presumably using such simple tools as netted or sticky traps
and fly swatters. The dire consequences of the pest elimination campaigns of Mao Zedong’s
Great Leap Forward certainly come to mind. But contemporary commentators marvelled at
the impact of intentional fly-killing. But contemporary commentators marvelled at the
impact of intentional fly-killing. The Rockefeller Foundation reported that the kitchen fly
traps made by a Mr. Yang at South-Eastern University were so effective that “there were
practically no flies” during a particularly hot summer.433 The Beijing Municipal Department
of Public Safety hosted an anti-fly campaign in 1930, in which participants were awarded a
copper coin for every ten flies caught – “a total of 12,134,010 flies were caught in the city
during the summer at a cost of $2,018.68”.434 Each student at a Chongqing middle school
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was reportedly able to catch and kill at least twenty flies each evening.435 Guangzhou’s
public bulletin declared its fly elimination work a success, claiming that “the waves from
last year’s fly elimination work have gradually spread everywhere, to villages and to the old
and young”.436

Moreover, the participation of the public resulted in more than just a decrease of number of
flies, or even gastro-intestinal illnesses – as the famed example of Qiaotou Village’s fly
elimination campaign, discussed in the “School Hygiene” chapter showed, an entire
community was apparently enlightened and emboldened through the experience. The
student government organization decided to start a fly killing campaign to help local
residents feel safe from disease. The student-led team instructed their peers and elders to
use simple fly swatters and traps to kill the flies, which could then be used to feed poultry to
keep them plump.437 The report of this fly elimination campaign showed that an entire
community was apparently enlightened and emboldened through the experience. An
elderly man initially dismissed the seriousness of the campaign at its start, saying “we can
now live more than seventy years, which would not have been possible if flies and
mosquitoes really were so harmful”. By the end of the campaign, no villager could deny that
flies were dangerous enemies.438 In all these cases, the successes were said to be due to the
work of “one or two teams that led the charge and many others followed”. Just as a single
student could start a campaign that would change the minds of hundreds in Qiaotou, every
Chinese person could start from killing a few flies to make progress.
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From clean kitchens, to clean food, to clean eating
Advice for what the common Chinese person should do with his or her kitchen soon
extended beyond mere cleaning. With the mass publication of special interest magazines for
public consumption, advertisements, news of health-related progress, cleaning advice, and
recipes all found a home. Journals such as Shanghai’s fortnightly “Health” magazine
Weisheng ban yue kan published both medical progress news and advice for the general
reader, while other publications ran regular columns for recipes and “hygiene common
knowledge”. Recipe guides until the mid-1930s were educational eye-openers for those who
were able and willing to broaden their dietary interests and make creative, cosmopolitan
changes to their routines. They were perhaps aspirational to many but went hand-in-hand
with the proliferation of advertisements for food and nutritional products in the print
media.

To understand the transition of the kitchen from a place that simply needed to be free of
germs and flies to one that could positively foster wonderful health benefits, we must
necessarily discuss nutritional hygiene and food science at the global level in the early
twentieth century. In The Pasteurization of France, Bruno Latour describes the teachings of
French “hygienists” in the Revue Scientifique journals in the 1880s as an “accumulation”:
“advice, precautions, recipes, opinions, statistics, remedies…” in attempts to launch “allround combat” on diseases.439 Unlike research bacteriologists, who may have considered
disease to be caused only by specific microbes, the hygienists considered any and all factors
as possible causes. They were, to a large extent, similar to those cholera-prevention activists
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who believed that the Chinese were additionally susceptible because of their lifestyles.
China’s authors for cleaning, cooking, and recipe advice followed a similar all-encompassing
framework, and moreover, showed that the hygienist mode of understanding health—the
absence of not only disease but also other undesirable elements—held firm even well into
the twentieth century, after the medical community’s acceptance of germ theory and the
popularization of targeted therapies.

Eliminating microbes to reach a hygienic ideal also required setting up entire ecosystems
that contributed to a more general abundance of healthfulness. It was thus not sufficient,
according to kitchen cleanliness guides, to merely clean and sanitize cooking equipment, but
the entire kitchen needed to be shielded from even dust.440 The “whole suspect outer world”
needed to be controlled not only for ultimate elimination of microbes, but also for more
“transcendental” goals —“asepsis”, or “complete isolation” from any pollution.441 The term
“dietary hygiene” (yinshi weisheng) emerged to encompass cleanliness guidelines for
kitchens, cooks, diners, dining rooms, the food itself, and the surroundings in which it was
served. Meals also needed to achieve aesthetic standards. Health’s “table for housewives to
clip out and post in the kitchen” was a short guide for teaching cooks at home to “save food
value as well as appearance of flavor”, indicating that appealing-looking vegetables were
more likely to be eaten.442 “Regardless of whether one uses gold, china, or bamboo [to
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serve], all equipment should be clean and neat”. Food should be arranged beautifully, and at
the correct proportions between serving vessel and amount of food.443

Readers were also encouraged to broaden their horizons and improve the variety of their
diets. After explaining necessary nutritional content—iron, protein, carbohydrates, etc.—for
health and in which foods to find them, an article in Weisheng ban yue kan ends with a
“motto for three daily meals”: “Every day I will eat: one pound of milk, one egg, one item of
fish or soybeans, one item of potatoes, large amount of vegetables, unhusked wheat bread
or coarse grains, and one item of fruit”.444 A “Home Hygienic Cooking Guide” (jiachang
weisheng pengtiao zhinan) published in 1932 by the Commercial Press, part of the “Family
Reference Book” (Jiating Congshu) series, deemed itself the quintessential guide for anyone
unfamiliar with cooking, as well as a well-rounded guide to disinfecting cookware and safe
food preparation techniques.445 While the recipes included are elaborate and often lengthy,
including an entry for “roast goose”, both parts of the book—the hygiene guide and the
recipe collection—were created specifically for the use of the individual at home. Moreover,
the provision of appropriate and sanitary kitchen equipment would not only ameliorate a
family’s health, but also protect and lessen the workload for the “housewife”, (zhufu) the
undisputed manager of the kitchen.446 Exploring new recipes could also help bring families
closer together: “this book should be interesting to many, especially women, but families
can make use of the book to read together”.447
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At the same time, a global movement towards clean eating and natural foods emerged. New
Deal food writing in the 1930s, according to historian Camille Bégin, reacted to the rise of
mass-produced industrial food and took moral stances around the “dichotomy between real
and fake, good and bad food” that persist even to today.448 Frozen vegetables and
refrigerated meat, considered more “pure” compared to processed or packaged foods,
became available to those who could afford them. In the global natural food movement of
the early twentieth century, Chinese food experts declared their distinct advantage.
Overseas Chinese restauranteurs in the United States, to combat pervasive racialized
discrimination of Chinese food as dirty, cheap, and lower class, drew upon the “traditional”
wisdom of their ancestors in published cookbooks from as early as the fourteenth century.
These were written with an “emphasis on food as a means to maintain the health of the
individual” and also to strengthen his relationship with society.449 Traditional recipe books,
such as the eighteenth century Record of Xing Garden with its collections of meals of “coarse
foods, like vegetables and stews”, became models for writers in the early twentieth
century.450 Chinese American restaurant owners and cookbook writers would often evoke
the concept of “nourishing life” (yangsheng) in their own publications around the turn of the
twentieth century.451
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American audiences took notice of Chinese ingredients such as soybeans and vegetables as
nourishing additions to a frugal, Protestant diet.452 Chinese methods of cooking—such as
using a steamer as to not overcook or damage the structural and nutritional integrity of
vegetables—were particularly lauded, with one writer proudly announcing that the
longtime staple Chinese steamer pot had only recently been introduced to Western
countries. Furthermore, the Chinese tendency to eat a variety of animals’ internal organs,
which are high in iron and other minerals, was also just beginning to gain popularity in the
United States, validating the longstanding practice.453 Mark Swislocki writes that the
increased interest in nutrition allowed Shanghaiers to connect with new values emerging in
a cosmopolitan place and time but also to maintain their Chineseness at the same time.
Reformists in China urged cooks to welcome natural, plant-, and animal-derived diets to
receive the best nutritional benefits from their food. Aside from improving the health of
Chinese people, this would also have a more grandiose effect—Chinese home cooks could
thus have an important and leading role in the improvement of nutrition for people all over
the world. After all, “Confucius”, wrote Shui Wong Chan in 1917, “taught [us] how to eat
scientifically”.454

Once intricate, varied, natural, and carefully prepared food was served, diners would also
need to follow certain guidelines while they were eating. While cholera prevention was seen
as incredibly urgent by city governments and doctors, and the explicit goal of many food
preparation guides, tuberculosis, also rampant, did not receive the same attention in the
first decades of the twentieth century. Even John B. Grant, a key public health faculty
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member of the PUMC, decided that China’s most urgent priorities for public health reform
were to control and vaccinate for severe gastrointestinal diseases.455 If placed on a Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs, safety from cholera seemed to be at the bottom of the pyramid, with
tuberculosis prevention, to be attempted through a more thorough overhaul of “economic
conditions”, a level or two above. This was the case, however, until the National AntiTuberculosis Association, established in 1933 by influential Chinese medical professionals,
began to consider whether a particularly Chinese dining characteristic had caused the
dizzying numbers of tuberculosis infections, even among wealthier, younger people—that
of “communal eating” (gong shi).456 The Association called for government support to ban
this “communistic salivary exchange”, eating from a “common dish into which the diners
indiscriminately plunge their chopsticks or spoons as they convey successive portions to
their mouths”.457 Its leaders proposed several dining reforms: diners could serve
themselves from shared dishes on a moving tabletop with designated serving utensils, carry
two sets of utensils (one for eating, and the other “hygienic chopsticks” for serving) or eat
only from individual servings that were portioned before each meal.458 It did not seem to
concern members of the Association that tuberculosis was widely understood by this time
to be an airborne disease for which people were infected through their lungs, nor that their
contemporaries voiced doubts about whether communal eating was really so dangerous.459
Lu Liuhua, celebrated among the first generation of female Chinese doctors, expressed her
reluctance to adopt “hygienic chopsticks”. Moreover, portioning out all food before the start
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of a meal would inconvenience those who were overly polite or late, and would actually
undermine the beauty of Chinese cuisine, in which each dish was to be enjoyed
separately!460

Figure 4.16: “If a healthy person and an infected person eat together, there is a danger of germ
transmission”. Source: Health-Picture Talks, Picture 10.
Nevertheless, the Anti-Tuberculosis Association was now sufficiently emboldened by
central government developments such as the New Life Movement and support from
important scientific and political figures to make these bold claims. Lu’s editorial, despite its
ambivalence, concluded that China needed a temporary hygienic chopsticks solution to curb
rising tuberculosis infection numbers, but it would not diminish the “strong social and
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family structures of Chinese culture”.461 Columnist Wang Zude presented case studies of
Nankai and Tsinghua Universities, exemplary in both education and social norms, where
students all carry two sets of utensils for serving and eating respectively.462 Even if not
every family could afford to refashion their dining tables to spin, the range of proposed
kitchen food and hygiene reforms were once again stressed as the most convenient, easy,
and cost-effective ways to prevent the spread of tuberculosis. The inclusion of designated
serving utensils in virtually every dietary hygiene guide throughout the 1930s was
testament to their perceived potential. Chinese people could establish this simple, humane
solution that would require neither infrastructure-building nor persecution.
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Figure 4.17: This was one of the “Health Habit Charts” created by the Council on Health
Education throughout the 1910s and disseminated around the country. Source: Peter,
Broadcasting Health in China, 38.
Berberi, the New Life Movement, and the patriotic soybean
While specific events such as the Fuzhou and Shanghai cholera parades may have had
missionary and colonial origins, and dietary hygiene was gaining its popularity globally as a
new life science, the basic act of managing nutritional and hygiene habits in the kitchen to
prevent disease had its Chinese roots. After all, the Chinese had their own longstanding
dietary taboos —excessive drinking, gluttony, and the ultimate “processed food”, polished
white rice. The idea that individual behaviour as a main cause of disease had long existed in
Chinese conceptions of wellness. The disease caused by thiamine (Vitamin B) deficiency
known as beriberi, which caused swelling and numbness of the legs and feet, was one such
example. It first made regular appearances as jiaoqi (foot qi) in Chinese physicians’ notes as
169

a disease caused by the humid and hot climate of southern China. By the thirteenth century,
physicians also considered the causes to be sufferer’s “habits, not their constitution or their
environment” after examining some northern Chinese cases.463 These early epidemiologists
bolstered their arguments with invocations of the political divisions between north and
south China, reflected in people’s diets, wealth, and bodily strength. As Hilary Smith
explains, the distinction between northern and southern versions of jiaoqi and the
differentiation in their respective causes and cures began to fade as China became “newly
unified”.464 By the early twentieth century, the integration of all existing understandings
into one, scientifically-defined disease “beriberi” was similarly a product of both scientific
progress and the political climate at the time: medical researchers were considering that
microbes were not the only necessary causes of disease, vitamin synthesis was becoming
common around the world, and China faced a looming threat from the rise of militaristic
nationalism from Japan, for which beriberi posed a threat.465 Instead of vaccinations,
antibiotics, and sanitation, the prevention and cure of the deficiency required dietary and
habitual changes for all Chinese.

Fortunately, medical advice reassured general readers, the cure for both the disease and
bad dietary habits could also easily be found domestically, and traditionally. Chinese
doctors had identified its dietary correlations in the Tang Dynasty, eight centuries before
European records.466 Even elite Japanese doctors had only recently accepted that beriberi
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was a diet-related disease in 1926, after decades of searching for a microbial cause.467 Its
causes of dietary deficiency matched nicely with traditional Chinese medical concepts that
designated behavioural attributes for certain ailments, and thus it is neither surprising that
jiaoqi and beriberi coalesced into a common nutrition-related disease, nor that reformists
agreed that the easiest cures were located in each individual’s kitchen. As Rogaski writes,
Chinese medicine proponents by the 1930s had brought “an indigenous form of weisheng…
into the ‘outer arena’ of race and nation” as wisdom that “resided within… Chinese people
themselves”.468

Chinese wisdom dictated that preventing and curing beriberi required the individual to
adopt humble, clean, and frugal practices in their dietary habits. Doctors in 1915 found that
where rice was “grown, husked, and pounded locally” without steam milling and polishing,
beriberi cases were non-existent, even as towns a hundred miles away experienced
epidemics.469 “Curing jiaoqi is not difficult”, wrote Jiang Tiyuan in 1935, “people who have
the disease should not eat rice that is too white, and instead substitute with soy, wheat, or
eggs, which are higher in Vitamin B”.470 As jiaoqi had been a disease associated with
progress and decadent lifestyles, prevention methods were even more approachable. The
cookbook Yinshi yu Jiankang (“Food and Health”) blamed recent civilization for people’s
inability to fight off germs and viruses— “cars and horses have decreased our exercise
opportunities, and food has become more intricately processed which disrupts the nutrition
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we should have”.471 In fact, nutritional researchers found that urban Shanghai workers who
preferred “polished rice” had worse nutrition than farmers and embodied how prosperity
“corrupted traditional customs”. They argued that “it was time for the city to learn from the
country”.472

Yinshi yu Jiankang urged its readers to shift their goals away from achieving financial wealth
and instead towards maintaining health. Communities around the country were lauded for
efforts to eat and promote modest diets. At Yenching University, domestic management
students’ experimentations with low-cost diets “heeded the demands of their discipline and
their country as they… acted in practical ways to translate scientific ideas of nutrition to
Chinese conditions”.473 An article on student nutrition criticized the dietary habits in
wealthy southern towns (eating polished rice, “unthinkingly” filling up on rice porridge) for
rendering jiaoqi affliction inevitable, and encouraged them to add coarse grains, soybeans,
and eggs. The article even brought back the north-south divide over differences in dietary
preference and nutrition, reiterating that beriberi’s causes had long been understood.474
The “ancient art” of Chinese nutrition offered the answers, even as the rest of the world had
only recently begun to recognize the importance of vitamins.475

Furthermore, being prompted to recover from jiaoqi could, and should, also push the
sufferer to make some additional lifestyle changes for better hygiene overall. If the
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individual could afford the expense, he or she should “relocate to recuperate” to a dwelling
with dry air and good ventilation and sunlight.476 Similarly, to address the various different
understandings of jiaoqi by readers who were perhaps perplexed about how exactly to
combat the disease, answers in Weisheng Yue Kan’s regular column “Hygiene Q and A”
(weisheng wenda) reassured readers that regardless of what type of jiaoqi they had
encountered or were trying to prevent (dry, wet, acute, malignant), their target diet should
contain soy, vegetables, and lemons, their housing should be clean, sunny, and ventilated,
and they should “avoid physical and psychological labour”.477 Should individuals in charge
of public spaces such as schools or prisons find a jiaoqi patient, wrote Jiang, they should
immediately improve the communal diet, and replace white rice with soy and wheat
products to prevent further instances, while improving overall sanitation of the facilities.478
These written discussions about such a disease explained away common fears with
attainable hygienic solutions and underscored the ease of behavioural change.

Thus, change for better jiaoqi prevention would come from within. This encouragement
perfectly aligned with the launch of Chiang Kai-shek’s New Life Movement in 1934, for
which Chinese citizens were expected to embrace ancient virtues of propriety and
righteousness in every aspect of their lives.479 Above other tenets, the Movement’s
teachings’ resonance with contemporary currents in Chinese society was loudest with the
kitchen hygiene reformists. Chiang’s “Guidelines of the New Life Movement”, published in
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newspapers around the country in May 1934, advised readers that “eating utensils should
be clean and food should be washed; one should eat local produce”.480 A series of cartoon
panels in the New Life Movement Weekly magazine (Xinshenghuo zhou kan) neatly summed
up the teachings of kitchen hygiene to date: “do not drink raw water, do not eat unclean
fruit in the summer, do not eat junk food”.481 Cleanliness, frugality, and rationality for
kitchen hygiene were united under the banner of New Life with government endorsement.

Women were both the architects and targets of New Life kitchen hygiene efforts. As an
extension of the New Life Movement’s socially-driven grassroots mobilization efforts, the
New Life Movement Women Service Committee of Nanjing trained 4,500 women and girls
from middle school students to government employees to become kitchen hygiene trainers
at recruitment agencies for domestic staff.482 New Life women’s organizations’ work in
kitchen hygiene improvement also capitalized on their foundational professional and
disciplinary training in domestic management. Guidelines produced by the organizations
from the late 1930s and early 1940s defined “cleanliness” as more than just washing one’s
own body or cleaning public places, and more reminiscent of the Pasteurian hygienists’ allround combat against impropriety. As kitchen hygiene experts, women could monitor the
work of others. As domestic management educators, they could publish textbooks for
general consumption. And, as housewives, women were expected to not only provide and
prepare nourishing foods for their families, but also understand how to leverage the foods’

Chiang Kai-shek, “Xinshenghuo guize [guidelines of the New Life Movement]”, Shanxi gongbao
[public bulletin of Shanxi], 1934.
481 “Xinshenghuo yundong tu jie [pictorial explanations of the New Life Movement]”, Xinshenghuo zhou
kan [New Life weekly] 1, no. 10 (1934): 1.
482 “Amah-Education Nanjing Plan”, The China Press, 17 July 1936. Even within Jiangxi, the New Life
Corps were “independently established organizations”. While all mandated to spread New Life ideas,
there were variations and different adaptations. Ferlanti, “The New Life Movement in Jiangxi
Province”, 975.
174
480

nutritional values to suit the needs of their family members’, and by extension, the needs of
the nation.483

The perfect food that conformed to the ideals of the New Life Movement was the humble
soybean. The soybean (and the economic potential of its industrialized production) had
been a steadfast companion of China’s modernization, praised and even coveted by those in
the West as a technologically-advanced innovation by the 1910s.484 Abundantly produced in
China, the superfood was locally sourced and higher in calories, protein, and fats than the
imported potato.485 Testing in the laboratories at the Peking Union Medical College
throughout the 1910s and 1920s confirmed that soy milk could be exclusively used to feed
infants, an excellent alternative to cows’ milk. Thus, the production of soybean milk and the
improvement of nutrition for orphans and refugee children became something for which
China could also take a global lead.486
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Figure 4.18: “Mother, this soy bean milk, that the nurse gives me [sic] tastes good”. Source:
Photographs from the Peking First Health Station, Rockefeller Archive Center. Sleepy Hollow,
NY.
While soy’s versatility and its links to Chinese innovation and pride were made clear,
especially by the 1930s, it was the fact that soybeans were inexpensive that really made
them popular to dietary hygiene reformists as a key food source. As early as 1905, Li
Shizeng, a Chinese scientist and tofu entrepreneur in Paris, argued that soy milk would be
the great class equalizer for nutrition. Poorer drinkers of soy milk would be able to receive
all its nutritional benefits without having to pay the premium for cow’s milk, for which
higher costs were attributed to sourcing and processing.487 The price of a quart of soy milk
and two “bean dreg cakes”, enough nutrition for one day for an adult, “would cost about the
equivalent of a 2 cent American postage stamp”.488 Soy milk, more uniformly produced in

487
488

Ying, “Huangdou de yingyang jiazhi”.
Arnold, “The Soybean ‘Cow.’”
176

factories, was in fact more hygienic than cow’s milk, which needed to be carefully
pasteurized.489 Chinese children had been drinking soy milk for thousands of years, one
writer claimed, and as a result, rickets, rampant among foreign children, was hardly seen in
China.490 Some newspaper editorials even suggested that it was a good alternative to breast
milk.491 Foreign doctors in China, on furlough back home in the United States, hosted
information sessions about the “complete protein food” that “sustains growth” to captive
housewife audiences.492 An overseas Chinese man in Malaya who sold bean sprouts to his
fellow compatriots attracted the attention of British authorities, and won acclaim for
developing a product that was clean, affordable, and nutritious.493 Not only important to
Chinese people within national borders, the soybean in fact began to connect Chinese
around the world, and elevated the status of the entire race as creative and humane food
technologists. Soybean products became intricately linked to Chinese innovation, scientific
progress, and nationalistic welfare.

By the mid-1930s, kitchen hygiene reformists, nutrition advocates, soybean entrepreneurs,
and the New Life Movement met at an intersection, symbiotically promoting the themes of
frugality, cleanliness, devotion to the nation, and bodily strength. Initiatives from the 1920s
gained national legitimization under the New Life Movement. In fact, according to
contemporary writers, it was imperative that communal eating norms be dismantled in
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favour of splitting food into individual portions or enforcing the use of hygienic chopsticks.
If not, picky Chinese diners would not get enough diverse nutritional hygiene and the nation
would also generate more food waste, directly contradicting Chiang’s stated New Life
directive that eating should be “to sustain life”.494 In other words, kitchen and food hygiene
reforms over the past decades built the foundations on which the New Life Movement was
even possible. Cholera, tuberculosis, and beriberi could all be defeated through the
proscribed tangible and ideologically coherent methods.
Wartime nutrition as the tiger returns
As the Japanese military occupied large areas along China’s east coast starting in 1937,
massive inland migration led to crowded, new cities and difficulties in the supply chain for
food. While China’s interior was able to begin producing a range of crops as the government
and entire cities moved west and southwest, certain imported and coastally-produced foods
became difficult to source.495 The government stepped in to curb grain price increases and
to ensure that troops and government personnel were fed, but changes had to be made in
the compositions of their diets.496 Cholera, typhoid, other gastrointestinal diseases, and
nutritional deficiencies once again posed tremendous threats.

Large-scale vaccinations drives and sanitation efforts were established early on. After an
outbreak of cholera in July 1939 killed around two hundred people near Hualong Bridge in
Chongqing, the wartime capital city, epidemic prevention teams rushed to set up
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provisional cholera hospitals and emergency treatment stations in the area, and set
disinfection squads to the river to make sure the drinking water was properly sanitized.497
Chongqing authorized a number of institutions to act as quarantine stations and
enforcement agencies, and to issue certificates to people and vehicles once they were
cleared. The staff—one doctor, one to three nurses, two to four assistants, and one support
worker—were given vaccines, supplies, and diagnostic instructions to differentiate between
infectious disease and food poisoning cases. Workers on ferries, cars, and public
transportation were required to be checked for disease and instructed to examine their
passengers and check for quarantine clearance certificates. Every water source used for
public consumption was to have a sanitation team of one or two people who would add
chlorine at least once a day and eliminate any fly larvae.498 In addition, authorities
understood the necessity of vaccinating widely, and early. Fortunately, Chongqing’s cholera
numbers during the war years were kept mostly low—in 1941, only seven cases were
reported after the city vaccinated 150,000 people. By 1944 the Chongqing government
could no longer meet all its vaccination targets because of wartime limitations, but the
initial rapid efforts “averted disaster”.499

Preventive infrastructural efforts and vaccination drives had not been enough to curb
cholera completely in the 1910s and were definitely insufficient in the 1940s. Even the
aforementioned government guidelines urged that to successfully and practically target
both military and civilian populations, a concerted promotion effort must be made based on
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the “central themes” of food hygiene: “how to kill germs in food, simple ways to prevent
flies, drink boiled water”, and others. Local governments were encouraged to launch
“cholera prevention” and “hygiene campaign” weeks in collaboration with various local
organizations, including medical bodies, New Life Movement chapters, and military
organizations.500 The Eight Route Army, in the Communist Party’s base area in Shaanxi, set
up its own army medical department which directed the digging of deep latrines and
outfitting all kitchen windows with fly screens.501 Telegrams in Chiang Kai-shek’s own name
were sent to military commanders around the country to remind “soldiers and officers to
not drink or use raw water to prevent cholera”.502

The collaboration of a variety of agencies was especially important; in 1942, the Ministry of
Social Affairs released an urgent memo regarding “society’s non-cooperation” with its
business affairs administration, denouncing Kuomintang party members’ employment of
gang-related criminal methods in the purchase and distribution of cholera vaccinations.
Because of vaccine shortages (due to production, distribution, and corruption issues), it was
thus even more important for groups and individuals to know about how to prevent cholera
for themselves. The Ministry, along with the Health Administration, urged “groups” to
disinfect drinking water, educate cooks on disinfection methods, and provide serving
chopsticks for group meals. Individuals also had the responsibility to get vaccinated, not
allow flies near food, and boil water before drinking.503
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The central government sought to ensure that knowledge about the dangers of an outbreak
of a disease like cholera, in addition to constant reminders of warfare, were top of mind.
May 25, 1943, was designated as a city-wide cleaning campaign day. In the spirit of the
Fuzhou and Shanghai cholera parades, the health bureau of Chongqing prepared posters,
coordinated promotional teams equipped with loudspeakers, and vaccination vans. This
campaign required active participation from all residents to reach certain cleaning goals.504
A key goal of the event, according to the host organization the Ministry of Education, was so
that “promotion and real life need to be closely aligned”, such that participation in hygiene
competitions must be seen as a form of wartime service itself. For mass vaccinations and
promotional materials to have their maximum impact for “increasing wartime strength”,
hygiene promotion needed to be practical.505

Mass-participation cleaning campaigns were common in wartime China in a variety of
different public spaces, as refugees, schools, government apparatuses, and intellectual
resources moved westward. For all such campaigns, multi-media promotional materials
were widely encouraged by sponsoring government bodies. Songs, posters, lectures, and
news articles were all valuable resources. Based on the National Health Administration
guidelines, “Each central theme can be expressed through variations of different slogans…
they can be posted to dining places, public transport stations, and other appropriate
sites”.506 Posters educating the public about the dangers of cholera appeared around
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Chongqing. One poster shows a fly with a Japanese Rising Sun emblem, with slogans on the
side reading “We need to prevent cholera and kill flies: and if you want to survive, kill the
Japanese soldiers… If you don’t kill it, it will kill you”.507 In another image, a fly is depicted as
a fighter jet that drops bombs labelled “cholera” onto a crowd of people. Numerous other
flies are lined up behind the first.508 A picture of two missiles heading towards a populated
Chongqing was captioned, “Air raids are scary, cholera is scarier!”509

Figure 4.19: “If you do not kill it, it will kill you”. Source: Historical Photographs of China,
University of Bristol
“Anti-Japanese Public Hygiene Banner”, circa 1938. University of Bristol – Historical Photographs
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Was the sudden resurgence of cholera in crowded wartime environments, and government
reaction through mass vaccination and education campaigns, proof that not enough had
been done to prepare the Chinese public in their daily lives? If the number of cholera cases
in a major city like Chongqing had really dropped to seven in the entire year of 1941,
perhaps the joint efforts of vaccination, sanitation, and increased public awareness were
really making a difference.510 The mass migration into internal China brought refugees and
crowding, but also educated personnel from China’s cities. The “émigré intellectuals” at the
National Southwestern Associated University, a provisional wartime campus in Kunming
incorporating students and staff of several Beijing-area universities, launched their own
crusade for “local betterment” through a fly extermination campaign when they realized
that their local business proprietors did not hold their restaurants to the same high levels of
hygiene standards.511

While the government’s public campaigns began a renewed effort for public sanitation and
cholera-prevention, they could not be separated from continued calls to pay attention to
both nutrition and frugality in the kitchen, all neatly all falling under the “dietary hygiene”
umbrella. The municipal health bureau of Chongqing established its “nutritional hygiene
consultation station” at the site of the capital post office, which administered advice and
grain provisions as well as health check-ups and vaccinations.512 The Chongqing Health
Bureau held a series of “Nutrition Advancement Movement” exhibitions in 1941,
Mary Augusta Brazelton’s monograph on mass vaccination in 20th century China discusses mass
vaccination as a unique wartime feature of China’s public health infrastructure, but concedes that it
was strict quarantine, not new pharmaceuticals, that was most effective at curbing cholera.
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collaborating with local universities and factories, and the local New Life Movement model
district. Attendees could watch plays, attend lectures, see farming displays from
universities, and participate in mass performances of songs written for the occasion. The
motto of the longest campaign held from May 5 to 8 was clearly influenced by wartime
messaging: “we must spend little money and eat well” (huaqian yao shao, chi de yao hao). To
nourish bodies and maintain health we do not need expensive foods. Rather, there are many
excellent common [modest] foods, which are also nourishing”. Suggestions for substituting
tofu and peanut oil for animal products were made into catchy rhymes and became part of
the promotional material. If participants followed the Movement’s guidelines for making
“bean dregs pancakes”, they could also achieve something unheard of during wartime—
helping their children become “plump”.513

After the success of the May events, the National Hygiene Laboratory also announced its
training of dietary managers (shanshi guanli yuan) in nutrition basics, environmental
hygiene, kitchen sanitation, food management, and other topics for respective workplaces,
reinstituted during wartime. Forty representatives from around Chongqing were to be
trained in nutrition basics, environmental hygiene, food management, and other topics for a
total of 192 hours, then returned to their places of employment as qualified managers of
nutrition and kitchen hygiene. An additional task of the manager was to ensure that food
was distributed well and not wasted. In keeping with the National Health Administration’s
recommendation to promote “common foods” (tongsu shipin) and a do-it-yourself attitude
during wartime, the Ministry of Agriculture’s experimental department produced a booklet
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of simple recipes of “everyday foods” (richang shipin) with categories for “beans”,
“vegetables”, and “pickles”, among others.514 Chiang Kai-shek’s own simple diet —“mostly
made up of vegetables with very little fish and meat”—was held up as a patriotic example at
the celebrations for the seventh anniversary of the launch of the New Life Movement in
1941; the same event also featured an agricultural produce competition in which university
and school teams showcased how they could easily mill flour or process soy sauce and
sugar.515 In Guangzhou, the YWCA organized a weeklong “Nutritional Cafeteria” (yingyang
shitang) in February 1943, an exhibition and educational campaign demonstrating the
innovation and the nutritional and monetary value of soybeans as a valuable food source.516

Wartime conditions required an overhaul of recipe and cooking guides that had been
circulating in Chinese society. The commercial abundance of health products, supplements,
and luxury food items of previous decades helped to instil and foster awareness of nutrition,
but it is doubtful that the products advertised in various health publications were used
widely, especially after supply lines were disrupted. Government agencies, charities, and
other institutions became sources for nutritional advice; a father of a five-year-old with
nutritional deficiencies wrote to ask the Chongqing Bureau of Health if there were any
cheaper alternatives to fish liver oil, as it was too expensive to consume during wartime.517
More than sixty thousand pamphlets were produced by the National Health Administration
to be distributed around Chongqing, including twenty thousand copies of “Methods to make
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up for nutritional deficiencies in soldiers during wartime”.518 The emphasis in food and
cooking guides changed from glorifying variety to underscoring frugality.

Innovation in food and dietary advice also fostered rational interest in personal health and
its implications for the national war effort. Like American and British counterparts, the
Chinese Ministry of Food turned to innovation to produce dehydrated food products —
“soup powder, crystallized soy sauce… corn bricks, wheat bricks” — for both army and
general population use.519 The Refugee Children’s Committee, a private organization formed
in 1937 to provide nutrition relief in Shanghai, adapted its recipes for soy milk and “bean
dregs cakes” to be used in individual homes. Spurred by the influx of refugees into Shanghai
after 1937, the Committee and its successor, the national China Nutritional Aid Council,
“scientifically” transformed soybeans from a cheap ingredient to the best source of both
nutrition and a tool for hygiene education.520 By 1940, the Council had expanded its
operations to six distribution centres in the Chinese interior, with financial aid from the
international charity organizations as well as the Chinese government.521

To a large extent, the promotion and popularization of soy milk and other “common foods”
during and at the start of the New Life Movement both helped, and was made possible by,
charitable work to provide food for China’s refugees. But despite clear plans and sufficient
support for such work, Chinese “nutritional activists” during wartime still found themselves
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facing issues of supply. While soybeans, vegetables, and other cheaper foodstuffs had been
promoted widely, wartime shortages made the provision of some products often
unsustainable. Arthur N. Young of the China Nutritional Aid Council wrote to the food
administration in Chongqing and the Council’s plans for producing “soy milk powder” hit a
barrier when its flour provision by the government was suddenly cut in half.522 The Ministry
of Food, established in 1940 to facilitate food distribution during the war, received petitions
from Chongqing’s Chin Tong Street Municipal Hospital, the Chongqing Food Supply Office,
and the Association for the Advancement of Children’s Nutrition for bags of flour to mix
with the soy bean powder they already had.523 Nutritional reformists acted now on two
fronts—charity to make up for nutritional deficiencies for the most vulnerable members of
society, and also continuing their public education initiatives to ensure that Chinese families
could replicate “scientific nutrition” in their own households. While independent
organizations and reformists took leading roles in nutrition-related projects as the war
continued, and the central government seemed to refocus its efforts on epidemic
prevention, both sets of efforts largely went hand in hand. The government-sponsored
nutrition campaigns, in addition, were clear signs that the individual kitchen became
simultaneously a space for sanitation, nutrition, war effort contributions, and general
progress. The war had accelerated the urgency for implementing more kitchen hygiene and
nutrition developments, but the infrastructure, interest, and popular and commercial
activities were already abundant.
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Conclusion
In late 1945 and early 1946, representatives from China were invited to join the advisory
council of the Sussex-based International Nutrition Institute and to send a delegation to a
food technology conference at the New York-based Institute for Food Technologies. The
central government also responded quickly to requests from the League of Nations to share
food and agricultural production information.524 China was now a recognized and important
participant in nutritional hygiene and dietary technological innovation, not to mention a
respected member of the victorious Allies. In addition, cholera prevention and treatment
methods seemed to become efficiently streamlined, and overall cases diminished. Cases
reported in Zhejiang in 1947, for example, were all recorded on standardised forms which
were filled out to indicate the victim’s demographic information, sources of food and water,
vaccination records, and household’s kitchen and bathroom conditions.525 Free vaccination
drives for all schoolchildren, workers, and municipal residents continued in cities such as
Chongqing, with vaccine administration locations in close communication with isolation
hospitals and clinics if determined necessary.526

In this immediate postwar period, new guides published for dietary hygiene reflected
possibilities for a new type of scientific and cosmopolitan ideal kitchen in peacetime. In
1946, the Commercial Press translated a dietary guide intended for “achieving the urban,
middle-class and above experience”. The author chastised the previous generation of
nutrition experts, who, fearful that industrial advances would take away foods’ precious
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natural value, “bitterly” directed everyone to return to unprocessed, “ancient foods”
(yuanshi shipin). Doing so, the author wrote, “would bring us to dismiss all of our
development and return to barbarism”. With vitamin synthesis, the author argued that
human progress need not be confined to nor hindered by rigid dietary restrictions but
should allow for flexibility and experimentation.527 A faculty member from the National
Central University chemistry department and experienced nutrition columnist wrote that
instead of using specific products as emergency supplements for unhealthy persons, the
pursuit of nutrition should be part of everyday life, three meals a day.528 A product like soy
milk would now need to find a place within everyday Chinese diets as a healthy addition to
prevent “endemic nutritional deficiencies”.529

In much the same way, the practices of drinking hot, boiled water and using fly screens
became basic household habits, the former a particular source of cultural distinction and
pride even in modern-day China, where vacuum-sealed thermoses are ubiquitous. Today,
cholera is neither top of mind nor politically relevant. The most common explanation about
why the Chinese drink boiled water is that they have been doing it for 4,000 years, with
hardly any mention about the quality of the available water in Chinese households, disease
prevention, or socio-political implications. In spite of the absence of public historical
knowledge about the practice’s recent history, the universal drinking of boiled water has
become an example of national virtue-signalling and expectations of Chinese citizenry, in
many ways similar to how soybeans were to be consumed in the 1930s. With this uniform
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practice, China had continued to take the lead on kitchen hygiene innovation through
mythologizing and appropriating supposed ancient, yet “scientific”, wisdom.

Decades of rich nutritional and dietary advice first increased public dissemination and
interest of raised living standards in individual homes in the early twentieth century. But
this legacy would later “reinvent the Chinese nation” that took charge of their own “rural
clinics [and] soy milk distribution programs at local schools” to bring scientific knowledge
and know-how to individual homes and local communities, “beyond the university and
government”.530 The path to victory of the Chinese over its long-standing enemies: cholera,
jiaoqi, tuberculosis, and the Japanese, was self-evident, cost efficient, and would increase
national strength in the face of adversity. More importantly, it allowed each individual to
become part of scientific innovation through pursuing a hygienic and nutritious kitchen
space.
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CHAPTER 5: STREET HYGIENE: SPITTING ON THE STREET AND CLEANING IT UP IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC
“I think that this spitting is scandalous too; but I regret the moderation of your
correspondent ‘Resident.’ I would go a step further and deprive the Chinese of the
right to breathe on The Bund or anywhere else where I am near for the aroma of
garlic discharged by some of them, not only through wide nostrils but also through
open capacious mouths, is becoming insufferable”.531
The above quote comes from a satirical editorial in a December 1914 issue of the NorthChina Herald, an English-language newspaper founded by British businessmen in Shanghai.
The writer, credited only by initials G. N., was a resident of the Shanghai International
Settlement and a frequent commentator on social issues. This article was written in
response to an earlier Letter to the Editor that denounced the “appalling increase in the
spitting habit of the Chinese” in the Settlement – “the insolence of this class of native in his
promiscuous spitting has reached a point that calls for the strongest counter measures”.532

The Herald’s Editorial Board had agreed with “Resident” but dismissed the malicious
“insolent” intent that the writer had attributed to those who were inclined to expectorate on
the street. “A Chinese spits, just as he keeps his cap on or does half a dozen other jarring
things, out of unconsidered, unconscious custom” and even the most “polite Chinese” would
often err on the side of “disgusting and unhealthy”.533 It was thus important for the foreign
residents in the Settlement to distinguish between those who were well-intentioned but
ignorant, and others for whom acts of indecency were precisely directed at offending or
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harming foreigners, or even just maliciously for sport. Regardless of this distinction, “if
anything can be done… Shanghai will be the healthier for it”.534

In spite of their disagreement on why the Chinese would choose to spit (was it insolence?
Ignorance? Lack of civility?), implicit in all the letters was an appeal towards some type of
appeal to higher authority to protect the privileged rights of its foreign residents. The
International Settlement was established in the middle of the nineteenth century through a
series of treaties between the Qing imperial government and foreign governments after
China’s losses in the Opium War of 1840—1842. The Qing was required to open Shanghai to
foreign trade and settlement. Negotiations through the 1840s allowed local Chinese
administrators to draw up the Land Regulations to govern the leased territory, which
contained a diverse mix of foreign residents into one distinct area, separated from the old
Chinese walled city.535 A series of land-deal treaties, beginning with the 1844 Treaty of
Wangxia between the American and Chinese governments, allowed foreign residents to
purchase property and remain in Shanghai in perpetuity.

Shanghai’s governing body was unique even among the foreign concessions in Chinese port
cities. The Shanghai Municipal Council was created in 1853 after the Taiping Rebellion
threatened foreign business interests in the city. Trapped in a battle between the Rebels and
imperial forces, foreign governments demanded protection and governing oversight for its
citizens and their business interests. The foreign residents opted to create a democraticallyelected board of representative ratepayers who gained their qualifications with the
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“ownership of land valued over 500 taels of silver”.536 Chinese nationals lived in the
Settlement, owned land, and enjoyed its protections, but were unable to participate in the
Council elections.537 In time, the Municipal Council would come to establish a number of
formidable institutions: the Shanghai Volunteer Corps militia, a Public Health Bureau, a
postal system, and its own police force and fire brigade, continuing to act autonomously
even after the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China in
1911.538 The International Settlement was never a colony in the same way as Hong Kong or
Calcutta; it was “never the possession of any one single Western power”.539 Thus, the
administration of the Settlement “island” was established piecemeal with home-grown
institutions as it attempted to prove itself as a viable and legitimate government.540 Charged
in the Land Regulations with the mandate to provide good living and business conditions
for its residents, the Council’s development of public health measures would continually be
shaped by the Settlement’s residents, global influences, and negotiations with the Chinese
and other foreign administrations that surrounded it.541

The Shanghai International Settlement was undoubtedly a pioneer in public health
administration in East Asia, having appointed its first auditor of public health under the
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police department in 1861.542 The management of public health also became good business,
as the Municipal Council’s Nuisance Department, established in 1867, employed street
cleaners who would clear the public streets of night soil and waste and sell the former to
nearby farmers for fertilizer.543 By the turn of the twentieth century, the Settlement’s
markets and abattoirs were required to attain municipal licensing and standards, and a new
“state-of-the-art” water supply and sewage system was completed by 1883.544 Shanghai was
also the centre of translating and publishing for hygiene- and health-related texts for use all
around China in the 1910s and 1920s. Compared to the Chinese interior, Shanghai seemed
particularly sanitary. By the mid-1930s, the International Settlement’s Public Works
Department hired 900 “nuisance coolies” to sweep almost 200 miles of public streets and
alleyways every night.545 One observer who travelled from Shanghai west into the Chinese
interior commented that the difference was stark – suddenly, spitting was so prevalent that
“a fine of ten cents for expectorating or blowing the nose on public floors or in the streets”
would add considerable finances to the Chinese government’s treasuries.546

Shanghai was perhaps a centre of hygiene innovation and reform in early twentieth century
China, but initiatives to involve larger populations in the improvement of public hygiene –
on the streets, in parks, transportation, and other public areas – spread beyond just this
cosmopolitan metropolis. For the purposes of this chapter, the International Settlement’s
experience features as one key case study. On the surface, the proliferation in China of anti-
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spitting and fly-elimination campaigns, nutritional guides for housewives, and other massparticipatory forms of hygiene improvement could be seen as holdover importations of
activities that were already popular in Western countries by the early 20th century. After all,
as Nancy Tomes writes, the prohibition of spitting featured heavily in efforts to control the
spread of tuberculosis around the Unites States. The National Tuberculosis Association’s
campaigns throughout the 1910s and 1920s aggressively focused on spit as the main and
most menacing vector of the harmful disease.547 Posters appeared around Philadelphia
during the 1918—1919 influenza pandemic declaring “Spit Spreads Death” and likening a
spitter to a devil.548 Large cities such as Philadelphia and New York began educational
efforts to curb spitting in public, with successful stories published regularly in the news
media.549 Even the suggestion that the act of spitting could have “insolent” intentions had
already been raised in American communities where men would “seek to annoy hygieneconscious ladies”.550 Public streets needed to be cleaned up as they were some of the only
sites that were inhabited by both the culprits of filth (such as the spitters, the Chinese, or
the lower classes) and the affected (pedestrians, the foreign residents of Shanghai, or the
upper classes). Even something quite elegant and benign, such as gentlewoman’s trailing
hemline, could pick up and carry “all sorts of evil things” into the home and infect her
innocent family.551 Besides physical streets themselves, new forms of transportation also
facilitated public nuisances – the Shanghai Municipal Council had outlawed spitting from

Tomes, Gospel of Germs, 134.
“Halt the Epidemic!”, 1918. Free Library of Philadelphia,
libwww.freelibrary.org/digital/item/65051.
549 One spitter in New York was “greatly embarrassed” after realising that “twenty pairs of eyes were
regarding him as if he were a pickpocket”. “Current Topics”, The Youth Companion 75, no. 36
(September 1901), 430.
550 Tomes, Gospel of Germs, 194.
551 Tomes, Gospel of Germs, 160.
195
547
548

moving vehicles, and Americans believed that common colds were spread more readily on
streetcars.552

However, while foreign organisations, predominantly those with missionary backgrounds,
were perhaps early actors to evangelise the Chinese on hygienic practices, the prohibition of
spitting in Shanghai and other street hygiene reforms should not be studied as a story of
imperialism, cultural clash, or teleological progress towards modernity. Writing about the
United States, Tomes argues that the “revolution in personal hygiene” had the ability to not
only ameliorate public health outcomes, but also maintain social order, and that this power
should not be underestimated.553 In fact, with Republican China’s growing cities and
changing, myriad iterations of national, municipal, and local governance, street hygiene
reforms became instrumental in creating symbolic and political meaning. It was in both
figurative and physical public spaces – editorial pages, commercial enterprises, and out on
the streets – and not just in the bigger, cosmopolitan cities like Shanghai that reformists
recognised the power of mass participation events to improve public hygiene. Efforts to
control individual (Chinese) behaviour in places like Shanghai, to prevent epidemics in the
cities, and to legitimise new governing bodies with limited budgets could all be advanced by
the launch of many mass participatory “hygiene movements” (weisheng yundong). The
movements often featured educational exhibits and other media but were always
punctuated by local authority-led “big clean-ups” (da sao chu or da qing chu), during which
residents were required to pick up brooms and take to the streets.
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John Watt writes in Saving Lives in Wartime China that street cleaning managed by police
departments was perhaps the only form of public health provision in the 1910s and early
1920s in China, and that reformers fundamentally changed healthcare in China away
“beyond this primitive context” in the decades to come.554 But this chapter shows that street
cleaning in fact continued to be prioritised and formalised, even with the growth of more
formal channels for hygiene administration, and that its symbolic significance in Chinese
society should not be understated. This chapter starts with a review of the calls for
prohibition of spitting in Shanghai throughout the Republican era, which highlights how
public complaints about hygiene were also symbolically transposed onto anxieties about the
power of a small government insecure in its sovereignty. Expanding to the rest of China, the
chapter then reveals that endorsement of any health-related initiatives, it seemed, worked
symbiotically to legitimise a local government’s work and also to promote mass
participation and facilitate vital statistics collections, as evidenced by the proliferation of
hygiene movements in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Finally, as Japanese occupation, war,
and the refugee crisis came to both China’s coast and ultimately the interior, the
improvement of street hygiene through mass participation became imbued with anxieties
about autonomy, safety, and modern propriety – both for Chinese territories and Chinese
bodies – especially when bacteriological warfare was expounded as a real, existential threat.
Moreover, Chinese society’s frequent practice with participating in such events
conveniently helped the government and military to streamline its necessary capabilities
and resources for national defence.
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Spitting in the Settlement: public opinion, Chinese behaviour, and autonomy
The December 1914 exchange with which this chapter opens illuminates several anxieties
of Shanghai residents in the new political system after the fall of the Qing Dynasty. Would
the Settlement’s autonomy be threatened by a mass immigration of members of the “mafoo
class” from the poorer Chinese part of the city?555 After all, the borders between the foreign
concessions and other parts of China’s port cities were still “porous”.556 How could residents
distinguish between upper-class, educated Chinese and their more uncouth counterparts?
With the Settlement’s necessary heavy reliance on travelling Chinese labourers such as
coolies and rickshaw pullers, what, if anything, could be done to elevate the overall
standards of health?557 While these complaints were against Chinese practices from
presumably foreign sources, Chinese businesses and other organisations capitalised on the
city’s overall interest in eliminating this unpleasant practice. Newspaper advertisements for
a “cough and lung-clearing elixir” promised that the patient would feel relief from cholera
and tuberculosis symptoms and stop spitting and coughing urgently.558 The Council on
Health Education published health advice in Chinese newspapers, advocating for the use of
spittoons and exercising caution when on a train platform or other public spaces.559
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By 1911, government-led advancement of public health was theoretically possible. The
Manchurian plague epidemic ended in the spring of 1911, prompting the outgoing Qing
government to set up the first modern public health service of China. Wu Lien-teh, head of
the North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service set up in the epidemic’s aftermath, had
become China’s leading medical professional concerned with public health. Wu’s theories
about common respiratory infections had been proven correct throughout the course of his
work in Manchuria, and he managed to popularise the use of gauze face masks for plague
control personnel to protect themselves against infection. Wu applied the dangers of
respiratory transmission to other rampant diseases in China, including tuberculosis.
Moreover, despite training as a bacteriologist himself, Wu was sceptical that pathologists
and bacteriologists in laboratory settings could help improve public health “in the lives of
individuals and nations”.560 For Wu and many of his medical colleagues, one could get
infected by a horrific disease by simply being in the public spaces and breathing the
communal air, and thus Chinese people needed education and reform in the ways they
behaved in public. Later in 1933, Wu established China’s Anti-Tuberculosis Association,
expanding his work with anti-opium leagues in the United States.

As discussed in Chapter Four on Kitchen Hygiene, the medical reasoning behind the
Association’s initiatives was sometimes questionable, but they were designed to change
individual behaviours, not progress scientific developments. In fact, scientists were split on
whether spit and other forms of street refuse were really so threatening. In a letter
republished for Chinese readers, Arthur G. Price, Medical Health Officer of Victoria, British
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Columbia, advised populations at risk of influenza to “abstain from the dirty and dangerous
habit of spitting on the streets”. On the other hand, Arthur Stanley, Health Officer for the
Shanghai Municipal Council, stated that the danger of tuberculosis transmission by spitting
on the street had been “overdone”.561 In response, letters to the editor argued with Stanley’s
assertion and urged the doctor to reassess the relative danger of sputum “in its wet state”,
which had the added characteristic of being particularly unattractive. The often hyperbolic,
exaggerated, calls to action for street hygiene movements in the 1920s and 1930s were
launched in much the same vein – the public were to mobilise to make the simplest changes
first, which would then lead to scientific enlightenment later.

The elimination of spitting on the street, for some an act synonymous with backwardness
and disregard for hygiene, was perhaps an opportunity for local authorities around the
country to demonstrate their authority. The debate remained, however, on the best way to
do so, with a long-term view of stamping out the practice altogether. At the 1915 meeting of
the China Medical Missionary Association, whose members were mostly foreign medical
professionals stationed around the country, Wu Lien-teh spoke of the necessity of public
education for hygiene.562 Sanitation was to begin in the streets. As Wu advocated for the
placement of spittoons, others prioritised the laborious work of cleaning the streets and
fighting insanitation – “if [the streets] had no dirt”, Dr. Duncan Main of Hangzhou concluded,
“there were no bacteria, and no bacteria meant that there would be no disease”.563 The
public activities of the Chinese should be targeted, taught, and monitored through the
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establishment of social leagues, advocated Wu, while Arthur Stanley stressed the need for
government authority, qualified personnel, and funding.564 While the Shanghai Municipal
Council’s Public Health Department under his purview was responsible for upkeep of street
hygiene overall, clearing night soil and garbage, its workers were not enforcers.

Efforts to educate the Chinese on hygienic practices had already been an ongoing part of the
work of missionary groups in China. Posters, like the one shown below, were part of a series
of “Health Habit Charts” printed and disseminated by the YMCA-affiliated Council on Health
Education, first to missionary primary schools and then translated for Chinese institutions.
Such educational material was not uncommon in large cities or areas where missionaries
and foreigners had considerable presence.
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Figure 5.20: Health Habits Charts no. 7: "I do not spit"
The Council would begin to use law enforcement in an attempt to improve public health and
curb the spitting problem, but not to the extent to which public commentators, both foreign
and Chinese, were satisfied. Spitting from a moving vehicle was designated a misdemeanour
in the 1910s, in part due to complaints from pedestrians spat on by tramcar passengers.
Spitting by pedestrians on footpaths and the street was more difficult to enforce. Public
security personnel tasked with street cleaning gradually expanded their roles to include
sweeping and washing sidewalks instead of just the removal of garbage and nightsoil.565 But
public commentators were calling for a complete overhaul of “Chinese habits”, not merely
damage control. Moreover, the suggestion of using police to regulate and fine spitting
offenders became particularly prickly, as large numbers of Chinese entered the police force
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after the Chinese national government’s unification of China under the Kuomintang
government, and the subsequent incorporation of the greater Shanghai municipality under
the Chinese central government in 1928.

The health administration of the Shanghai International Settlement was not initially
convinced that the Kuomintang’s new public health administrative infrastructure, located
just up the river in the capital Nanjing, was potentially helpful to their overall goals. As
Western-educated Chinese doctors (and national government appointees) such as Hu Houki and Li Ting-an were appointed to leadership positions in public health administration for
the greater municipality of Shanghai (including the Chinese walled city), Chinese residents,
now full participants in the Shanghai Municipal Council’s governing structure, “took over
the SMC and its agencies” as they gained voting rights.566 Despite the municipality’s
dedication to follow national directives for launching hygiene campaigns, it was still mainly
representatives from the Shanghai Municipal Council who set up smallpox vaccination
drives for nearly 60,000 Chinese Shanghaiers in 1929, around half of whom did not reside
in the Settlement.567 The same year, a plan to open additional work sites for the Kao-chiao
Hygiene Demonstration Area was delayed by several months because administrators at the
new national Ministry of Health were unfamiliar with the situation and could not appoint
appropriate personnel.568 By 1930, the Health Bureau under the Shanghai Municipal Council
had become “attached to the [newly-created] Health Administration of the National
Government” under the Kuomintang, but the actual operations of public events were still
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carried out “by the cooperative effort of various Boy Scout and kindred organisations”.569
Unclear about the chain of command or collaborative possibilities between the Council and
the Chinese government, critics began to more forcefully insist on mass efforts to educate
the lower classes, and also to diagnose why more drastic measures had not yet been taken.

With education deemed too cumbersome and policing too sensitive, some foreign
commentators during the Settlement’s period of administrative flux wondered why
ratepayers even bothered with spitting prohibition. After all, Shanghai was prosperous, had
the markings of modernity, and attracted a great deal of business, so what was one small
nuisance? Even though it had successfully funded and encouraged public health research,
hospital construction, and vaccination drives, the Council’s main and initial goal was still to
safeguard the business interests of its residents. Newcomer Flora Belle Jan dismissed that
habitual spitting had anything to do with class or education, writing that while spitting was
not surprising among coolies, “the hallways of this province's highest educational
institution are soiled by deposits of students' mucus. The man who inspired this article is a
professor who makes the dining room sound like a sanatarium [sic] for tuberculars”. She
instead blamed Chinese pride, the “sensitivity” shown by the educated towards “criticism of
his country”.570 The path to modernity was clear with landmark behaviours on a universal
trajectory, but Chinese arrogance and Western complacency during a time of prosperity
ensured that the latter side would not force the former to change.
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Perhaps, as journalist Edward Hunter wrote in 1930, it was now time to concede control of
such foreign institutions as the Peking Union Medical College and Shanghai’s medical
schools over to the Chinese. A Chinese doctor who was willing to simplify his use of Chinese
characters to write a syndicated daily column on health and hygiene habits to “address the
public and not the profession” would be able to remove suspicion and distaste of the West
“by explaining simple theories of health, illness, and hygiene”. Perhaps they could shift their
focus away from working in the Settlement’s state-of-the-art research laboratories to
helping the public in tangible ways instead. Just as the Chinese seemed to have reservations
towards the behests of the foreign residents in the Settlement, missionary and other foreign
doctors were too arrogant to realise that mass education, for which “simplicity does not
mean ignorance or loss of dignity” was key to solving the hygiene crisis in China.571 Thus
while Shanghai’s elite health officers could continue to vaccinate the population, treat
infections, and tout the virtues of hygienic behaviour, it seemed to Jan, Hunter, and others
that previous methods and discussions were ineffective in enforcing a change to a
fundamental, base characteristic of the Chinese race. It was especially difficult when
political future of the Settlement would become further entwined with that of the Chinese
state.
Cleaning up in the New Republic
In the summer of 1927, Wuchang’s city government launched its first “hygiene movement”
(weisheng yundong). Starting on July 1 at 10am, all offices would be closed for work and all
staff would be expected to participate. Cleaning and promotional materials, including
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printed signs for every shop front stating “promote cleanliness and hygiene”, were provided
by the Rural Ministry (zhongyang nongmin bu).572 All participants were to pick up refuse on
the streets and clear the gutters, among other activities, and spread written reminders for
hygiene in public settings.573 The event was to go on in spite of weather – the rain, the Rural
Ministry explained, would even provide some “natural powers” to ensure the cleaning
efforts go smoothly. To motivate all workers and residents to participate, there would also
be a fly killing competition between all Wuchang’s schools, with prizes to be announced at
6pm.574

Similar street cleaning efforts had taken place in other cities throughout the 1920s. In
Beijing, the Rockefeller Foundation’s China Medical Board worked with the city’s Division of
General Sanitation to more efficiently set up refuse collection locations and maintain public
latrines.575 Gradually, John Grant of the Peking Union Medical College predicted that cities in
China would transfer “health” work in each municipal government from the purview of the
police and to more specifically designated health departments. The Chinese “Commissioner”
in charge of public sanitation work would, ideally, be “technically trained”, and be able to
approach the work with a scientific, instead of merely commercial, expertise.576 This
consideration was possibly naïve, as municipal governments in China’s Republican cities
tended to be comprised of “young men in their late 20s and 30s” who had observed modern
cities during their studies abroad, but had little bureaucratic expertise or consideration
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about how to reform China’s much older, much larger, cities.577 In Shanghai, the Public
Works Department, the second biggest expenditure for the Municipal Council after the
Police, was required to frequently justify its expensive, long-term projects as catalysts in
“creating the environment in which Shanghai flourished”.578 The Chinese part of the city
inaugurated a training course for health inspectors in 1926, but their training seemed
inadequate for their work’s purview. Graduates would be responsible for sanitary
inspections of streets and food establishments, collection of vital statistics including births,
deaths, and notifiable disease, and making house-to-house calls.579

While new, inexperienced municipal government departments were attempting to clean
city streets, build new infrastructure suitable for automobiles, and raise money, Wuchang’s
mass clean-up for public areas was an early example of the proliferation of similar events
throughout the first few years of the Nanjing Decade. The growing expectation in many of
China’s urban centres – including Guangzhou, Suzhou, Xiamen – was that public street
cleaning should be undertaken by the general populace. The Shanghai government issued
an order in December 1928 that “each district’s administration committee should organise a
hygiene movement”.580 Cash “prizes [were] awarded by the Municipal Government to the
most efficient street-cleaners”.581 In Nanjing, the “Capital Hygiene Movement’s” goals
(shoudu weisheng yundong dahui) were announced in December 1928 to coincide with the
end-year clean-up (da sao chu) period common in Chinese tradition to prepare for the new
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year. 582 Each school, workplace, public building, were to organise “city residents” to united
and conduct clean-ups in their communities and their surroundings, elevate these spaces’
reputations, and conform to “our country’s traditions”.583

In fact, these movements did not just copy what societies did overseas, but actually revived
the “Chinese spirit”. According to the directives, as the first to invent medications for
illnesses, the Chinese were, the most focused on health and hygiene, from the earliest times.
Zhu Bolu’s “Maxims for Managing the Home”, dating back to the late Ming Dynasty,
canonised the need for everyone to “develop clean habits – ‘as soon as the sun rises, [one
should] get up immediately and sweep the hall and porch so that inside and outside are
both tidy and clean’”.584 Clean-ups were to be scheduled for May 1 (on the solar calendar)
and the 17th and 18th of the twelfth month (on the lunar calendar each year), the former to
eliminate disease vectors for summer illnesses such as cholera and typhoid before the
weather gets too hot, and the latter to coincide with the saying “on the 17th and 18th [of the
last month before the New Year], the more you sweep the more riches you get”. Not only
Chinese medical knowledge, but also traditions, were now “scientized” to map onto
biomedical considerations of hygiene to make new mass participatory initiatives seem more
palatable and legible.585 Nevertheless, the promotional documents for these hygiene
movements still made unbridled use of hyperbole and sensationalism. Germs were more
dangerous in the summer because they could enter a body through sweat pores. Dried spit
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on the street infected with tuberculosis, carried in dust particles, could follow the air into
someone else’s nose and mouth, and infect them too!586 “Unless you do not breathe, there
will be a chance for infection” on China’s streets.587

Prior to the establishment of the Ministry of Health in Nanjing, a China Medical Board memo
stated, China not only lacked technically qualified or interested health personnel, but also
“rural or provincial units” with a unified agenda for public health administration.588 Though
there did exist a centralised health administration after 1928, as documented by Ka-che Yip
and Sean Hsiang-Lin Lei, the Ministry of Health was a “compromise of political convenience”
by the Nationalist Party with its new allies.589 Its stated lofty goals to promote medicine
were aligned with Grant’s memorandum and proposal for a National Health Council, but the
duties of the resulting government body were vague, nor did it include in its budget
localised public sanitation work on the municipal level. While Lei asserts that high profile
public health reformers such as Grant and Wu Lien-teh became “dual agents” committed to
constructing power for the centralised state while also happening to promote medicine, the
proliferation of street cleaning campaigns around the country and the promotion and
published commentary surrounding these local events provide another lens through which
to view political participation and public health in Republican China.590
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Local authorities still became more, not less, empowered to take matters of street hygiene
on their own terms, through directing their own efforts. Some cities were effectively
autonomous. In Shanghai, Boy Scouts, police, and the Peace Maintenance Corps created a
monitoring body that inspected and instructed city residents to not only keep streets clean
but also to monitor behaviour.591 In Beijing, the China Medical Board’s Peking Health Station
carried out sanitary inspections on the streets and public latrines, and collaborated with the
Self-Government District Office and the YMCA on inspection of food establishments.592 In
the Chinese Communist Party-controlled base in Jiangxi, the Red Army launched regular
clean-ups every five days, with one leader assigned to every seven or eight households to
direct the work. With slogans such as “caring for others is caring about public hygiene” and
“ensuring that every worker and peasant will pay attention to hygiene at every second and
with every step”, Red Army leaders sought to mitigate the potential damage caused by
infectious disease outbreaks. According to a report from 1932, the death rate from a cholera
outbreak in Jiangxi was 30%, compared with 79.5% in Beijing. The conclusion of a report
claimed that “now in the soviet everyone is quite attuned to paying attention to hygiene”.593

To ensure that the meanings of the hygiene movements were entrenched, Beijing’s SelfGovernment District Office (zizhi banshi chu) representatives suggested that more frequent
communal cooperative activities were necessary. Li Shilin, an officer in the municipal
administration, wrote in an editorial in Huabei Ribao that each street’s management office
should be responsible for promoting and recruiting workers for every weeklong clean-up.
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Since the city now remembered the foundations laid out by the mass hygiene movements in
previous years, Li wrote, each district could easily launch its own, sustained and more
effective, efforts without lectures, theatrical performances, or costumes, in other words,
without expensive fanfare.594 New urban governance in Chinese cities, especially in order to
deal with public street building, infrastructure maintenance, and divisions of responsibility,
“provided political opportunities for gaining the cooperation of ordinary citizens”.595 The
North-China Herald reported that everyone was imbued in a new “spirit of reform” and
spilling out into the streets with “their own dust-pans and brooms, to give a practical
demonstration”.596 Even unpopular projects such as converting old city walls to automobile
roads in Canton and Shanghai drew, despite initial scepticism, the possibility for residents
to voice ideas and participate on boards and committees.597 In Canton, “the emergence of
disciplinary regulations that sought to teach individuals to be civilized citizens” were tied
closely to local buy-in for new infrastructure projects, collaborations between the city
government, local business owners, and construction companies. Building and maintaining
new, modern streets, for example, required residents not to “shout, spit, urinate, or defecate
in the streets”.598 The regulation of participation in street hygiene required realistic and
specific agenda that appealed to and benefited local constituents.

Reformists, medical professionals, and local politicians certainly also turned to the Chinese
national administration for collaboration and support. As discussed in Chapter Four, in the
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summer of 1931, the National Health Administration in Nanjing and the health departments
of the Shanghai International Settlement, the French Concession, and the Greater Shanghai
Municipality, came together for a “Cholera Parade” over twelve miles along city streets.
Following the front banner “Joint cholera prevention work for all local inhabitants by the
three Health Departments in Shanghai”, Boy Scouts and Girl Guides carried models of
homemade, effective fly traps, dioramas demonstrating best practices for boiling water or
preparing fruit, and advertisements for soap, before handing out trilingual handbills.
Uniformed police were then charged with leading the crowd towards vaccination vans. Each
stage of the parade was a demonstration of the correct “right way” behaviours followed by
the “wrong way” and subsequent consequences, and the parade Committee did not shy
away from using sensationalist imagery in its display.599

The event reinforced that the public streets of Shanghai were a symbolic site – this time,
however, not a symbol of filth that needed to be cleaned up, but a site for education and
exhortations for improvement. The Anti-Tuberculosis Association of China also took
advantage of these collaborations to work with the China Medical Association, previously a
body of missionary doctors that had merged with the Kuomintang’s National Medical
Association in 1932. Concurrently, the Settlement’s newspapers reported proudly that the
Mayor of Greater Shanghai advocated for “healthy clean living” and the cessation of
“committing of other nuisances in public” to increase living standards.600
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The New Life Movement takes to the streets
The Nanjing government’s enthusiasm for big clean-ups every May and December certainly
contributed to their being launched twice a year in many Chinese cities. Shen Pao and
Minguo ri bao frequently gave notice of events that were to happen and reported on the
progress of past events. Popularly, the term da sao chu (big clean-up) was appropriated by
commentators and political figures discussing their discontent with government corruption.
At the inauguration of the new head of the Control Yuan (jiancha yuan) in Nanjing, the
appointee stressed that his job would be to conduct political da sao chu to rid the country of
all corruption and to lift the people’s suffering.601 Reflecting on the Nanjing governments
initiatives at a national level, Sun Ke, son of Sun Yat-sen and leader of a rival government to
Chiang Kai-shek’s, mockingly suggested his Guangzhou-based faction “conduct a da sao chu”
to quickly get rid of Chiang’s fast-spreading influence as a “plague rat”, otherwise the
country would not survive.602 At the height of the New Life Movement, Sun Feng, a popular
screenwriter unsatisfied with critic Lin He’s review of his latest movie, called for a “hygiene
movement for movie criticism”. Commenting on the public fight, director Zhou Yan accused
both sides of “trading mutual fire” without realising that it was the movie production
companies’ creation of a toxic, limiting environment, that really needed a da sao chu.603 The
language of cleaning up and sweeping out the debris evidently permeated many segments
of the society, and at least for China’s urbanites, the hygiene movements were both literal
events and symbolic manifestations of political and ideological concerns.
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The launch of the New Life Movement in 1934 and its hygiene initiatives thus drew on
familiar language, activities, and expectations. The thirteenth hygiene movement in
Shanghai in June 1934 was to be “unprecedented” – in addition to the routine big clean up,
there would be a full inspection of all street cleaning staff, educational exhibitions at five
different sites across the city, and wholesale vaccination sites targeting all parts of the
population.604 At the event’s launch, Mayor Wu Tiecheng reiterated that city residents
needed to be unselfish, and that taking care to make sure that their surrounding
environments can support the health of the whole. His speech was followed by others’,
including Wang Xiaolai of the Chamber of Commerce, who agreed that the da sao chu
needed to be performed in people’s minds first – that only when minds and the outside
were clean could the public’s health problems be solved. Red-handled brooms specially
made for the occasion were handed out to VIPs, and the mayor himself took to the streets to
start sweeping.605

The Anti-Tuberculosis Association’s public health education efforts received governmental
support for its weeklong anti-spitting campaign in March 1935, presided over by Li Ting-an,
the Chinese commissioner for the Bureau of Public Health in Greater Shanghai.606 The
Shanghai-based Chinese newspaper Shen Pao covered the event with articles on March 27
and 29, detailing the target audiences for each day of the campaign (students on the first
day, industrial workers on the second, businesses on the third, etc.) and printing condensed

“Shi san jie weisheng yundong dahui [thirteenth hygiene movement]”, Shen Pao, 28 May 1934.
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June 1934.
606 “’Don’t Spit!’ Campaign to be Launched to Fight Tuberculosis”, The China Press, 26 February 1935.
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transcripts of Li’s opening speech. Especially of note were the two hundred organisers and
sponsors listed and thanked in the articles, including representatives from the New Life
Movement local committee, French Concession, Municipal Council, YWCA, and the rubber,
cigarette, and soap industries of all of Shanghai’s districts.607

After the opening ceremony, with over a thousand in attendance, both government health
officers and boy scouts then distributed thousands of handbills at street intersections.608
Trams, theatres, offices, and other public spaces were decorated with placards.
Interestingly, educational posters during this time shifted to bold language extolling the
dangers of spitting and the need for individual responsibility to not endanger the health of
the public. In one poster, a sickly Chinese-robed man spits on the ground near healthy,
playing children. The image magnifies his expectorate to show many crawling germs that
have now landed on the ground. The caption explains the man’s “unforgiveable mistake”: “if
the phlegm contains the tuberculosis bacillus, [spitting] can spread tens of thousands of
bacilli as it floats through the air borne by dust on the ground, or is left on communal-use
tools. As it is breathed into the lungs, passers-by will unknowingly contract tuberculosis”.609
Shen Pao’s summary of the poster’s message is succinct and decisive: “Spitting everywhere
kills like no other”.610

“Mingri kaishi dongyuan jinzhi tutan yundong [Anti-Spitting Campaign begins tomorrow]”, Shen
Pao 12, no. 22241, 27 March 1935.
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Figure 5.21: "An Unforgiveable Mistake" explaining how tuberculosis is transmitted
In addition to daily newspapers, discussions of the popularity, politics, and practicality of
the sustained push for clean-ups were found in journals and magazines. Beginning in 1934,
the Health Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior began to publish the Weisheng ban yue kan,
a fortnightly magazine for popular consumption about hygiene news and advice for lay
readers. Among the pages were reports from infectious disease hospitals, previously shared
internally or only in English among medical professionals, advertisements for pasteurised
milk from the Shanghai Dairy Company, and the winning artworks of a poster-design
competition for primary and middle school hygiene education by teachers-in-training.
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Figure 5.22: “It is imperative to spit into a spittoon” – entry for an elementary school hygiene
illustration competition, 1934.
Commentators in the North-China Herald and The China Press lauded the goals of the New
Life Movement for the national government’s finally taking note of the problem of street
hygiene that they had noticed, and put up with, for decades. On the other hand, some
Chinese commentators were more apprehensive about the promises of New Life. Weisheng
ban yue kan also became a key receptacle of news and opinions about the New Life
Movement’s advancements in hygiene and public health, among them a worry that such a
national-level, ideologically-driven program would lead to underwhelming results. Xia
Canglin wrote apprehensively about the seeming enthusiasm for the movement by political
leaders, some of whom were thoughtful but never paid attention to local surroundings, and
thus did not empower their “followers” to conduct their own initiatives. Xia was concerned
that the “fanfare” around the Movement was empty, impractical, and Chinese participants
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would soon forget about the real goals. Better to go back to starting with the easier reforms,
he wrote, eliminating bad practices such as spitting and urinating, and not loosening those
regulations.611 And while government and community goals for public hygiene were aligned,
“[we] cannot just rely on the government to organize hygiene movements and they still
have to come from people’s coordination”.612 In fact, according to Li Qiguang, the meaning of
a “weisheng yundong” inherently required community coordination and participation. Even
if the government had now designated clean-up weeks in May and December, all residents
could do their part to not litter or otherwise discard refuse in public streets and waterways.

It seemed that the strength and weakness of the New Life Movement in combating issues of
street hygiene were the same. The spiritual aspect of the movement struck the right chords
among those who had prized re-education for hygiene purposes, but it also shifted the focus
of China’s political leaders away from practical, on-the-ground concerns in the locality.
While past attempts at street hygiene reform made heavy use of police and sanitary board
inspectors to regulate and fine offenders, the New Life Movement purported to make
obsolete any need for regulatory policing of negative public behaviours. After all, a real
“moral campaign” would not require apparatuses of discipline.613 Instead, China needed to
draw on a Confucian concept of “exhortation from above”, combined with internalised

Xia Canglin, “Xinshenghuo yundong xia de weisheng he jiankang wenti [problems with hygiene and
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recognition of the behaviours that had marked Europe, the United States, and Japan as
“modern”.614

Historians of Republican China generally consider the Movement an incoherent failure, as it
demanded submission from subjects with little incentive. As a political movement aimed to
militarise the masses and to “cultivate… the habit and ability of unified action”, it neither
succeeded in its stated goal for moral reform nor its implicit, fascistic goal to unite all
potential wartime personnel under the Party’s umbrella.615 As Ka-che Yip writes, the “moral
platitudes” emphasised by the New Life Movement were mostly irrelevant to the
socioeconomic concerns of local residents in rural areas.616 However, the Movement’s
adherence to Confucian values appealed to missionary hygiene reformists who had been
concerned that their methods were too foreign to find real resonance among the Chinese.
Indeed, as Edward Hunter had written a few years earlier, masses would be much more
eager to learn “when the lesson sheets were attractive and interesting”.617 In addition, the
tract-like “tenets” of the New Life Movement were packaged, as discussed earlier, in a
familiar form. The New Life Movement, like the municipal clean-up movements that
preceded it, advocated “cleanliness and orderliness” through the expression of virtues and
personal responsibility.618 While earlier movements gave power to a monitoring body, the
1935 clean-ups required the police districts to organise “persuasion teams” (quandao dui)
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to conduct more hands-on, “door-to-door” efforts to “persuade” them to participate.619 But
to those urban residents who had long been recruited into local clean-up efforts, and even
given some degree of autonomy in doing so, the New Life Movement’s value was negligible,
and the government insistence on it threatening.

Thus, the late 1920s clean-up events, and their continued popularity into the 1930s,
proliferated at the symbiotic intersection between several factors. New city administration
and their reformist allies relied on the “political power of the [newly-consolidated,
centralised] state”, and paid homage to its ideals. These administrations were often staffed
by returned overseas students with some knowledge in public health and engineering, who
were able to draw upon their deeper global connections locally and abroad. City- and
district-specific movements that stressed public participation, such as the street clean-ups,
were developed by these reformists in this political environment that simultaneously
celebrated national strength, local autonomy, and individual responsibility. They also set
the tone for the New Life Movement, and the wartime hygiene initiatives to come.

Street cleaning and wartime sovereignty
The Shanghai International Settlement declared neutrality after full-blown war broke out
between China and Japan in 1937. For some time, the territory was a “lone island” of respite
while the rest of the country, and the world, was increasingly at war. The Anti-Tuberculosis
Association was still planning to hold another anti-spitting campaign in 1939, but the NorthChina Herald editorial board had its reservations. Previous methods of poster exhibitions

“Zuo ri qi quanshi da sao chu [starting yesterday a city-wide big clean-up]”, Shen Pao 15 September
1935.
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and public notices proved to be ineffective, because, compared to other dangers, including
deadly diseases for which vaccinations were necessary, “the evil results of public spitting
are unfortunately not so apparent to the average Chinese”. Perhaps it was time to deepen
the penetration of hygiene education, and begin to focus efforts on schoolchildren who may
bring home the teachings “to their elders in a manner likely to convince them of the error of
their ways”?620 Perhaps, despite decades of good intentions and initiatives, the Council was
simply not “strong enough” to take on a habit with such a deep-rooted place in Chinese
society?621

Making arrangements for more than 100,000 refugees since the fall of Nanjing in late 1937,
residents of the International Settlement not only felt the strain on the city’s resources, but
also the dread that the territory was being “neglected” by both the Chinese government and
the “European metropolises” which they called home.622 The Settlement increasingly
became the site of raids and attacks on suspected Kuomintang or Japanese agents; its
territorial integrity began to feel more untenable. Some commentators wondered why the
Concessions in Shanghai had not yet been given back to the Chinese government or merged
together for stronger bargaining power against the Japanese puppet government.623 These
concerns were tied to the calls for the Shanghai Municipal Council to act on its own terms to
punish the bad behaviour of its residents, thus crucially asserting that it was still a strong,
sovereign entity.
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Issuing fines for spitting offenders seemed to be the only way forward to control
superstitious, ignorant, and malevolent spitters alike, and the Council seemed to respond to
the call with the new proposed bye-laws in April 1941. It included a “whole gamut of
regulations” regarding public health, including “notification of infectious diseases… and the
prohibition of spitting in public places”. The North-China Herald editorial board was
surprised that these had “not been enacted and enforced” before, considering the public
discussion by ratepayers.624 The Council’s wording on the proposed law, however, triggered
some “anxiety” over the robustness of these new promises, which still used the terms
“public enlightenment… “to educate the public to a higher standard of conduct in public
health matters”.625
“It cannot be too strongly emphasized that one of the best methods of education in
such matters as overcrowding and spitting in public is actual enforcement of
penalties. Poster displays may be all very well… but those responsible… should be
dealt with firmly.626
The bye-laws also failed, in the opinion of other commentators, to actually define what
“spitting in public” entailed so that the Council could reasonably expect the police to enforce
the bye-law.627 And how would fines affect the “poorer Chinese”, suffering from the phlegmy
effects of “improper nourishment”?628 Did the lack of intelligence of the superstitious – was
the Chinese habit not similar to the “little boy of the west [who] spits on his new shilling or
sixpence for good luck”? – require the monetary punishment of an enforced fine for any
policy to be effective?629 The new bye-laws, in other words, were simultaneously too
nebulous, too strict, and too dismissive of ratepayers’ concerns. For a foray into reaffirming
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the authoritative power of the Shanghai Municipal Council, the anti-spitting bye-laws raised
doubts in residents’ minds that they were protected from the vagaries brought on by the
war or its partner, infectious disease.

On the other hand, the Kuomintang administration in China’s interior took a more urgent
and proactive approach. In spite of the loss of critical resources and personnel during the
National Health Administration’s march west, epidemic control and city hygiene inspection
teams were retooled, often recruiting any available personnel – boy scouts, local volunteers
– as staff. The Administration began constructing highway health stations (weisheng gonglu
zhan) along the newly-built highways that provided essential services. The models for these
stations – number of personnel, essential facilities and resources – were the district and
county health stations that began during the Nanjing Decade.630 Small model health
demonstration areas in Guizhou and Yunnan provided services to “small local centres”,
were staffed by public health nurses and sanitary inspectors who “reached out to individual
households”.631 Across the country, there were 848 county health centres in a streamlined
network in which vaccinating local people and reporting on progress and disease incidence
was an established practice.632

Summer hygiene movements continued as the Kuomintang government and many Chinese
residents fled into the interior. They were possibly more important because of urban
crowding, the refugee crisis, and unfamiliar climate conditions to prevent epidemic disease.
The Executive Yuan released a series of scoring guidelines for Health Administration
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officials and other experts invited to judge cleaning competitions between schools, military
troops, factories, and other work units.633 In Chongqing, a hygiene movement spanned the
entire summer of 1939 with a specific plan for each week – health officials will start with
vaccinations and pair them with educational exhibits. By week three, “disinfection week”,
teams from the city government would go to all the city’s streets and demonstrate how to
clean these public spaces.634 Throughout 1942, residents participated in a series of cleaning
competitions in all public leisure spaces and on the city streets. The condition of each street
and alley was graded out of 150 points on various criteria – clear thoroughfare, existence of
rubbish bins, cleanliness of footpaths, and others. Over 350 streets were judged during this
October/November competition.635 Larger in scale and more elaborate than previous cleanups, this was representative of many of the summer hygiene movements that were held
during wartime. Shi Bao, a collaborationist newspaper in Beijing under Japanese
occupation, announced that the First National Midwifery School, the Maternity Hospital, and
other medical institutions in the city, many set up through funding and collaborations with
the China Medical Board, would lead residents in a big clean-up around the city, and similar
events continued in Beijing throughout the rest of Japanese occupation.636 In Communist
base areas, hygiene advocacy continued from Jiangxi Soviet days through “four cleans”
campaigns, and the Party collaborated with local Chinese medicine doctors to expand their
outreach – both to facilitate epidemic control and political legitimacy.637 With the advent of
war, hygiene movements helped to organise municipalities into manageable sections for
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local governance, practise how to quickly mobilise many people, and keep track of the
condition of key public resources such as wells.

The constant fear of biological warfare – whether imminent or not – as a possible tactic of
the Japanese military added to the urgency with which all Chinese people needed to prevent
disease.638 Chinese populations, already sensitive to wartime sacrifices, were also
frequently reminded of the importance of wartime hygiene through the clean-up events and
government messaging. The Chongqing health administration published a series of
suggested slogans for the summer 1939 hygiene movements, including “the Japanese
empire are poisonous, like flies!”639 Roadside inspections for communicable diseases,
previously set up through district offices in the cities, now were under the purview of the
military. At the highway health stations, travellers were checked for infections and
vaccination certificates, and sometimes quarantined and deloused on-site.640 Just as dried
dust particles were not the biggest transmitters of tuberculosis on Shanghai streets, and the
health dangers of spitting on the street exaggerated, the bacteriological warfare as depicted
in many government communications accounted for a negligible portion of the war’s real
casualties. The real effect of the stressing the dangers of bacteriological warfare was “in
sowing fear” among the Chinese public.641 As Nicolas Schillinger writes, reports of Japanese
wartime advancements, even those in conventional warfare arenas, created a sense of
terror among Chinese residents; health authorities and reformists redirected this fear
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towards hygiene using familiar language and promotional forms, urging participation in
clean-ups and vaccination drives. Concerns about the hygiene of public spaces, such as the
streets, again evoked the public’s anxieties over China’s sovereignty, their communities’
survival, and by extension, people’s own autonomy over their bodies.

Habitual street cleaning practices developed in the 1920s and 1930s enhanced the handy
organisations and tools for the Chongqing wartime government to keep track of wartime
preparedness. During clean-ups, teams were instructed and supervised to check the
conditions of public water tanks, that sandbags were secured in the right places along the
streets, and to administer cholera and typhoid vaccines.642 Still, the extended war caused
strain on the health administrations, both central and local, and political factioning at the
higher levels made chains of command unclear. Inflation was high and funding for local
health centres was inconsistent but did arrive through channels such as the China Medical
Board and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. While other forms
of progress in medical sciences and public health were interrupted, the expectation that
Chinese citizens take part in cleaning up the streets continued.

Conclusion
In a 1947 editorial titled “On Spitting” in the San Francisco publication Chinese World, C. Y.
Lee addressed the thousand-year-old Chinese tradition. Lee, a graduate of Columbia and
Yale Universities and soon-to-be famous novelist of The Flower Drum Song, had found
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himself living in limbo in San Francisco after the end of the Pacific War, unable to obtain
consistent paid employment nor to return to China.
“I often think that if Chinese people spit, it may be because we have no other way to
air our grievances. I myself want to swear loudly and lob a mouthful of spit every
time I think about how Chinese people have suffered under foreign invasions and
from internal aggression. But in America, where I am not afforded this freedom, I
can only write an essay to vent”.643
Lee’s promotion of the action of spitting seems both odd and anachronistic. A decade
earlier, proponents of the New Life Movement had been setting up regional branches in
most of China’s provinces. Overseas, Chinese graduate students at exclusive universities,
such as Lee’s alma mater, had also long taken up the mantle to educate their working-class
diasporic compatriots, who resided in the Chinatowns of Western cities, of the importance
of hygiene.644 If spitting had been such an undesirable trait for so long, why did Lee
suddenly seem to support it?

By “internal aggression”, Lee referred to the civil war that had been raging across the
country. After the Japanese surrender in the summer of 1945, China had but months of
peace before the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party took up arms against each
other. Political instability had affected the writer himself – unable to find or afford passage
back to China after his graduation, Lee wondered if he should stop trying to find work in the
United States and instead hand himself over to immigration authorities to be deported, for
free, back home.645 For the time being, underemployment in Chinatown, despite Lee’s Ivy
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League pedigree, seemed to be the only option. He compared himself to the underdog
diplomat Li Hongzhang, who famously stood up for Chinese sovereignty in the face of
foreign incursion at the turn of the twentieth century, proudly spitting to express his
discontent. Both had to make the best for his livelihood, faced with political uncertainty,
racial discrimination, and an extra-legal immigration status. According to Lee, the noble act
of spitting, perfected by Li, had become a trick of civil disobedience, an act by which a
Chinese man takes control of his own bodily jurisdiction. Ironically, spitting, like cleaning
up, was just another way of exercising autonomy.

Clean-up events continued in China throughout the early years of the People’s Republic. In
the spring of 1949, the residents of newly-liberated Beijing gathered in Tiananmen Square
for 91 days to clean the city up after the long years of war. First, they started with
residential courtyards and alleys, before moving to larger streets and moving the collected
refuse to be transported to the countryside. The People’s Liberation Army got involved,
providing almost two thousand animal-drawn vehicles and forty motor vehicles. Ultimately,
73,537 people had been mobilised in this campaign, a turning point symbolising the power
and benevolence of a new regime that cared intimately about the welfare of the public.646
During the Korean War, the Chinese Communist Party launched the “Patriotic Hygiene
Campaign… [portraying] germs as foreign enemies” to conveniently mobilise individuals to
combat what was actually a more “indigenous” type of deficiency.647 Even at schools today,
students are regularly required to take part in sweeping the floors and wiping their tables
at the end of the day.

“70 nian qian beiping ying xin da sao chu, li shi 91 tian [70 years ago in Beiping a big clean-up to
welcome the new regime, lasted a historic 91 days]”, Beijing Ribao, 23 February 2019.
647 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, 297.
228
646

Figure 5.23: Cleaning up Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1949
As Ruth Rogaski writes, these campaigns were normalised then reproduced in the People’s
Republic to “produce new citizens through the inculation of new modes of decorum and
cleanliness”.648 But more saliently, the appropriation of these cleaning initiatives for
political purposes was not unidirectional. For the citizens, the language of clean-ups has had
even more staying power as a symbolic or political tool. Chinese essayist Li Guangtian
referred to cleaning up widely in his collection of works from [title of poem/collection when
I get it]: “we have 600 million pairs of strong hands to sweep away everything that needs to
be cleaned. We have swept away imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism…”649 Mao Zedong’s
war against the “Four Olds” during the Cultural Revolution was also commonly referred to
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as “wenhua da sao chu”, or cultural cleaning up. Contemporary Chinese-language media has
used da sao chu to refer to Xi Jinping’s crackdowns on internet pornography and his “Party
Mass Line and Practice” rectification movement, and the anti-CCP Epoch Times has even
used the term to suggest a burning of the Party’s books, papers, and doctrines.650 Hygiene
movements and street clean-ups may have seemed like visible surface-level, easier-tolaunch solutions for beleaguered and cash-strapped health administrations, but their
symbolic public meaning had staying power in orienting leaders and participants towards
projects of national reconstruction and citizen consciousness-building.
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CONCLUSION
“During most of our years in Shansi Province”, recalled Percy Watson after his return to the
United States, “we thought nothing of going out even late at night on long medical trips and
during the daytime our two boys often went miles into the country to hunt partridges
without any servants to accompany them”.651 Watson also remembered fondly the local
friends he and his family had made and how at home the Fenchow Station missionaries
always felt. The almost idyllic way in which Watson remembered his time in Shanxi (plague
trips notwithstanding) paints a picture of satisfaction with real achievement in a
challenging, yet amenable, environment.

Watson left China in the 1930s, before the start of the decade of war that would end with
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The Chinese Civil War broke
out soon after Japan’s surrender in 1945, and many foreign institutions operating in China
were concerned about the political ramifications for their continued work. In a November
1946 report by a commission from the Rockefeller Foundation to assess its future work in
China, chairman of the commission Alan Gregg lamented that despite the decades of work,
the political situation now threatened the legacy of the China Medical Board. “In return for
all the effort American teachers of medicine have put in China there is now no solid, tangible
institution to show for their labors”.652 While Gregg recommended that the Rockefeller
Foundation still continue to fund the Peiping Union Medical College, other directors of the
Foundation were less optimistic about China’s resilience. Raymond Fosdick, the
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Foundation’s president, wrote in October 1946 that the future of China “looks far darker
than it did in July when your report was drafted”. China was too “unstable” with the war
“growing in bitterness and intensity”, and Fosdick was unwilling “to make a definite
commitment”.653 The Mass Educational Movement was similarly hamstrung by the political
conditions during the Civil War, unable to resume its health program in the original
demonstration areas.654

At a meeting in January 1947, the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation finally
agreed to appropriate 10 million dollars to the China Medical Board.655 The goal was to
resume full classes at Peking Union Medical College by 1951. Before the Foundation could
see the fruits of its latest donation, however, Beijing was taken by the Red Army and the
United States government froze all funds earmarked for China in 1950. In January 1951, The
Communist government nationalised the Peking Union Medical College and the prestigious
school’s ties with the Rockefeller Foundation ended.656 The reformists, in hindsight,
appreciated and craved the laissez-faire attitude of Republican China’s varied authorities
throughout their time, even while they wished for more government support for their
initiatives. The unpredictability of the Civil War was threatening to their efforts, as was the
possibility of a tightened and centralised national government in China in its aftermath.
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Thus, the end of Republican China on the Chinese mainland in 1949 was also the end of an
era for the development of public health in China – the withdrawal of missionary and
Rockefeller-developed institutions, the exodus of myriad personnel with overseas
connections, and, of course, the mass migration of millions of educated Chinese to Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and other places around the world as the People’s Republic was
established. The old order for public health infrastructure seemed to be fundamentally
changed. However, recent scholarship by historians of China and Overseas Chinese reveal
that the new regime maintained many of the existing methods and initiatives for public
health improvement. Mary Augusta Brazelton’s recent monograph on mass vaccination, for
example, details the Communist Party’s continued focus on vaccination as a key health
intervention, making use of Republican-era resources such as laboratories. In fact, the
People’s Republic went far as to promote the country’s capabilities internationally, raising
its profile in global health diplomacy.657 In addition, Xiaoping Fang’s book on the cholera
epidemic in the early 1960s features the local government’s efforts to control the disease by
implementing mandatory disease reporting, carrying of vaccine passports and recovery
certification, and social registration systems. All were methods that were introduced and
finessed during the Republican period. These measures symbiotically then enhanced the
Party’s surveillance and data collection capabilities not only to respond to health
emergencies, but also during peacetime.658 As Wayne Soon writes, even Mao Zedong’s
efforts to nativise and biomedicine while simultaneously scientising “Traditional Chinese
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Brazelton, Mass Vaccination.
Xiaoping Fang, China and the Cholera Pandemic (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2021).
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Medicine” echoed the efforts of transnational Chinese during the Republican era to promote
biomedicine to their respective overseas communities.659

As discussed in the previous chapter, the language surrounding hygiene movements often
also took on political connotations that featured prominently in the early campaigns of the
PRC. Hygiene textbooks in China in the early 1950s, for example, continued to use the
language of “germ warfare by the enemy” as a justification of why hygiene promotion and
education was so important to peasants and soldiers. “We must all be equipped with the
common knowledge of hygiene as it is the most effective way to combat germ warfare”.660
Thus the story of hygiene and public health in twentieth century China is one of trial and
error, social mobilisation, tangible engagement, and above all, continuity. The
disillusionment of the China Medical Board’s directors during the Civil War was real and
devastating for the progress of health provision in China, but their contributions ultimately
left a lasting legacy that remained, in fact, intact. The concepts of hygiene and public health
as it pertained to individuals’ daily lives were more enduring than the political institutions
that championed them.

As the case for most dissertations, there are many threads that I would have liked to explore
but would have to save for the monograph project. Fundamentally, more work is needed to
bring out the social histories and personal stories throughout the dissertation. Oral
histories and memoirs, among other personal sources, will continue to colour my research.

Wayne Soon, Global Medicine in China: A Diasporic History (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2020).
660 Dong Junqing, Weisheng xuanchuan jiaoyu [hygiene propaganda education] (Renmin Weisheng
Chubanshe, 1954), 1.
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Another such issue is the abrupt end of the dissertation’s timeframe in 1945, a decision that
was made by necessity due to the types of sources I was able to access. The book would
keep its thematic chapters on the communal spaces I have laid out, but its time frame will be
extended into the post-World War II years and into the early 1950s. I argue that political
discontinuity from China’s Civil War and regime change did not ultimately disturb the
strong social foundations of grassroots-level health and hygiene developments. Doing so
reinforces the dissertation’s assertions that the proliferation of community-level initiatives
was more impactful and durable for the health of the “public” than central governmental
structures.

I also plan to add an epilogue that reflects on contemporary trends in personal
responsibility and public health and hygiene in China today, and their reverberations
around the world. Many targeted behavioural campaigns I highlight in my dissertation, such
as mask-wearing during plague epidemics, boiling water to prevent cholera, and spitting
prohibition against rampant tuberculosis, have become ubiquitous additions to the Chinese
Communist Party’s current “Traditional Chinese Medicine” canon. This epilogue is not only
valuable but timely, as the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted profound re-evaluations of
the necessary distribution of responsibilities for health maintenance between individuals
and government structures (local, national, and international) in the twenty-first century.
Ideally, the book and its various thematic chapters will be suitable for assigned reading in
undergraduate and graduate classes in modern Chinese history and medical humanities, as
key examples of how to construct social histories of public health focused on lived
experience and individual agency.
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Another avenue to be explored is the intersection of the Republic of China within its
national borders with Chinese living in other parts of the world. This dissertation has
challenged the idea of “transnational” networks by including the stories of migrants to, not
just from China. Further attention should be paid to individuals who went back and forth. In
particular, I am fascinated with the emergence of health and hygiene products in urban
Chinatowns around the world. Chinese elites launched initiatives focused on literacy,
vaccination, and spitting prohibition, and, through these, the governments of the Republic
and People’s Republic of China claimed the inhabitants of urban Chinatowns as their own
national subjects. Fittingly, those who had been educated by missionary medical
professionals in China before continuing their careers abroad reapplied their learned
methods of health evangelism to their lower-class co-ethnics. At the same time, migrant
communities leveraged both local and global resources to improve local hygiene and their
public image, their contributions to global hygiene movements, and how particular
commodities, such as soybeans, Tiger Balm, and spittoons took on proud identities as
products of Chinese wisdom and innovation. Moreover, I hope to shed light on the
development of communities’ alternative initiatives for public health provision throughout
the twentieth century and how these created the foundation of a modern, transnational
China that still resonates culturally today. Altogether, my research reveals that the Republic
of China was not only a participant in, but an important contributor to, hygiene innovation
and reform in the twentieth century.
***
This dissertation was originally envisioned as an in-depth study of Shanxi province under
the Yan Xishan administration. But, as I progressed into my research, I realised that it was
not something I could accomplish as a graduate student. My first trip to the provincial
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archives in 2014 coincided with a round of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. Fearful of
any possible punishment from above for letting in the wrong type of researcher, the
archivists and staff sat around a folding table outside the archive doors, playing cards all
day and effectively barricading the entrance. No foreigner was allowed in without
registering with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but this could only be done through a
process with which the staff was unfamiliar. Later, in 2019, I was told by more than one
archivist and librarian (all of whom were close family contacts) that any documents
produced before Liberation had already been handed over to the central government, and
that I was unable to do much of my planned research. Whether or not this was true, the
longstanding tradition for foreign researchers of Republican China to fly under the radar at
provincial and county-level archives seemed to be coming to an ominous end.

Adding to my despondence was the coincidence of the start of the COVID-19 pandemic
before I had completed all my planned research trips. I instead sat down to review my
archival notes. I had spent so much time planning a dissertation about the sincere and
genuine care that communities a century ago took to improve their personal hygiene – wash
their hands, wear masks, stay home when sick – but it seemed as though the same lessons
were still being repeated with the same degree of urgency. Places like Hong Kong, with the
legacies of SARS still in living memory, touted its residents’ unanimous mask compliance
and civic responsibility during lockdowns, yet could still not convince more than 60% of its
most elderly population to get vaccinated.661 Old photographs of mask-wearing in
Philadelphia during the 1918 influenza pandemic resurfaced in my local media outlets, but

Hong Kong Vaccination Dashboard, accessed May 10, 2022.
https://www.covidvaccine.gov.hk/en/dashboard
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American public health authorities still could not agree on whether and how to advise the
public to wear them. How could I, as a historian, write with confidence that there had been
any progress when the overall outlook was so grim?

But as I read my way through whatever older books, manuscript collections, and digitised
sources that I could access, I began to see that what Shanxi could accomplish, ultimately,
throughout the entire country and even in Chinese communities around the world. Driven
by financial and other practical concerns, smaller administrations and societies did their
best to implement health and hygiene initiatives. The reformists were not clueless
missionaries or returned students, arrogant in their assumptions about Chinese
backwardness, but rather China’s proud representatives in a robust transnational network
of health innovation. That some of them did not look is not disqualifying, but rather calls for
historians to re-evaluate the meaning of the term “transnational”. There were, in other
words, many little Shanxis during a period of fragmented – but not dysfunctional – political
identity. The deep-dive study of Shanxi would have to wait for another project, but it
comforted me to realise that the province was not actually so unique.

Moreover, my concerns about COVID-19 could be set aside if I focused on the real-life
narratives beneath the political noise. My last research trip to the Rockefeller Archive
Center in early March 2020 was punctuated by news and discussions about the
pandemic.662 By this time, Italy was in an emergency stay-at-home situation, and

Some of these reflections have previously been published in my research report for the
Rockefeller Archive Center in May 2020. Sarah Yu, “The Daily Life of Hygiene and Public Health in
Republican China”, Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports, online, 2020.
https://rockarch.issuelab.org/resources/36672/36672.pdf
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Washington state had over 100 cases. A positive case had just been confirmed in New
Rochelle, NY in the same county as the archive. It was surreal to read about a meningitis
outbreak in the Peking Union Medical College student dormitories one minute and
discussing with the other researchers whether archives were going to remain open the next.
In addition to bouncing back and forth between time, I also found myself alternating my
analytical scale. My 1920s readings were filled with juicy specifics: hospital menus for the
sick, a trachoma diagnosis manual, step-by-step instructions for sanitising family wells, and
lists of items to include in public health visitors’ briefcases. The concurrent 2020 news, on
the other hand, featured theoretical modelling and debates from the highest levels of our
governments, with breaking news and sweeping demographic data with the occasional
global health map. I found infographics particularly unhelpful when trying to figure out
what I should be doing for my family and myself – how would the New York Times’ travel
tracking map of people leaving Wuhan help me deal with a very real toilet paper shortage?
Nor did blaming the Chinese government’s covering up of early cases make me feel better
about deciphering the Center for Disease Control’s ever-change advice on taking personal
precautions. Family members overseas messaged, concerned about the rising number of
cases, but what I kept telling them about my day-to-day experiences sounded totally
discordant to the news they had received.

What helped me out of my disillusionment was finally realising that the historical
perspective I have been able to gain to write research and my dissertation was fuelled by
my very concern about this disconnect. Committing to tell the stories of the more quotidian
concerns oriented me to write. As a historian, I may have found it simple to reduce the past
into a set of statistics and numbers. Numbers of cholera and smallpox cases were readily
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published, after all, in contemporary newspapers and medical journals. But these say little
about how our predecessors – fellow actors in the face of public health crises – went about
their daily lives and made hygiene a part of them. Honing in on the lived experiences of
individuals and their communities allows historians to view their time, and ours, with
empathy and grace.
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